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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is twofold. The first is to develop a comprehensive methodology for 
assessing performance and then to apply It to the UK electrIcIty dIstnbution network 
operators (DNOs) to analyse the impact of the regulatory reforms and privatisation 
introduced in 1990-91 on their quality, efficiency and productivity developments. The 
models and methods developed will not only be useful in the electricity distribution 
context but also applicable to other organisations that need to assess and monitor both 
their efficiency and quality. These objectives are realised through the use of the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method, the main subject area of this thesis. This method 
has recently become very popular in the empirical literature due to the minimal 
assumptions underlying it, the ease of handling multiple inputs and outputs, and its 
usefulness in the measurement of productivity. 
Performance measurement needs to keep pace with the changes in the industry. With the 
developments in energy and regulatory policy, and the enactment of the Utilities Act 2000, 
the focus of regulation has broadened from a narrow economic focus towards a wider one 
of protecting the interests of consumers. The latter includes not only price but also quality 
of service. Given this broadening focus, it is essential that performance measurement 
takes into account these aspects. 
This thesis incorporates new dimensions into efficiency and productivity measurement of 
electricity distribution network operators by taking into account the quality characteristics 
of electricity distribution operations. The dimensions of quality of service in electricity 
distribution were defined in this study namely, the quality of supply dimension and the 
quality of customer service dimension. Plausible measures of service quality were 
suggested. In order to provide a more balanced performance assessment, the new DEA 
model that incorporates the quantity as well as the quality of the services that distribution 
network operators provide their customers was used. In this study, only the quality of 
supply dimension was used in the analysis. (The quality of customer service dimension 
was omitted due to lack of data). Besides this, in order to achieve a more comprehensive 
assessment, both the operating and capital costs of distribution operations were included 
as inputs. 
The technological realities of the electricity distribution production process were captured 
in this study by taking into account the production trade-offs that exist between inputs and 
outputs. NVhen trade-offs occur, the reduction in one factor can lead to increases in another, 
thereby reducing the overall reduction. The reflection of production trade-offs provides 
more reliable results that can be utilised in management and policy making. The 
production trade-offs were accounted by developing an enhanced DEA model using 
weight restrictions that are constructed on the basis of production trade-offs. The 
enhanced DEA model thus was referred to as the 'weight-restricted' model. This model 
developed was used to evaluate the DNOs efficiencies in 1999/00. 
A new productivity index called the 'weight- restricted' Malmquist productivity index was 
also developed in order to evaluate the quality and productivity changes of the DNOs 
since 1990/91. This new index is similar in spirit to the Malmquist productivity index but 
it reflects production trade-offs and service quality rather than just quantities per se. In this 
regard, the index is more appropriate to evaluate the DNOs. The index was decomposed in 
this study into its root components of efficiency change and technological change. 
x 
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Over the last two decades, electricity industries have witnessed widespread regulatory 
reform around the world (APEC, 2000; OECD 2000). The reforms have two main 
dimensions, often concurrently: firstly, the liberahsation Of Prices and access to markets 
that had previously been restricted, and then additionally, in some cases, the privatisation 
of activities directly run by the goverm-nent; and secondly the implementation of a new 
regulatory design (Galli and Pelkmans, 2000a; 2000b). Regulatory reforms are widely 
recognised to be an important tool for enhancing efficiency, productivity and quality, and 
reducing prices (see for example OECD, 1997; OECD, 2000; APEC, 2000; Gonenc, 
Maher and Nicoletti, 2001). 
England and Wales were two of the earliest countries to have experienced electricity 
industry reforms in 1990. This involved the full package as discussed before: industry 
restructuring (that allowed liberalisation), privatisation, and the creation of a new 
regulatory framework and regulatory body, introduced simultaneously (OECD, 2002). The 
reorganisation of the industry structure comprised the horizontal separation of generation, 
to create competition at that level of the industry, and the vertical separation of the 
Li, eneration, transmission, distribution and supply sectors to promote competition where 
appropriate and facilitate effective regulation of the remaining natural monopolies. Thus, 
competition Nvas introduced in the generation and supply sector whilst the natural 
monopoly functions of transmission and distribution were regulated. Supply -was also 
subject to regulation until a fully effective competitive market came into existence in 1999. 
The restructuring of the firms in the industry was accompanied by a regulatory framework 
intended to promote efficiency and competition. The Electricity Act 1989 set up this 
regulatory framework, and established the Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) 
(merged with the Office of Gas Supply (OFGAS) in November 2000 to form the Office of 
Gas and Electricity Market (OFGEM)). The regulatory framework put in place was based 
on a RPIA 2 price control formula, to be managed by OFFER 3. The job of the regulator 
was to ensure that the natural monopoly (transmissions and distribution utilities) was 
subject to price controls. The underlying idea behind the price control approach was to 
allow prices to move in line with general price inflation after deduction of X% for annual 
efficiency gains. The effect of this was to fix ceilings on prices so that regulated 
companies' pursuit of profits was met by minimising costs. This was to mimic the 
competitive market in the absence of competition. Thus, economic efficiency was the 
prime concern of the price control regulation. 
Under the Electricity Act 1989, the regulator had a principal objective and duty to 
promote competition in generation and supply of electricity (Section 3(l))(HMSO, 1989). 
However, the New Labour Government, which came into power in 1997, had criticisms of 
the regulatory basis and this was set out in its Green Paper on Regulatory Reform (DTI, 
1998ý 1999; Helm, 2003). It was argued that that the regulation was too personal4 (Helm, 
2003), that the consumers' interests were not adequately protected and the social and 
environmental concerns Nvere not adequately reflected (DTI, 1998,1999). Consumer 
concerns became more important (as reflected in the Green Paper on Regulatory Reform) 
2 
in line with the growth of consumer consciousness. Consumer organ, sations wanted to see 
the industry made more responsive to the expectations and needs of theii- consumers. 
In addition, other factors changed the basic nature of the electricity industry: 
e rules on mergers changed in 1995 when government golden shares expired and 
take-overs were allowed (Helm, 2003); 
* multi-utility companies were emerging (EA, 200 1); 
* general concerns about the environment increased (IPCC, 1990; 1992; 1995); and 
9 specific government targets on renewables and combined heat and power energy 
were set (DTI, 2000; Mitchell, 2000). 
These developments offered new benefits for consumers, but also presented new 
challenges for economic regulation. The regulatory framework needed to be modernized 
to keep pace with developments, in order to be able to tackle emerging regulatory 
problems, adapt to rapid technological changes, and respond to consumers' needs and 
preference of high service quality. These requirements resulted in the enactment of the 
Utilities Act in 2000. 
The Utilities Act 2000 brought about fundamental changes to the regulatory framework 
applying to the electricity industry and its structure, which was set up originally under the 
Electricity Act 1989. The Utilities Act reshaped the regulatory machinery and placed the 
needs of consumers at the heart of the regulatory process. The overall objective of the 
regulator was redefined to "protect the interests of consumers ... wherever appropriate by 
promoting effective competition (Section 9-4AA(l))(HMSO, 2000). Thereby, the 
interest of consumers was raised to become the primary objective. This included the 
3 
disadvantaged consumers. The competition objective was refined as a means. i. e. 
whenever it is appropriate to the end of protecting consumers, rather than an object in 
itself The Act also stipulated that in pursuing the said objective. the regulator is required 
"to have regard to" social and environmental guidance issued by the Minister of State. 
This is to ensure that the regulator understands the Government's broader social and 
environmental context of policy objectives and priorities. The Govenu-nent issued the 
Social and Environmental Guidance to OFGEM in 2002 (DTI, 2002). This guidance has 
recently been revised (DTI, 2003a). This is seen to be complementary to the achievement 
of the longer term energy strategy policy set out in the Energy White Paper to promote a 
low carbon economy (DTI, 2003b). Thus, social welfare and environmental objectives 
were introduced alongside those of economic efficiency, although still not of equal 
importance to the pursuit of competition. 
In recent years, there has been an increasing focus on the distribution sector of the 
electricity industry by the energy regulator. Three main reasons account for this. First, the 
1990's had been a time when regulation concentrated on transmission issues. However, it 
was gradually realised that the distribution company's capital assets were twice as large as 
that of transmissions networks (EA, 2002) and that monopoly regulation was as important 
in distribution as transmission 5. 
Secondly, concerns about the environment increased (IPCC, 1990; 1992; 1995) and the 
government set targets for renewable and combined heat and power (CHP) energy (DTI, 
2000). The energy sector 6 is responsible for 95% of climate change emission in the UK, 
and the electricity sector contributes 28% to this (PIU, 2002, the Energy Review para 2.20 
and 2.21). The governments new White Paper on Energy Policy hopes to cut climate 
change gases by sixty percent of the 1990 levels by the year 2050 (DTL 2003b). 
4 
Renewable and combined heat and power (CHP) energy efficiency are the main tools of 
reducing climate change gases from the electncity sector (DETR, 2000). Renewable and 
CHP powers plants are often connected to the distribution network. A government 
working group, the Embedded Generation Working Group (EGWG) showed that the 
distribution network operators (DNOs) had no economic incentives to connect renewable 
and CHP power plants (EGWG, 200 1) 7. EGWG was then followed by the D'stributed 
Generation Co-ordinating Group (DGCG). This set up various strands of work to 
understand the technical and regulatory requirements of moving to a more sustainable 
energy system. It was realized that if more renewables and CHP were to connect to the 
distribution network, so that the government targets could be met, the basis of economic 
regulation would have to change to provide DNOs with more incentives. The various 
programmes of work at OFGEM are working towards that end. 
Thirdly, regulatory policy developed to improve incentives to DNOs in respect of quality 
of service provided to consumers (OFGEM, 1999b). This is consistent with the principal 
objective and duty of the regulator to protect the interests of consumer, as set out under 
the Utilities Act 2000. DNOs have close contact with consumers, and have a significant 
influence on the quality of service and security of supply that consumers receive. This 
third area of quality of supply within DNOs is one of the main focuses of this thesis. 
Thus, DNOs operations have taken centre stage within economic regulation. It is clear that 
the distribution network is a key area to promote the development of a sustainable energy 
system, to protect the environment, and to safeguard the interests of consumers through 
quality of supply. This thesis concentrates on the distribution function of the DNOs in 
England, Wales and Scotland. 
5 
As set out above, the Utilities Act 2000 places a principle objective on OFGEM to protect 
the interest of consumers wherever appropriate by promoting competition. However. 
DNOs are effective monopolies and the introduction of competition is not possibIc or 
practical because competing networks are too expensive to set up and have no chance of 
profitable operation. DNOs have a crucial role to play in delivering long-term security of 
supply and the quality of service that consumers receive. Additionally, distribution 
charges account for a significant proportion of the total electricity bill that consumers pay 
- approximately 30% of a typical domestic consumers' bill. In these circumstances, 
protection of consumer interest is approached in two ways: setting maximum pnces that 
can be charged for distribution services and specifying standards of service quality which 
must be achieved. These are attained through the use of price controls and mechanisms 
such as standards of perfon-nance. 
However, it has been theorized that the price cap regulation gives disincentives to 
technological investments and quality developments (Liston, 1993; Armstrong Cowan and 
Vickers, 1995; Agrell, Bogetoft and Tind, 2002) that result in quality degradation (Spence, 
1975; Vicker and Yarrow 1988; Rovizzi and Thompson, 1992). Under the price cap 
regulation a monopoly firm is not allowed to raise its prices, even if it makes investments 
to improve service quality (Kidokoro, 2002). Thus the monopoly has no incentive to 
upgrade service quality. This may result in the decrease of the actual service quality and 
postponement of innovations in quality. A decrease in quality will be equivalent to an 
increase in price (Liston, 1993). In addition to the disincentives provided by the price cap 
regulation towards quality developments, the existing quality regulation in the form of the tý 
Guaranteed and Overall Standards of Performance (GSOP) does not provide sufficient 
incentives for continuous improvement in quality. The GSOP imposes penalty payments 
on DNOs for not meeting specific quality targets. Once the companies reached the targets, 
6 
quality concerns could d1minIsh since there were no explicit mechanisms that financially 
rewarded DNOs for improved service quality. Besides this, the take-overs and mergers in 
the sector led to the concern that the companies would prioritise the usage of financial and 
management resources over the new areas acquired in order to stabilise and not provide 
sufficient resources to fulfil their obligations to ensure appropriate levels of service quality. 
Additionally, companies that know that they will be taken over may hold back on 
investments on quality improvements. In the light of all these issues, customer protection 
was enhanced through the extension of the quality regulation framework within the 
distribution sector. 
The recent extension of the quality regulation framework is called the Information and 
Incentives Project (11P) which was designed to provide incentives to DNOs to improve the 
quality of service that they deliver to consumers as a whole (OFGEM, 2001 a). Between 
April 2000-2002 the IIP project concentrated on data gathering from DNOs. Once the 
appropriate data was gathered the IIP incentive scheme was implemented in April 2002. 
The incentive scheme works to improve the level of service that DNOs provide by linking 
certain quality of service measures to the amount of revenue that they collect from 
consumers. For the first time incentive regulation could impact on DNOs revenue. DNOs 
will be financially rewarded for improved quality of service or penalised otherwise. As a 
result of the increased quality regulation, the DNOs are placed under enormous pressure to 
improve the quality of service beyond just meeting targets. 
To summanse, where competition is not feasible, price control regulation has been 
supplemented and reinforced by incentive regulation which allows companies to reap 
financial rewards for delivering outcomes that are in the interests of consumers. This is a 
7 
more mature and sophisticated regulatory system which makes demands on the DNOs to 
become more innovative and abandon the traditions of the past. 
The regulatory framework currently in place for distribution provides powerful incentives 
to DNOs to operate efficiently (and keep prices down) as well as to improve the quality of 
service they provide to consumers. OFGEM acknowledges the merits of incentive 
regulation. In developing the network monopoly price control for the forthcoming price 
control period, 2005-2010, it again puts the main emphasis on providing incentives to 
companies to improve efficiency and quality of supply (OFGEM, 2003b). The increasing 
trend of utility regulators, in UK and other countries, in providing incentives for superior 
performance (see for example Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001) is making the measurement of 
performance more important than ever. 
Performance measurement is an essential part of incentive based regulation (Weyman- 
Jones, 2001b; OFGEM, 2003f). It is the building block from which incentive regulation 
can be established. It helps set adequate regulatory incentives. RPI-X, while bringing 
important benefits, is less able than incentive regulation to promote certain outcomes from 
regulated companies while at the same time exerting pressure to keep costs down. 
Not only will performance measurement help set adequate regulatory incentives but, as 
pointed out by Agrell and Bogetoft (2000), it will also provide incentives for greater 
efficiency and quality by rewarding best performing companies and penalising those who 
do not keep up with the defined efficiency and quality standards. This is by taking 
performance into account in assessing the level of revenue a regulated company is allowed 
to recover, a crucial element of the price-cap regulation. Thus, the measurement of 
performance is needed in order to increase the DNOs performance based revenue up from 
8 
the 2% in the III? that was designed to provide incentives to DNOs to improve the quality 
of service. Currently, OFGEM is benchmarking the performance of the DNOs to inform 
its judgements on costs and revenue as part of the d1strIbutIon Price control review for the 
period 2005 to 2010 and to reward efficiency gains (see OFGEM, 2003f, CEPA, 2003). 
In line with the developments in energy and regulatory policy, and the enactment of the 
Utilities Act 2000, the focus of regulation has broadened from a narrow economic focus to 
a wider one, with a primary duty of protecting the interests of consumers while having 
regard to the social and envirom-nental concerns. There is greater emphasis on quality of 
service, long term security of supply, disadvantaged consumers, and the environment. 
Thus, it is becoming questionable whether measuring performance by price is adequate 
when regulation is increasingly expected to combine economic, social and environmental 
obligations. 
Given this broadening of the focus of regulation, it is essential that perforinance 
measurement takes all these aspects into account. In doing so, performance measurement 
will evaluate effectiveness, i. e. the extend to which the company succeeds in achieving its 
goals. By correctly reflecting the company's goals, performance measurement will 
provide results that are relevant for policy making. This study will incorporate the 
dimension of quality of service in performance measurement. But it will not look at issues 
such as system security and environmental concerns from this point on. 
The developments outlined above are also changing the role of network operators from 
acting predominantly as passive distributors to becoming market facilitators that would 
reflect the expectations and needs of consumers (Strbac and Jenkins, 2001 a). This implies 
an undiminished concern xvith quality of service and secun ty of supply. DNOs need to be 
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efficient in what is valued by consumers and make more responsible decisions by 
evaluating their impact on consumers. Accordingly, it is essential to examme DNOs 
perfon-nance when their role and incentives change, and to determine their efficiency in 
delivering what is required by consumers. 
There appear to be major inadequacies in the traditional methods of performance 
measurement within network monopolies (discussed in detail in the next section). Correct 
measures of performance based on 'real' resources and output of the company are needed, 
based on rigorous and sophisticated methods. The importance of using sophisticated 
performance measurement technique and the dangers arising from using simplistic 
measures, in the context of regulated utilities, are pointed out in Coelli, Estache, Perelman 
and Trujillo (2003). OFGEM is, in fact, seeking for more robust and sophisticated 
techniques for measuring DNOs performance (OFGEM, 2003a). This study will address 
the issue of performance measurement and utilise more rigorous and sophisticated tools in 
benchmarking best practice in order to provide 'real' measures of performance that are 
useful for guiding policy. The performance evaluation methodology developed in this 
study will not only serve the needs of OFGEM and but also other organisations that need 
to assess and monitor both efficiency and quality. 
To conclude, perfon-nance measurement is an essential part of incentive regulation 
(Weyman-Jones, 2001b, OFGEM, 2003f). Incentive regulation is increasingly the 
dominant regulatory way forward to ensure customers get what they want. Thus, 
performance measurement has to keep pace with the changes in the industry. It has to be 
based on rigorous and sophisticated techniques. This study will develop perforinance 
measurement tools that are more appropriate and that will be useful to the new regulatory 
design mechanism. 
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1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
The above introduction has set out the context for the analysis within the PhD and 
exposed the relevance of performance measurement in regulated utilities. The following 
sections set out the main aims of the study and the motivation behind it. It will also afford 
a preliminary indication of the methodology that will be utilised to achieve the core aims. 
The study aims to develop models and methods that would be more appropriate than 
existing ones for evaluating UK distribution network operators' (DNOs) perforinance and 
to apply it to the distribution network operators in order to evaluate the impact of the 
regulatory reforins and privatisation introduced in 1990-91 on their quality, efficiency and 
productivity developments. 
Specifically, this study sets out to achieve the following objectives: 
1. To define the dimensions of quality in electricity distribution and suggest plausible 
measure(s) of service quality in this sector. 
2. To account for the quality dimension in the measurement of efficiency and 
productivity in electricity distribution. 
3. To account for trade-offs between inputs and/or outputs that exists in the production 
process in the measurement of efficiency and productivity. 
4. To develop a 'weight-restricted' productivity model based on the Malmquist 
productivity index. 
5. To measure the relativc efficiency of the distribution network operators in 1999/00. 
6. To measure and analyse the quality and productivity change of the distribution 
network operators over the post-reform post-privatisation period 1990/91 to 1999/00. 
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1.3 Motivation 
The motivation behind the study was to overcome the shortcomings in the approaches that 
have been used to evaluate the performance of the DNOs, and to improve and extend the 
existing literature. To assess performance, OFGEM has so far used econometric 
techniques 8 (OFGEM, 1999b) and various performance indicators (see for example, the 
annual Report on Distribution and Transmission System Performance). However, these 
methods are either too simplistic, not defensible or unsuitable for use in evaluating DNOs 
which use multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs. Econometric techniques (e. g. least 
square regression) that estimate the relationship between costs and costs drivers can 
produce misleading results in small sample size (as is in our case) (DTe, 2000). In 
addition, econometric techniques are based on strong assumptions about the form of the 
technology of production. Empirical results derived using regression estimate the average 
as opposed to frontier technology. 
Arguably, the frontier method (which will be described in further detail in Chapter 2) is 
more suitable in the context of regulation, particularly at the early stages of regulatory 
reform (CEPA 2003) when a priority objective is to reduce the performance gap among 
the utilities (Jarnasb and Pollitt, 2001). This is because, from a regulatory point of view, 
the frontier method has a stronger focus on performance variation between firms and can 
be used for setting firm-specific efficiency requirements (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). 
Moreover, at the early stages of regulatory reform not much is known about the potential 
for cost reduction and the underlying efficiency frontier (CEPA 2003). In fact, the frontier 
method has become a popular method among electricity regulators. Agrell and Bogetoft 
(2000) report that the fi-ontier method, called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), has been 
proposed or in use by electricity regulators in a number of countries such as Netherland, 
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Norway, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand and Finland. In the UK, the regulator had 
appointed consultants Cambridge Economics Policy Associates (CEPA) to produce a 
report examining the important considerations for the regulator In using benchmarkIng in 
the 2005 distribution price control review. The consultants have suggested the use of DEA 
in benchmarking the efficiency of the electricity distribution businesses in the forthcoming 
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price control review (CEPA, 2003) 
Recent studies by Weyman-Jones and associates (for example, Bums and Weyman-Jones 
(1994,1996,1998) and Tilley and Weyman-Jones (1999)), WART (1999), Weyman-Jones 
(2001 a) and Hattori, Jamasb and Pollitt (2002) were based on frontier estimation 
techniques. Of these studies, all except Bums and Weyman-Jones (1996) used the non- 
parametric linear programming approach called DEA and accordingly relied on simple 
assumptions about the technology. The subject of all these studies was the UK DNOs. 
None of these studies, however, attempted to account for quality of service in the 
measurement of utilities efficiency and productivity. Generally, the exclusion of quality 
dimensions limits the practical value of performance measurement in organisations where 
maintaining and improving service quality is critical to achieving performance objectives. 
The exceptions to the above are studies by Bums and Weyman-Jones (1998) and Tilley 
(2000) (doctoral study) who made useful early attempts to incorporate quality in 
productivity measurement. These studies measured productivity, incorporating different 
inputs and different dimensions of quality in different models to ensure robustness. 
However, quality was captured with a single index dimension only and as the models did 
not incorporate weights restrictions the quality variable could be ignored where there was 
poor perfonnance (this is elaborated in page 60). 
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This study thus aims to build on and extend the earlier work by accounting for the qualltv 
dimension of service in efficiency and productivity measurement in a more advanced. and 
effective manner. By incorporating quality as well as the quantity of service. a balanced 
assessment of the companies overall performance will be obtained. The task of accounting 
for quality within efficiency and productivity measure is extremely complex. It is 
important to assess carefully the dimensions of quality in electricity distribution and 
ensure that the quality measures reflect what consumers actually value and that it can be 
measured. Hence, this study will first define the dimensions of quality in electricity 
distribution and suggest plausible measure(s) of service quality in electricity distribution 
before proceeding to include quality dimensions in efficiency and productivity 
measurement. 
This study will focus on the 14 UK distribution network operators' (DNOs) performance 
over a ten year period after the reform and privatisation (1990/91 to 1999/00). In this 
regard, this study will do a comparative evaluation on a larger number of utilities than 
before., including as well the two Scottish DNOs. The DNOs efficiency will firstly be 
evaluated using the popular non-parametric linear programming technique called Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This approach to efficiency measurement has many 
advantages. Among others, it is based on multi input-output frontier representations of the 
technology, which can easily handle multiple input-output producers such as the DNOs. 
As such, variables reflecting quality can be incorporated into the analysis. In the empirical 
context, the results are obtained by using linear programming, and thus, they are easy to 
compute and rely on minimum assumptions (this is discussed in page 32). Further, this 
approach can be used with the Malmquist productivity index to measure productivity 
change over time (Coelli, Rao and Battese 1998). In this study. the productivity of DNOs 
will also be evaluated using the Malmquist productivitv index that incorporates qualitv of 
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service delivery. This index can be decomposed i into multiple components to give insights 
into the root sources of productivity and its change. 
It may be noted that there are two problems with the above standard approaches to 
efficiency and productivity measurement. First, the incorporation of quality in efficiency 
evaluation implies a structural increase in the number of variables in the model. The 
increase in the number of variables in the DEA model with a relatively small sample size 
(as is the case in this study) has the effect of reducing the discriminatory power of the 
model leading to many firms rated as efficient or productive and making the interpretation 
of the results meaningless. It has been acknowledged that the small sample size caused by 
a small (and declining) number of utilities is problematic in regulatory studies (Weyman- 
Jones, 2001 a; Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 2003). One way to remedy this is to increase the 
sample size. Increasing the sample size can give better discrimination to the empirical 
results. A rule of thumb suggested by Golany and Roll (1989) is that the sample size 
should be at least twice the number of inputs and output variables to get good 
discrimination. In a regulatory setting, the sample size can be increased by adding 
overseas utilities to domestic samples, but the issue of data comparability makes it a 
complex task. This is because the overseas utilities have different ownership structures, 
operate in different regulatory environments, have different levels of government 
involvement, and vary in the quality of data collection, auditing and reporting and thus are 
seldom comparable 10. Nevertheless, companies under evaluation obviously need to be 
assured that the comparative efficiency assessment is rigorous and tenable. 
The second problem with the standard approach is that the DEA models only consider the 
quantity of inputs and outputs, and do not take into account the trade-offs that exists 
between inputs and/or outputs. This is due to the total weighting freedom possessed by the 
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DEA model that allows weights to be assigned in contrary to the known trade-offs in the 
production process. This may result in inappropriate estimates of efficiency and 
productivity, giving doubt to the relevance of the results to the question of policy. Trade- 
off (closely related to the economic concept of marginal rates of 
sub stituti on/transfo rmation 11) describes the ability of the company to replace or substitute 
one good for another so as to maintain the same level of efficacy. The existence of trade- 
offs between inputs may be supported by the fact that companies with significantly 
different input mixes produce outputs at similar levels. The importance of considering 
trade-offs in efficiency assessment in the utility industries was highlighted in 
"Performance and Benchmarking" article published in The Utilities Journal (1999a). It 
was underscored that ignoring trade-offs can lead to unrealistic cost reduction targets set 
by the regulator and may result in companies being unable to finance themselves. This 
could have a lasting impact on the structure of the industry and services it provides to the 
key stakeholders - the customers. Thus, in order to obtain results that are relevant for 
policy making, it is essential to use models that correctly reflect the technological realities 
of the production process. As pointed out by Laitner, DeCanio and Peters (2000), 
successful modelling "must reflect what people and organisations actually do". 
The need to improve the discriminatory power of the DEA model 12 , and more generally to 
obtain performance measures that reflect the technological realities of the production 
process has motivated the improvement of the standard DEA model. The extended models 
would be more appropriate for evaluating DNOs who have to make trade-offs between 
competing production factors. This is currently even more important in light of OFGEMs' 
(2003a) proposal to assess DNOs efficiency through explicit consideration of trade-offs at 
the next price control re, \,, Iew (2005-2010) and beyond. OFGEM recognises that "having 
the lowest possible cost for a particular activity does not imply greatest efficiency, 
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because of trade-offs with other elements of cost and outputs delivered" (OFGEM, 2003a). 
Since efficiency is a key input in detennining of pce ceilings under the Pnce cap 
regulation, as well as the basis of incentive regulation, the benchmarking of performance 
by rigorous, defensible and sophisticated methodologies is of great importance. 
Following on from the above discussion, this study will develop extended DEA models. 
referred to as 'weight-restncted' DEA models, with enhanced discriminatory power and 
which reflect the details of the technology of production. This will be achieved by 
incorporating weight restrictions constructed on the basis of realistic production trade-offs 
using the trade-off approach devised by Podinovski (2000,2002). These weight 
restrictions curtail the total weighting freedom of the DEA model in assigning weights to 
inputs and outputs, and thus improve the discrimination power of the model and also 
ensure that the ratio of input-output weights obtained by the model correctly reflects the 
trade-offs that exists in the production process. In this way, the assessed efficiency will be 
compatible with economic theory since they are consistent with the economic notion of 
input and/or output substitution. Also, the results obtained can promote insights that will 
provide useful policy guidance. 
In addition, this study will develop a modification of the input Malmquist productivity 
index by incorporating weight restrictions based on production trade-offs in the DEA 
models utilised to calculate the index, and thereby reflecting the technological realities of 
the production process. The new index is referred to as the 'weight-restricted' Malmquist 
index as it is based on 'weight-restncted' DEA models. This new index will be 
decomposed into components that reflect efficiency change and technological change, and 
thus will provide additional insights into the root source of productivity changes. The 
extended DEA and Malmquist models developed in this study will then be applied to the 
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DNOs in order to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of the reforms 
introduced in 1990 on the DNOs quality, efficiency and productivity. 
This study should prove valuable not only to regulators, but also companies and other 
organisations in various settings. It will provide a key reference for OFGEM regarding the 
implementation of the price control process and the establishment of adequate regulatory 
incentives. The extended models developed in this study will be useful in imposing 
comparative competition" between intrinsically monopolistic utilities and provide 
performance incentives to them. The analysis can also be used to evaluate the impact of 
different policy measures on the performance of utilities. The study's findings will be a 
useful reference for implementing and assessing utility regulation world-wide. The 
extended models developed are not restricted to specific electricity utility applications, but 
can also be applied to other organisations, in need of assessing and monitoring both their 
productivity and quality. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This chapter has introduced the background to the electricity industry in the UK and has 
exposed the relevance of performance measurement in regulated utilities. It set out the 
academic rationale underpinning the study, outlined its main aims and objectives, and 
provided a preliminary indication of the methodological tools that will be utillsed to 
achieve the core aims outlined. 
Chapter 2 will introduce the theory and methods of efficiency and productivity 
measurement, by focusing on frontier methods. Particular emphasis will be given to the 
DEA method and its dynamic counterpart, the Malmquist index. It will also review the 
relevant empirical literature on disti-ibution network ut'lltles performance measurement. 
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The DEA models for the evaluation of quality, efficiency and productivity of DNOs will 
be developed in Chapter 3. It will also include the refinement of data to improve its 
quality. The models developed in Chapter 3 will be applied in Chapter 4 to the sample of 
UK DNOs to evaluate their efficiency in 1999/00. The DEA models will be further 
extended by incorporating weight restrictions based on realistic production trade-offs and 
then reapplied. Chapter 5 will develop the 'weight-restricted' Malmquist index that is 
based on 'weight-restricted' DEA models for the measurement of productivity and quality 
changes. This index will then be applied to the DNOs to evaluate their quality and 
productivity changes over the post-reform and post-privatisation period, 1990/91 to 
1999/00. 
Finally, Chapter 6 will summarise the preceding chapters, discuss the results and give key 
conclusions. It will also highlight the main theoretical, empirical and methodological 
contributions made by this research, discuss the implications of the findings in relation to 
policy making and management of electricity utilities and provide directions for future 
research. 
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1 This is with the exception of nuclear power. 
'Retail price index minus A' with A' being a percentage reduction in total costs, for 
example RPIA where X=3 for the price control 1995-2000. 
3 There is extensive literature on the history of reforms in the UK. See for example EA 
(2002), Newberry (1999), Surrey (1996) and Annstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1995). 
4 Helm (2003) argued that the independence of regulator from politics resulted in 
personalisation. With very general duties, the sort of regulation that resulted depended 
heavily on the character and interpretation placed upon the duties by the individual in 
whom they were invested. 
5 In 2000/01, the capital assets of the distribution system were f 13,190 million compared 
to E6,498 million of the transmission system. In terms of line length, the distribution 
system stretched 812,380 circuit km compared to 24,673 km of the transmission system 
(EA, 2002). 
6 The energy sector includes transport, domestic heating, industry and business, and 
electricity sectors which consume fossil fuel that result in climate change emissions (PIU, 
2002). 
7 Embedded Generation Working Group -a joint DTI, DETR, OFGEM Working Group 
convened between March 2000 and March 2001, see www. dti. gov. uk/energy/electrici . 
8 In its efficiency assessment of the DNOs, in the third Distribution Price Control Review 
(OFGEM, 1999b), OFGEM used Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to regress cost against a 
composite scale variable for the year 1997/98. The composite scale variable was 
constructed by adjusting customer numbers for differences in units distributed and length 
of network. Having established the relationship between costs and scale, in order to define 
the frontier, OFGEM rotated the regression line about the intercept with the y-axi i it is until i 
reached the lowest cost point. This approach ignores the cost-scale relationship established 
by the data, making the regression analysis redundant apart from defining the intercept. 
The construction of the composite variable and the manual adjustment of the regression 
line introduced bias into the analysis. This approach is not Corrected Ordinary Least 
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Square (COLS) which shifts the regression line parallel to the original line until it meets 
the lowest cost point such that the relationship between costs and scale remains. 
9 The use of regression analysis was suggested to assess the validity of the DEA results. 
10 The difficulties and controversial issues in international benchmarking have been 
discussed in Jamasb and Pollitt (2003), WART (2001), REGGEN (1998), QCA (1999) 
and ESAA (1994). 
11 The notion of trade-off is closely related to the economic concept of marginal rates of 
sub stitution/transformation. Whilst the latter reflects the exact proportions in which factor 
substitution occurs, the former shows the approximate proportions in which factors are 
substituted. 
12 Another approach to improve discrimination proposed by Andersen and Petersen (1993) 
is by ranking the efficient units by computing 'super-efficiency' scores. However, their 
approach does not remedy the problem of the disregard of the technological realities of the 
production process due the models' flexibility in assigning weights. Furthermore, it has 
been pointed out by Xue and Harker (1999) that the approach gives rise to conceptual 
problems when applied to the case of variable returns to scale and non-discretionary inputs 
(the latter is used in this study). 
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Chapter 2 
A Critical Review of Theories, Methods and Studies Related to 
Efficiency and Productivity 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the context of the study and showed the relevance of 
performance measurement in regulated utilities. It also set out the academic rationale 
underpinning the study, outlined its main alms and provided a preliminary indication of 
the methodological tools that will be utilized to achieve the core aims outlined. This 
chapter introduces the main concepts of efficiency and productivity and the methods for 
their evaluation,, and reviews the main literature contributions to their evaluation. The 
purpose of the chapter is to provide an analytical and technical framework for the 
empirical analysis that will be presented in the second part of the thesis. The presentation 
is selective and mostly focuses on frontier analysis methods to efficiency and productivity 
evaluation. Particular emphasis is given to the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method, 
which is important for the achievement of the research objectives of the study. 
Productivity and efficiency are two entwined concepts; the foriner incorporates the latter. 
Productivity is an absolute concept. It is defined as the ratio of output to input, or in the 
general case, the ratio qf an index of outputs over an index of inputs consumed to produce 
I. t. Productivity can change through time due to technological change (i. e. the creation of 
new technologies) and efficiency change (i. e. improvements in the use of existing 
technologies). Thus, productivity measurement incorporates efficiency measurement. On 
the other hand, efficienc--v is a relative concept. The efficiency of a producer is defined by 
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comparing its input and output to those best perfonning of its peers. These are the 
producers that use the least input to produce certain output or conversely, they produce 
maximum output from given input. In this sense, efficiency Is defined by companng 
observed and optimal values of inputs and outputs. In this comparison, the optimum is 
defined in tenns of production possibilities e. g. a production frontier and efficiency is 
labelled technical. 
The definition of efficiency can be broadened to overall (or cost) efficiency by defining 
the optimum in terms of a behavioural goal. In this case, efficiency is labelled economic 
and is measured by comparing observed and optimum cost, revenue or profit, or whatever 
is pursued, subject to appropriate constraints on quantities (i. e. reflecting the technology 
of production) and prices (i. e. reflecting the market conditions). 
This chapter is organised as follows. The chapter starts with the concept and measurement 
of efficiency in Section 2.2. It includes a description of the theory underlying the 
representation of the technology of production and the efficiency frontier which is based 
on the Axiomatic Approach (Koopmans, 195 1; Debreu, 195 1; Shepard, 1970). Section 2.3 
gives a brief overview of the main approaches to efficiency and productivity measurement 
and the motivation to use DEA. As DEA is the broad subject area of this thesis, Section 
2.4 provides a detailed introduction to the DEA method. It includes a review on the main 
DEA models for the evaluation of efficiency before discussing the extension in DEA in 
terms of weight restrictions. Section 2.5 deschbes the measurement of productivity using 
the Malmquist index approach and presents some extensions that will be used later in the 
empirical part of the thesis. The applications to the case of electricity distribution are 
reviewed in Section 2.6 and Section 2.7 summarises and concludes. 
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2.2 The Concept and Measurement of Technical Efficiencý 
As mentioned above, overall efficiency has two components: technical efficiency and 
allocative efficiency. The technical component refers to the ability to avoid waste by 
producing as much output as input usage allows, or by using as little input as output 
production allows. The allocative or price component refers to the ability to combine 
inputs and outputs in optimal proportions in light of prevailing prices. Therefore. overall 
efficiency is the ability to reduce inputs or augment outputs proportionately to minimise 
costs. Because this study performs an analysis of technical efficiency, this chapter will 
focus on technical efficiency only. 
A formal definition of the concept of technical efficiency was provided by Koopmans 
(195 1). According to him, in a multiple outputs multiple inputs case, technical efficiency 
is a situation such that it is impossible to increase even just one output without either 
decreasing at least one other output or increasing at least one input; or, vice versa, it is 
impossible to decrease even just one input without either increasing another input or 
decreasing at least one output. In other words, it is the maximum attainable output given a 
set of inputs, or the minimum level of inputs required to produce a given level of output. 
A measure for technical efficiency was introduced by Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957). 
Their measure is defined as one minus the maximum equiproportionate reduction in all 
inputs that still allows continued production of given outputs. A score of uni I 
technical efficiency because no equiproportionate Input reduction Is possible, and a score 
less than unity indicate the severity of technical inefficiency. 
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In order to understand the differences between the Debreu-Farrell measure and Koopmans 
definition of efficiency, we first relate both to the structure of production technology. The 
technology ofproduction is the relationship between the inputs used by a productive unit, 
referred to as a Decision Making Unit (DMU), and the amount of outputs obtained. 
Consider the case in which a set of j=1,..., n DMUs each uses a vector XE 93, ' of 
observed inputs to produce a vector Y c: 91' , of observed outputs. 
Thus, DMU j uses 
amount of xij input i, i to produce amount of yj of output s, s= It is 
possible to represent the production possibility set (PPS) with an input-output set which 
denotes all the input-output feasible combinations corresponding to a certain production 
process. More formally this is represented by: 
T=f (X, Y)l XE=- 93, ' can produce YE=- 93, ' 1. 
The input possibility set L(Y), for each Y is defined by: 
L(Y) = fXI(X, Y) E=- TI 
And the output possibility set P(X), for each X is defined by: 




The following properties are postulated for the production possibility set (see also Banker, 
Charnes and Cooper 1984; Banker and Thrall, 1992; Banker, 1993): 
Postulate 1: Inclusion of observations. The observed (Xj, Yj )eT, for all j= 1,..., n. 
Postulate 2: Convexity. If (Xj, Yj ) cz T, j=1,..., n and kj ýý 0 are nonnegative 
In ,=n In . 
scalars such that -, dj=l i1, then 
(jj=I kj xj ý -. dj=l jyj) c T. 
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Postulate3: Inefficiency. 
(a) If (X, Y) e T, and X ý! X, then (X, Y) c- T. 
(b) If (X, Y) E=- T, and Y:! ý Y, then (X, Y) E=- T. 
This property is sometimes referred to asftee disposability. 
Postulate 4: Ray Unboundedness. If (X, Y) c T, then (kX, kY) cT for any k>0. 
This property is also called the constant returns-to-scale assumption. 
Postulate 5: Minimum Extrapolation. If a production possibility set T' satisfies 
postulates 1,2,3 and 4 above, then T c-- T. 
The production possibility set T satisfying the above postulates can be constructed from 
the observed DMUs (Xj, Yj) 0=1,..., n) as follows: 
«X, Y) 1X> EjkjXj, Y< EjkjYj, kj > Oý. (2.4) 
The 'distance function' of an input set L(Y) defined by Shepard (1970) is given by: 
DI(X, Y) =I /h(X, Y) where h(X, Y) = min f0: OX EE L(Y), 0>01. (2.5) 
This distance function is equivalent to the definition of efficiency of Debreu (1951) and 
Farrell (1957); it is defined as the equiproportionate increase (in outputs) or decrease (in 
inputs) necessary to reach the frontier. It is reciprocal to the Debreu-Farrell input measure 
of technical efficiency given by: 
FI(X, Y) = min 10: OX EE L(Y) 1. 
Thus, 




The boundwy for inputs that can be used to produce a given combination of outputs is 
defined by 
Ls(Y) = {Xj h(X, Y) =II 
and the efficient subset is represented by 
(2.8) 
LEM =-- f XI h(X, Y) =I with X! ý X => X# L(Y) unless X= Xj. (2.9) 
Thus, each production possibility set has a boundary, which is defined by a subset of 
DMUs that satisfy the property of efficiency. 
Technical efficiency can also be measured with an output orientated measure. The 
boundary for outputs that can be produced consuming a given combination of inputs is 
defined by 
PS(X) = JYJ h'(X, Y) = 11 (2.10) 
The Debreu-Farrell output measure of technical efficiency is defined as 
Fo(X, Y) = h'(X, Y) = maxf a: (FY EE P(X)). 
The technical efficiency measure is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The production possibility set 
was defined on the constant returns-to-scale assumption and the illustration is developed 
under this assumption. Consider a set of DMUs each producing a single output (Y) using 
two inputs (XI andX2) in varying quantities. The DMUs inputs are normalized so that 
they can be represented in a two-dimensional diagram. In Figure 2.1, the line connecting 
DMUs A, Bý C and D form the technical efficient ftontier or boundary. Note that the 
frontier has a piecewise linear shape. All the data points can be enveloped within the 
region enclosed by the frontier line, the horizontal line spanning from C and the vertical 
line spanning from A. This region is called the production possibility set. This means that 
the observed points are assumed to provide (empirical) evidence that production is 
27 
possible at the rates specified by the coordinates of any point in this region. The efficient 
frontier dominates all the production bundles that are on the interior of the frontier which 
means that a DMU on the efficient frontier can produce more or equal amount of output 
compared to a DW on the interior and use less input in at least one dimension (defined 
on the input side) 13 . For example, in Figure 2.1, A dominates E since It uses less Input X, 




ure 2.1 Debreu-Farrell Technical Efficiency Measurement 
XI/Y Fig 
As can be seen, it is possible for the DMUs that lie on the interior of the frontier to 
radially contract their input usage without reducing the given level of output Y, and 
therefore they are inefficient. For example, E is inefficient. Its technical inefficiency is 
OE' 
given by the ratio -- This means that the inefficiency of E is to be evaluated by a OE 
combination of A and B because the point E' (a composite DMU) is on the line 
corinecting these two points. A and B are called the rýference set or the peer group for E. 
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DMUs A. B, and C are considered efficient as they cannot radially contract one of their 
inputs without worsening the other or reducing the output. It is also worth noting that D, 
even if it lies on the frontier and then is considered efficient according to the Farrell 
measure, is not according to the more restrictive definition of efficiency of Koopmans. It, 
in fact, contains slack in input XI, i. e. it is possible to reduce X, input usage without 
reducing the level of output produced. 
Thus, the Debreu-Farrell measure of technical efficiency does not coincide with the 
Koopmans definition of technical efficiency. Koopmans definition is sti-ingent, requinng 
simultaneous membership in both efficient subsets, while the Debreu-Farrell measure, 
being the reciprocal of distance function, only requires membership in the boundary. This 
is a shortcoming of the Debreu-Farrell measure. However, the practical significance of the 
problem depends on how many observations lie outside the cone spanned by relevant 
efficient subsets. The problem disappears in much econometric analysis in which the 
parametric form of the function used to represent production technology (for instance 
Cobb Douglas) imposes equality between boundaries and efficient subsets. The problem 
can be important in the linear programming approach in which the non-parametric form 
used to represent the boundary of production possibilities imposes slack by assumption 
(see discussion in Section 2.4, page 37). If the problem is deemed significant in practice, 
Lovell (1993) suggests that the Debreu-Farrell efficiency scores and slacks be reported 
separately, side by side. A lot of effort has been directed towards finding a solution to the 
problem. The two most popular options have been to report the radial measure and ignore 
possible slack or to report a combination measure. 
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2.3 Main Methods and the Motivation for Data Envelopment Analysis 
The measurement of efficiency and productivity can be conducted using two different 
approaches: those based on average practice in the sample and those based on best 
practice. In other words, respectively, non-frontier and frontier approaches. As was 
referred to in the introduction (page 12) the frontier approach was selected for this study, 
in view of its popularity and its ability to better deal with the issue of regulation. The two 
main frontier approaches are the linear programming non-parametric technique of Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA; Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978) and the econometric 
parametric techniques of Corrected Ordinary Least Square (COLS) and Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA; see e. g. Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The former are usually 
deterministic, though some contributions for a stochastic version (SDEA) have been 
recently developed by the literature (see, e. g. Olesen and Petersen, 1995; Li, 1998). The 
latter can be both detenninistic and stochastic but as the lack of statistical noise is a strong 
limitation they are more commonly used in their stochastic version. In the econometric 
approach, standard estimation techniques (e. g., regression analysis, maximum likelihood) 
are used to estimate production functions from which efficiency and technical change can 
be inferred. In the non-parametric DEA approach, a best-practice function is empirically 
built from observed inputs and outputs by means of linear programming. A review of 
these frontier approaches and their relative merits can be found in Lovell and Schmidt 
(1988), CAA (2000) and CEPA (2003). 
As was stated on page 14 of this thesis, in this study the DEA approach is used in order to 
estimate various measures of efficiency, productivity and quality change. DEA is a 
convenient method of analyzing performance in electricity distribution for several reasons. 
For example, the electricity distribution service is clearly a multiple-output activi I ity. 
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Multiple outputs are easily incorporated in the DEA approach. However, it is d, fficult to 
work with multiple outputs in the traditional neo-classical production function based 
approaches (Lovell and Schmidt, 198 8; BAA, 200 1). DEA also has the advantage that it is 
less 'data- intensive' than econometric methods. The sample size in our study is restricted 
to 14 DNOs. The techniques based on econometncs methods may be inappropnate when 
there is only a relatively small sample size (Bauer et al., 1997). Econometric methods 
require a large sample size for statistical reasons (Lovell and Schmidt, 1988; BAA, 2001) 
and tend to be less effective with small sample size (DTe, 2000). If one or two companies 
in a small sample size have a particular characteristic in common and are also unusually 
inefficient, the regression analysis will indicate that this characteristic is a cost driver 
because it is statistically correlated with high costs. Thus, statistics become unreliable if 
the sample size is too small. As a result, regression that estimates the relationship between 
cost and cost driver can produce misleading results in small samples. Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) is still more vulnerable to the effect of small sample size, since the 
decomposition of variation in the sample into random (i. e. statistical noise) and efficiency 
related components requires a large number of data points to be statistically significant. In 
fact, the Cambridge Economics Policy Associates (CEPA, 2003) background study on the 
use of benchmarking to assess the efficiency of electricity distribution businesses for the 
2005 distribution price control review, prepared for OFGEM, rejected the use of SFA on 
the basis of the small sample size. They proposed the use of DEA for measuring 
efficiency and the use of Corrected Ordinary Least Square (COLS) for assessing the 
validity of the DEA scores. The use of DEA is therefore motivated by data restrictions, 
and the ease of incorporating multiple inputs and outputs. The latter Is important, Since 
variables reflecting quality can be incorporated into the analysis (a main objective of our 
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study), e. g. by augmenting the vector of inputs and outputs (Fare. Grosskopf and Roos, 
1995). 
Another virtue of DEA , is that it does not require the specification of an explicit 
functional 
form for the production frontier or an explicit statistical disti-ibution for the inefficiency 
terms, unlike the econometrics methods. Thus, as emphasised in the introduction (page 
14)5 it is able to estimate efficiency with minimal prior assumptions about the production 
technology or the sampling distribution. Other strengths of DEA are that it ensures that 
substitution possibilities between multiple inputs used and outputs provided are explicitly 
taken into account to form a comprehensive measure of performance, and it can account 
for the influence of the characteristics of the operating environment on efficiency by 
directly including operating environment variables into the DEA model. Therefore, DEA 
better reflects the different operating enviromnent and different objectives of the unit 
being assessed. 
The DEA method is not without drawbacks, of course. The main disadvantages of DEA 
are that statistical inference cannot be performed on firm specific estimates with standard 
techniques, and it is more susceptible to data measurement error and problems of outliers 
in data. Even so, there are some recent developments of non-parametric statistical tests for 
DEA models which can be found in Banker (1993,1996). Also, the results drawn from 
Banker, Gahd and Gorr's (1993) DEA versus SFA comparison 'show DEA to produce 
more accurate efficiency estimates ... even with remarkably 
high measurement error 
present'. SFA only gains the upper hand when measurement error reaches a threshold of 
betxveen ± 17% and 45% of observed output values (depending on sample size, 
technolo,,, \, and the distribution of efficiency). 
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2.4 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
DEA is a benchmarking technique developed by Chames, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). It 
measures the relative efficiency of several homogeneous DN/fUs in their use of multiple 
inputs to produce multiple outputs. We say relative efficiency because its measurement by 
DEA is with reference to a subset of efficient 'best practice' DN4Us which the rest of the 
DN4-Us are compared with. Each DMU represents an observed correspondence of input- 
output levels. 
DEA estimates technical efficiency by first constructing a production possibility set (PPS) 
assumed to contain all input-output correspondences which are feasible and then 
estimating the maximum feasible expansion of the output or contraction of the input levels 
of the DMUs within the PPS. The estimation of the efficiency of DMUs, in the framework 
of DEA, is conducted using linear programming models. 
The DEA models that provide a radial measure of inefficiency require one to choose 
between an input and an output orientation. The objective of the input-orientated model is 
to minimise inputs while producing at least the given output levels. In contrast, the output- 
orientated model attempts to maximise outputs while using no more than the observed 
amount of any input. The choice between an input-onentated model and an output 
orientated one can be based upon considerations of which factors are more easily 
controlled by the DN4U. Thus for instance , if producers are required to meet market 
demand, and can freely adjust input usage, then an input-orientated model is appropriate. 
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2.4.1 The DEA Models 
2.4.1.1 The Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) Model 
The CCR model was initially proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978. To 
present fori-nally the CCR model, consider a set of n DMUs, j=l,..., n, each consuming m 
inputs, xij ,i=: 1,..., m to produce s outputs, yj ,r=1,..., s. The objective is to measure the 
efficiency of DMU jo relative to the best observed practice in the sample of n DMUs. It is 
possible to obtain a measure of relative efficiency of DMU jo that is defined by the ratio of 
a weighted sum of its outputs to a weighted sum of its inputs. To this end, weights are 
attached to each DMUs inputs and outputs. These weights are not defined a priori, and 
they are chosen in order to maximise the efficiency ratio of DNIU jo so that they are shown 
in the 'best possible light'. 
For an input orientated assessment under CRS, the relative efficiency of a DMU jo is 
obtained from the following model: 




eo = max _r m 
I ij 0 
s 
Iuy 





UrlVi ý! o Vrandi 
34 
where u, and v, are the weights for the output and input, respectively. The ratio of the 
weighted outputs to the weighted inputs is maximised subject to the constraint that no 
other DNIU has an efficiency ratio exceeding unity using the same set of weights. The 
efficiency score is bounded between zero and one. DMU jo is said to be efficient (has a 
score of unity) if no other DMU or combination of DMUs can produce more than DNIU jo 
on at least one output without producing less in some other output or requiring more of at 
least one input. Note that the PPS was defined based on the constant returns-to-scale 
assumption and the CCR model is also developed under this assumption. 
The CCR model is a fractional model but can be transformed into an ordinary linear form 
by scaling either the denominator or the numerator of the objective function equal to a 
constant such as I (see Chames, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978). The next sections present the 
equivalent linear programming (LP) models (multipliers forinulation), and their duals 
(envelopment formulation) for computing efficiency within the DEA framework. 
2.4.1.1.1 The CCR Model as a Linear Programming Problem 
Assuming constant returns to scale, the technical efficiency of DW jo can be determined 
either under input reduction or output expansion orientations, corresponding to 
fon-nulations (2.13) and (2.14). These models result from the linearization of the fractional 
model (2.12). The primal and their corresponding dual in the input and output orientations 
are presented as follows: 
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The primals in (2.13) and (2.14) are also referred to as the multiplier formulation of the 
DEA model. u, and vi are the multipliers or weights for the output and input, respectively, 
and treated as variables in the model. 
The relative efficiency score for DMU jo is given by eo in (2.13) and ho in (2.14). Due to 
the CRS assumption, the relative efficiency score of the output orientated models relate to 
that of the input orientated model via eo = I/ho (see Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978). 
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The duals in (2.13) and (2.14) are also called the envelopment formulation of the DEA 
model. In the envelopment formulation, using the case of the input orientated model, the 
model seeks a set of ), values which minimise Oo to 0* and identifies a point within the 0 
PPS which uses the lowest proportion 0* of input levels of DMU jo while offering output 0 
levels which are at least as high as those of DMU jo. This point is a composite DMU 
nn 
corresponding to the linear combination of efficient DMUs kj'xij, kj'yj , with i i 
Y, 
j=1 i=1 
=11..., m and r=1,..., s. Oo is termed the technical input efficiency of DMU jo. The 
efficiency score 00 is bounded between zero and one. Efficient units will have a score of 
unity, while inefficient ones will have a score less than unity. 
Under the assumptions of the PPS presented in Section 2.1, it can be said that 
nn 
lkj*xij, lkjy, 
j outperforms (OOxjO, yj,, ) when 0* < 1. With regard to this property the 0 
j=l i=l 
input surplus and the output shortfalls is defined as s- (=- 93' and s' E: -: 93', respectively and 
the "slack" is identified as 
nn 




with s- ý! 0, s+ >- 0- 
The CCR model calculates the slack variables after the calculation of the radial efficiency 
measure by a two-stage process. In the first stage, the optimal value of 00 is calculated, 
and in the second stage the sum of any remaining slacks is maximised to properly identify 
the "efficient peer" of the unit under observation. 
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Noting the input orientation of the problem, it follows that 0 is the DEA variant of 
Debrue-Farrell measure FI(X, Y) introduced in Section 2.1. Note that 0 is a radial measure 
of efficiency which is the minimal factor by which all inputs can be reduced 
equiproportionally within the PPS, without decreasing the level of any outputs. Recalling 
the divergence between Koopmans definition of technical efficiency and the Debreu- 
Farrell measure of technical efficiency, it follows that a value of 0 equal to I does not 
ensure full efficiency, since (Ooxj,,, yj,, ) may contain slack in any of its m+s dimensions. 
The full efficiency in the sense of Koopmans is achieved if and only if 0=I and all slacks 
are zero. 
In the remainder of this study, the notion of efficiency adapted will correspond to that 
defined by Debreu-Farrell. This is because we will be measuring productivity using a 
version of the Malmquist productivity index (Fare, Grosskopf, Lindgren and Roos, 1992) 
that is based on distance functions which are reciprocals of the Debreu-Farrell measure of 
efficiency. 
2.4.1.2 The Banker, Charnes and Cooper (BCC) Model 
The CCR model in the preceding section was built on the assumption of constant returns 
to scale of activities. That is, if an activity (X, Y) is feasible, then, for every positive scalar 
t, the activity (tX, tY) is also feasible. However, this assumption can be modified to allow 
efficiency to be assessed under a more generable assumption of variable returns to scale. 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) extended the basic CCR model to enable the 
estimation of efficiency under a variable returns to scale assumption (VRS). The CCR 
models yield an evaluation of overall technical efficiency. The BCC model under VRS, on 
the other hand, can distinguish between technical and scale inefficiencies by estimating 
pure technical efficiency at the given scale of operation, and identifying whether 
increasing (IRS), decreasing (DRS), or constant returns to scale (CRS) possibilities are 
present 14 . Under the assumption of VRS, the linear models with input and output 
orientations are as follows: 
Input Orientated under VRS (2.15) 
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To illustrate the different models, Figure 2.2 exhibits 4 DMUs, A, B, C and D, each with 
one input and one output. The efficient frontier of the CCR model is the dotted line that 
passes through B from the origin. Under the assumption of CRS, DMU B can be 
extrapolated to points on this dotted line, such that the change in input level causes an 
equally proportional change to the output level. The frontiers of the BCC model consists 
of the bold lines connecting A, B and C. It is made of convex combination of the extreme 
points lying on the production surface. The PPS is the area consisting of the frontier 
together with observed or possible activities with a surplus of inputs and/or a shortfall in 
output compared with the frontiers. A, B and C are on the frontiers and BCC-efficient. 





Figure 2.2 The BCC Model 
The BCC model differs from the basic CCR model for assessing efficiency (Model 2.133 
n 
and 2.14) only in that it includes the convexity constraint I ý, j -I in the envelopment 
j=1 
torrIlUlation and the variable coo in the multiplier formulation, which prohibits 
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extrapolations of scales of operations. The presence of the convexity constraint in the VRS 
model reduces the feasible region for the DMUs, which, in general, results in an increase 
of efficient DMUs. Otherwise the CRS and VRS DEA models work in the same way to 
arrive at an efficiency measure. Thus, in the input orientated model, the model seeks the 
set of k values (envelopment form) which minimise 00 to 0* and identifies a point within 0 
the VRS PPS whose input levels reflects the lowest proportion 0* to which the input 0 
levels of DMU jo can be radially contracted without detriment to its output levels. 0*, is 
termed the pure technical input efficiency of DMU jo. It is referred to as pure because it is 
'net' of any scale effects. 
In general, under the VRS assumption the orientation of the assessment (input or output) 
affects the point of projection on the frontier and the resulting efficiencies may not be the 
same, as can be seen for DMU D. Thus, for inefficient DMUs we may have eo :ý I/ho, 
although the subset of efficient DMUs is the same irrespective of the model orientation. In 
other words, the "reciprocal relationship" between the input-orientated and output- 
orientated efficiencies in the CCR model is not available in the BCC model. 
The BCC model is solved by using a two-stage procedure similar to the CCR case. The 
evaluations secured from the CCR and the BCC models are related to each other in that 
the efficiency score of a unit under VRS is not less than the efficiency score under CRS 
since the imposition of the convexity constraint makes the feasible region of the BCC 
model a subset of that of the CCR model. 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) show that the efficiency score generated by the CCR 
model is a composite total efficiency score that can be broken up into two components: 
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scale efficiency and pure technical efficiency. The BCC model generates the pure 
technical efficiency score. Dividing the CCR score with the BCC score generates a 
measure of scale efficiency for each DN4U- So, the divergence between the CRS and VRS 
efficiency score captures the impact of scale size on the performance of the DMU 
concerned but not the nature of scale inefficiency. See Banker, Chames and Cooper (1984) 
and Banker and Thrall (1992) for a discussion on the identification of returns to scale. 
In conclusion, the choice of a DEA formulation requires a choice of orientation - 
minimisation of inputs or maximisation of outputs, and a scale assumption - constant 
returns to scale or variable returns to scale. While the choice of orientation is based upon 
considerations of which factors are more easily controlled by the DNIU, the scale 
assumption is based upon evidence. Dyson et al. (2001) suggests that the data should be 
tested for scale effects and the VRS model should only be used when scale effects can be 
demonstrated. Other extended models, namely additive, multiplicative and chance 
constrained, can be found in the DEA reference text by Cooper, Selford and Tone (2000). 
2.4.2 Non -discretionary Variables 
The basic DEA models (e. g. Model 2.13 and 2.15) measure the efficiency of a DMIJ in 
terms of the maximal radial contraction to its input levels or expansion to its output levels 
feasible under efficient operation. Such measures are not suitable in contexts where at 
least one of the variables to be radially contracted or expanded is not controllable by the 
DW. These variables are referred to as 'non-discretionary' or 'exogenously fixed' 
variables. 
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Banker and Morey (1986) extended the basic DEA models to enable them to be used for 
assessing efficiency under input-output variables that are exogenously fixed or non- 
discretionary. The models below show respectively the modifications to the basic input 
orientated CRS and VRS DEA models developed by Banker and Morey (1986) for 
dealing with non-discretionary variables in the general case. The corresponding output 
orientated models can be deduced by analogy. 
Input Orientated under CRS (2.17) 
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In the above models, the inputs have been partitioned into two subsets D and ND 
consisting respectively of discretionary (under the control of the DMU) and non- 
discretionary (i. e. exogenously fixed) inputs. These models differ from the basic DEA 
models (2.13) and (2.15) in that eo measures the radial contraction feasible onIv in respect 
of the discretionary inputs rather than all inputs. 
2.4.3 Incorporating Weight Restrictions 
The original DEA model as developed by Chames, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) was based 
on the assumption that DMU should be allowed the full freedom in the choice of weights 
of the inputs and outputs, in order to show the efficiency of the DMU in the 'best possible 
light'. However, one fundamental problem which stems from the freedom given to DN4Us 
to choose their own weights is that they can choose unrealistic weights, which are 
inconsistent with prior managerial knowledge about the production process, if that will 
help them appear efficient relative to other DMUs. Thus the efficiency rating of a DMU 
may say more about the prudent choice of weights the DMU made rather than any 
intrinsic good performance. 
One approach to this problem is to impose weight restrictions to curtail the freedom under 
standard DEA. A number of authors have proposed extensions to the onginal DEA models 
that allow the resti-iction of weights flexibility (notably Thompson et al., 1986, Dyson and 
Thanassoulis, 1988, Wong and Beasley, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990; Thanassoulis and 
Dyson, 1992). Allen et al. (1997) provides a detailed survey of the different types of 
weight restrictions that can be specified in DEA models. Among these, the more prevalent 
approach used in practice is the so-called "assurance region" approach by Thompson et al. 
(1986,1990). In this approach, constraints are imposed on the relative magnitude of 
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e region weights for specific inputs and outputs. We xvill be concerned with the assuranc 
approach of incorporating weight restrictions in this study. 
There are also different approaches to constructing the weight restrictions. The most 
common approaches are where weight restrictions are based on the perceived importance 
or value of individual inputs and outputs, or reflect cost or price considerations. It has 
been pointed out by Allen et al. (1997) that such weight restnctions generally invalidate 
the radial nature of efficiency and break-down the interpretation of the efficiency rating as 
a radial improvement factor. The problem here is that the weight restrictions generally do 
not represent the technological realities of a specific production process. By using weight 
restrictions in DEA models without linking them to specific technological realities of the 
production process under consideration, the interpretation of the efficiency score is 
obscured (Podinovski, 2000,2002). 
Podinovski (2000,2002) recently proposed the trade-off approach that enables the weight 
restrictions to incorporate additional information on production technology in a DEA 
model. In this approach, the weights are restricted using realistic production trade-offs. 
The trade-off approach solves the problems with the price or value related approach. It 
redefines the production possibility set (by expanding it) and preserves the radial nature of 
efficiency in the DEA model to enable a meaningful interpretation of the efficiency score 
(Podinovski, 2000,2002) (these ideas are discuss in detail in Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4). 
Further, in Chapter 4, a detailed discussion on the application of assurance region type of 
weight restrictions capturing the technological realities of the production process of the 
industry addressed in this study is undertaken. 
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2.5 The Concept and Measurement of Productivity (Change) 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, productivity is the ratio of output to input. 
This ratio is easy to compute in the single input-output case. Nevertheless. in the multiple 
input-output case, the inputs must be aggregated in an economically sensible fashion, as 
must the outputs, so that productivity remains a ratio of two scalars. Thus, in the general 
case, productivity (or total factor productivity) is defined as the ratio of an index of 
outputs divided by an index of the inputs consumed. Many alternative approaches for 
aggregating inputs and outputs are available (see e. g. Diewert, 1992,2000 for discussion). 
Productivity can vary through time due to differences in production technology i. e. 
technological change and due to changes in the efficiency of the production process i. e. 
technical efficiency change. Much effort has been directed to attribute productivity 
variations to these sources. Until very recently, productivity change was entirely attributed 
to technological change and the potential contribution of efficiency change was ignored. 
Solow (1957) was the first to attribute output growth to input growth and technological 
change, regarded as a shift in the production frontier. The seminal paper by Nishimizu and 
Page (1982) was the first attempt to incorporate efficiency change into a model of 
productivity change by decomposing productivity growth into shifts in the production 
frontier (i. e. technological change) and movements away or towards it (i. e. technical 
efficiency change). This work was largely ignored until the work of Fare, Grosskopf, 
Lindgren and Roos (1989) (published in 1994) that explicitly decomposed productivity 
change into technical efficiency change and technological change components using linear 
programming techniques. 
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The use of index numbers to measure the change in productivitv dates back to the works 
of Fisher (1922) and T6mqvist (1936), that defined ratios between the (indices of) outputs 
and the (indices of) inputs of a firm in different points in time. Caves, Christensen, and 
Diewert (1982a, 1982b) introduced the Malmquist productivity index 15 that has become a 
very common way of measuring productivity change (see Fare, Grosskopf and Russell 
(1998) for a summary of empirical studies that applied this index to various industries). 
Fare, Grosskopf, Lindgren and Roos (1989) extended the work on the productivity index 
by Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982a) by, as noted earlier, decomposing the index 
into technical efficiency change and technological change components and illustrated how 
the non-parametric linear programming approach can be used for its calculation. They 
applied it to measure and analyse productivity growth in Swedish hospitals. 
The basic idea is graphically illustrated in Figure 2.5, which for simplicity depicts the two 
inputs one output production case, with constant returns to scale technology. The figure 
depicts a case where technological advancement has occurred between time periods t and 
t+I and thus the production technology shifts closer to the origin in time period t+l 
reflecting the fact that lower input levels are required to produce a unit of output. In this 
figure, a production unit shifts from point A: (X', Y') in period t to point B: (Xt+', Yt+') in 
the period t+1. Production is technically inefficient in both periods as the observed input 
output bundles are in the interior of the boundary technology of its respective period. The 
technical efficiency of the production unit appears to have improved from time period t to 
time period t+I as well. The output in both periods is unitized to I under the constant 
returns to scale assumption and so Y'+1 = Y'. Hence, the input values are normalized to 








It Figure 2.3 The Malmquist Productivity Index 
The next sections present the Malmquist productivity index and some of its extensions, 
relevant to the thesis. 
2.5.1 Malmquist Productivity Index 
The Malmquist productivity index is constructed from ratios of distance functions. The 
formulation of this index in terms of distance functions leads to the straightforward 
computation by exploiting the relation between distance functions and Debreu-Farrell 
measures of technical inefficiency. This also allows for the explicit calculation of changes 
in technical efficiency, unlike the T6mqvist (1936) and Fisher (1922) ideal productivity 
index that do not account for inefficiency and, thereby, bias the productivity estimates 
obtained (Grosskopf, 1993). Another advantage of the Malmquist index as opposed to say 
the T6rnqvist index, is that the former does not require data on prices or cost/revenue 
shares. This is obviously useful in the electricity distribution context addressed here where 
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prices are biased or unreliable due to market failure (monopoly power), governmental 
interference (regulation) and the existence of durable inputs (capital goods) that are used 
over several period of time. 
To define an input-based Malmquist productivity index, assume that for each time period t 
and t+l, a set of DMUs are each using inputs vector Xc9i+ to produce outputs 
vector YE=- 9V . 
In each period the technology is defined in terms of the input possibility 
set in (2.2) and satisfies the properties of convexity, ray extension (constant returns to 
scale), inefficient production and minimum extrapolation stated before. 
Recall the input distance function that was defined in (2.5) and in period t it can be written 
as: 
Dt (Yt 5 xt ) -,: 
v 
1// minýO > 0: OXt e Lt (Yt» 
* (2.19) 
Note that D '(X', V) ý! I if and only if X' E=- QY). A value of D tj (X t, Y') =I implies that 
the DMU is located on the frontier, and a value exceeding one that it is below the frontier 
(indicating inefficiency). The input distance function is reciprocal to Debreu-Farrell's 
input measure of technical efficiency. This permits the decomposition of productivity 
change into two parts, one measuring changes in technical efficiency and one which 
captures the shift in the production frontier. 
The definition of a Malmquist index also requires definition of mixed-period distance 
functions such as: 
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(2.21) 
The first mixed-Period distance function, in (2.20), measures the maximum proportional 
change in inputs required to make (Yt+', Xt+') feasible in relation to the technology at the 
previous period. Similarly, the second distance function, in (2.21), measures the maximal 
proportional change in inputs required to make (Yt, X') feasible in relation to the 
technology at t+1. Although the single period input distance function is > 1, in both the 
mixed period cases, the value of the distance functions may be less than 1. This can occur 
if the input-output vector being evaluated is not feasible in the other period. 
Given the above definitions of distance functions, the Malmquist productivity index as 
defined by Fare, Grosskopf, Lindgren and Roos (1989) is: 
M, (yt+l, xt+l, yt Ixt 
D, (Y t", X "') DI" (Y ", X t") 
1/2 
(2.22) 
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This productivity index is a geometric mean of a pair of ratios of input distance functions. 
The first ratio compares the performance of observation from periods t and t+1 relative to 
the production possibilities existing in period t, and the second compares the performance 
of the same observation relative to the production possibilities existing in period t+1. 
Following Fare, Grosskopf, Lindgren and Roos (1989) an equivalent way of writing this 
index is 
D'j"(Y", X"') D'I(Y"', X"') D'I(Y', X') 
1/2 
mI (Yt+l, Xt+l, Yt, Xt 
D tj (Y t, X') Xt) 
(2.23) 
1Dt, 
" (Y t", X t+') DI" (Y t, 
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Expression (2.23) decomposes the Malmquist input-based index into the product of two 
terms. The first terin is the ratio of two input distance functions involving observation and 
technology from periods t+ I and t, respectively. This measures the change In the input 
measure of Debreu-Farrell technical efficiency between year's t and t+I and is referred to 
as technical efficiency change. It is equivalent to the ratio of Debreu-Farrell technical 
efficiency in period t+I divided by the Debreu-Farrell technical efficiency in period t. 
Technical efficiency change indicates whether production come closer (further) to its 
production boundary when moving from period t to t+l. This is why it is often called the 
"catching up" factor. The second term remains a geometric mean, which indicates whether 
the production boundary has shifted between the two periods evaluated and is known as 
technological change. It is the geometric mean of the shift in the production boundary 
observed at Yt+' (the first ratio inside the bracket) and the shift in the production boundary 
observed at Yt (the second ratio inside the bracket). 
In terrns of the distances in Figure 2.3, the index (2.23) becomes: 
mI (Y t+l, x t+l, Y t, xt) = 
OB OF [OC OD] 
1/2 
OC OA LOE OF I 
(2.24) 
The ratio inside the square bracket measure shifts in technology at output levels Y'+' and 
Yt , respectively, and so technological change 
is measured as a geometric mean of these 
two shifts. The term outside the bracket measures technical efficiency at t+l and t, 
capturing changes in efficiency over time. Improvements in productivity over time yield 
Malmquist index with a score less than one. Deterioration is associated with a Malmquist 
index with a score greater than one. A unit score implies constant productivity over time. 
The technological change and efficiency change components have the same interpretations. 
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At this point it is worth making two important observations. Because the Index Is defined 
in terms of radial distance functions which accommodate multiple inputs and outputs no 
explicit aggregation of them is need, which is a major advantage. Also, because the 
distance functions in the Malmquist index are reciprocal to the Debreu-Farrell measure of 
technical efficiency, a simple approach to their calculation is the DEA linear programming 
models described in the earlier section. It involves solving four sets of DEA linear 
programming problems given by the equation (2.13) in Section 2.4.1.1.1 and its 
substitution in equation (2.22) (We may recall that technology described in equation (2.13) 
satisfies constant returns to scale). This is the approach that will be used later in the 
empincal part of the thesis. 
2.5.2 Extensions of Malmquist Productivity Index 
The Malmquist index presented in the previous section measure and analyse productivity 
change accounting for input and output quantities alone. However, quality is important in 
service production such as the electricity distribution services provided by DNOs and 
therefore, should be taken into account in the measurement of productivity change. 
One of the first attempts to incorporate quality attributes in productivity measurement is a 
paper by Fixler and Zieschang (1992) that show how a market-determined price- 
characteristics locus can be used to adjust the T6mqvist productivity index of Caves, 
Christensen and Diewert (1982a) for changes in input, output and process characteristics. 
Using distance functions, they showed how the quality adjusted productivity indices 
proposed are the product of two indices, a quality index and a Caves, Christensen and 
Diewert-type Tbmqvist productivity index. 
c-) 
Following the lead of Fixler and Zieschang (1992), another similar effort was made by 
Fare and associates in relation to the Malmquist productivity index defined by Caves, 
Christensen and Diewert (1982a). First, Fare, Grosskopf, Lindgren and Roos (1989) 
extended the work on productivity index of Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982a) by, 
as was noted earlier, breaking down the Malmquist productivity index into technical 
efficiency change and technological change components using linear programming 
techniques. In a subsequent paper, Fare, Grosskopf and Roos (1995) extended this 
productivity index by incorporating attributes into the technology. These attributes were 
used to measure service quality of the industry in the study, Swedish pharmacies, and, in 
particular a quality change index was extracted from the Malmquist productivity index. 
By imposing a separability assumption on the distance functions, they decomposed the 
Malmquist productivity index into three components, namely a quality change index, a 
technological change index and an efficiency change index. Later, the productivity model 
in Fare, Grosskopf and Roos (1995) was generalized by Fare et al. (1997) to allow for 
both input and output quality attributes. 
The quality attributes were included by augmenting the input and output vectors. More 
formally, the distance function for period t can be rewritten as 
Dt(Yt5Wýx t ýAt) 
y (2.25) 
1X nmin{Oý! O: O(Xt, At)cLQt(Yt, Bt)j 
' 
where A', Bt represent input and output quality attributes respectively. The augmented 
input possibility set LQ'(Yt, B) is the set of all (X', A) that can produce (Y', B). Then, the 
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The index (2.26) is in the spirit of the Malmquist productivity index in (2.22), but the 
distance functions incorporate quality attributes. This index considers quality as an 
integral part of the production process. In the spirit of the Malmquist index in (2.22) the 
quality augmented Malmquist index in (2.26) is the geometric mean of two indices. The 
index has a similar interpretation with that in (2.22) and it can be decomposed in a similar 
fashion, into technical efficiency change and technological change, all accounting for 
quality. 
Nevertheless, in some cases it is interesting to measure, not only changes in productivity 
over time, but also changes in quality over time. To measure output quality change, Fare, 
Grosskopf and Roos (1995) defined a Malmquist quality change index. We generalize the 
and output quali index in Fare, Grosskopf and Roos (1995) to allow for both 1 ity 
attnbutes as follows: 
tttttItIt+It+It+It+ 
1/2 
DI (Y ýBx, ADI 
(Y 
,BIx, A Ql 
tttttt+I t+l tt+It 
(2.27) 
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The index is in the same spirit of the earlier Malmquist indices. The first term in the 
square bracket in (2.27) compares A'+' and B'+1 with A' and B', respectively, taking as 
given the technology and input-output quantity vectors of period t. The second term i t: ) n the 
square brackets in (2.27) is as the first but with reference to period t+l. Since the index 
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depends on the technology, the resources and the outputs of both periods. in addition to 
the attributes, the changes In these will affect the quality Index- This makes the index an 
integrated part of the production process. A score less than one in (2.27) indicates quality 
progress, greater than I regress and unity implies no change in quality. 
Fare, Grosskopf and Roos (1995) illustrated the relationship between the productivity 
index in (2.22), the quality- augmented productivity index in (2.26) and the quality index 
in (2.27) under an assumption of separability between attributes and inputs/outputs. The 
assumption of separability between attributes and inputs/outputs makes it possible to 
factonse the distance function used in computing the Malmquist productivity index. 
Following Fare, Grosskopf and Roos (1995), assuming the distance functions are 
separable in quality and inputs/outputs, that is if they can be factorised as 
ttttttttttt DI (Y 
5B IX 






then, the quality- augmented productivity change index in (2.26) can be written as follows: 
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The formulation in (2.30) is the quality change index. Q1, in (2.27) multiplied by the 
productivity index, MI, in (2.22). We may recall that the productivity index M, can be 
decomposed into technical efficiency change and technological change. Thus, by 
assuming the separability of quality with inputs and outputs, the quality-augmented 
Malmquist productivity index is further decomposed into three components, namely 
quality change, technical efficiency change and technological change. In fact one may 
compare the results in (2.26) and (2.30) to find out whether the separability assumption 
holds true (Fare, Grosskopf and Roos, 1995). 
2.6 The Empirical Studies on Efficiency and Productivity of Electricity Distribution 
Network Utilities 
This section reviews the literature on electricity distribution network utility's efficiency 
and productivity measurement. The review will study and summarise the main 
methodologies used so far in earlier research in this area, the selection of inputs and 
outputs and the main results of such applications, with emphasis on those using the DEA 
method. The information gathered will be useful in guiding the choice of the themes and 
questions addressed in this study as well as in organising the empirical part of the thesis, 
enabling the discussion of its results in light of previous studies. 
The recent experience of regulatory reform and privatisation of the electricity supply 
industries around the world has put an increasingly sharp focus on the analysis of the 
performance of electricity network utilities. This is because performance measurement is 
an essential part of the price cap regulation since efficiency and productivity are key 
inputs in the determination of the revenue that companies are allowed to cover costs under 
this type of regulation. Performance measurement is also the basis of incentive regulation, 
56 
which is increasingly being adopted by many countries. since it not only helps set the 
regulatory incentives but drives further efficiency, as pointed out in the introduction to this 
ies thesis (page 8). This area has attracted considerable attention and the number of studi 
that seek to measure electricity utilities efficiency and productivity has increased 
substantially. There is now an extensive literature that reflects this growing interest. For a 
recent survey of benchmarking studies in the electricity sector see Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2001). 
In the last 15 years, the techniques outlined in the first part of this chapter have been used 
extensively to evaluate distribution network utilities. Most of these evaluations were 
motivated by the desire to measure efficiency and productivity, but also at a second stage 
to investigate the association of performance with observable characteristics of 
distribution network utilities and their environment. In particular, the main issues 
investigated include: 
economies of scale; 
0 the impact of average and frontier specifications on efficiency estimates; 
ownership impact on performance, 
0 effects of reforms and privatisation on performance; 
o inter-country comparisons; 
the specification of inputs and outputs and the sensitivity of efficiency results to 
variable specification, 
* the impact of operating environment on performance. 
Details of the electricity utility studies reviewed are summansed in a table fon-nat in the 
appendix to this chapter. This table contains inforination about the author(s), year of 
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publicatioin. country, number of distribution network utilities under observation. method, 
input-output set and results. The following paragraphs surnmarise the general conclusions 
of this review. 
The performance measurement literature related to the electricity sector has been 
predominantly concerned with technical rather than allocative efficiency. This is because 
of the problems of valuing inputs and outputs in electricity distribution services. One 
exception is the study by Goto and Tsutsui (1998) comparing the relative performance of 
US and Japanese electric utilities which assumed that input prices are given to the utilities. 
Several patterns emerged from the review. There is a rapid increase in the number of 
studies, with almost all of them occurring since 1991. Benchmarking studies of electric 
network utilities have adopted a range of method but the most popular method is the 
mathematical programming approach - DEA. This may reflect the consensus among 
researchers that this technique is more appropriate for distribution utility perfon-nance 
measurement. Only a few studies applied different methods to the same data (e. g. Jamasb 
and Pollitt, 2003; Hattori et al., 2002; Weyman-Jones, 2001a; Kumbhakar and 
Hjalmarsson, 1998; Meibodi, 1998; Pollitt, 1995; Miliotis, 1992 and Chames et al., 1989b) 
to compare the results and evaluate the methods used. 
There is a wide range of input and output variables used. The variety of variables that has 
been used show that there is no firm consensus on how the basic functions of the utilities 
are to be modelled. For, example, in some cases a variable is used as an input and in 
others the same ,, ariable is used as an output or it is considered as given (non- 
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discretionary) while in others it is regarded as controllable (discretionary). Ne\ ertheless, 
all the studies have agreed on adopting an input orientation perspective. 
The difficulty and controversy that surrounds the measurement of real inputs and outputs 
of distribution network utilities is reflected in the input and output variables used in 
different studies. The most commonly used inputs are operating expenditure, number of 
employees, transformer capacity and network length, whilst the most widely used outputs 
are energy delivered, number of customers and the size of service area. The outputs are 
sometimes disaggregated according to the voltage level (HV and LV) and customer types 
(residential, commercial and industrial). 
In most cases the physical measures of inputs, such as network size and transformer 
capacity, are used and very few studies have used monetary measures of operational and 
capital inputs (used in only 4 studies, e. g. Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003; Hattori et al., 2002, 
Agrell, Bogetoft and Tind, 2002 and DTe, 2000). From a regulatory point of view, it is 
often preferable to focus on costs (monetary measure) rather then use physical measures in 
benchmarking since the primary aim of regulators when using benchmarking is to promote 
cost savings in the utilities so that prices to customers can be lowered. Also, 
benchmarking should be referenced to both operational and capital costs and not partial 
costs (say, just operating costs) as this will encourage the utility to game the regulatory 
system by substituting operating and capital expenditure. 
In terms of the output variables used, almost all studies used measures of physical 
performance such as the number of customers and the units of electricity distributed. 
There is little use (in only 5 studies, e. g. Korhonen and Syrianen, 2003. Grifell-Tatje and 
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Lovell. 2003; Tilley, 2000; Bums and Weyman-Jones, 1998 and Chari7es et al.. 1989b) of 
measures of quality of service. Quality of service is integral to the electricity distribution 
production process. Measur-ing perforinance without including quality leaves out one of 
the key outcomes of the production process. By excluding it a utility that provide services 
of higher quality may be considered to be less efficient, not because they are truly less 
efficient but because they use more resources to provide better service to their customers. 
The above studies made useful early attempt to capture quality in performance 
measurement. However, some aspects of these studies may be developed further, viewing 
quality as a multidimensional phenomenon with no single measure capable of accounting 
for all the facets of quality provided in electricity distribution. It is also useful to ensure 
that the DEA model effectively takes account of quality. This is because, due to the 
flexibility in choices of weights in determining efficiency, the DEA model could choose to 
ignore the quality variable if it reflects low performance levels. One approach to curtail 
this freedom is to impose weight restrictions. Further, the methodology by which quality 
is incorporated may be refined by keeping the quality measures consistent with the 
volumes measures of the other inputs and outputs i. e. by using un-normalised measures 
(this is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3, page 92) 16 
Regarding the purpose of the electric network utilities studies on the perfon-nance, many 
of the studies were trying to study ownership impact on the performance to compare the 
different types of electnc network utilities, i. e. private and publicly owned. The studies 
found conflicting results. The majority found that privately owned firms were more 
efficient than public electric utilities, e. g., Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1998), 
Bagdadioglu, Waddams-Pnce and Weyman-Jones (1996), Berry (1994), Claggett (1994, 
1995) and Hougaard (1994). while Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass (I 992a, 1992b) and Pollitt 
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(1995) found no significant difference in productivity associated with the mode of 
ownership, and Neuberg (1977) posited that publicly owned firrns were relatively more 
efficient than investor-owned electric utilities. 
Another strand of studies explored the electricity distribution retums to scale. Most of 
these studies found significant increasing returns to scale in electricity distribution (see, 
e. g. Fillipini, Hrovatin and Zoric, 2004; Korhonen and Syrjanen, 2003; Kumbhakar and 
ja marsson, 1998; Fillipini, 1998; Scully, 1998; Bums and Weyrnan-Jones, 1996; New 
Zealand Ministry of Energy, 1989; Huettner and Landon, 1978 and Neuberg, 1977). One 
exception is Salvanes and Tjotta (1994) who, in a study of Norwegian electricity 
distribution, distinguished between returns to scale and returns to network density. 
Returns to density measure the economies of increasing the amount of electricity supplied 
when the network is held constant. Returns to scale measure the combined economies of 
increasing the amount of electricity supplied and also expanding the network. They found 
no evidence of economies of scale above small output levels, but significant evidence of 
economies of density. 
A limitation of the analysis of retums to scale is that the empincal studies typically 
postulate the returns to scale properties of the production technology, without providing 
some evidence to support the choices made. As a result, the conclusion of studies 
regarding returns to scale characteristics may be misleading due to an artificial fitting of a 
VRS frontier to a data set with an underlying CRS technology (or vice versa). 
Other than the above, the principal purposes of other studies have been to make an inter- 
country comparison of electricity distribution network utilities (see, e. g. Jamasb and Pollitt, 
61 
2003 and Hattori et al., 2002, WART 1999; Goto and Tsutsui, 1998: Lawrence, Houghton 
and George, 1997; Pollitt, 1995 and ESAA. 1994), to investigate the association of 
performance (efficiency scores) and observed utility and environmental variables using 
regression analysis (e. g. Tilley (2000); Tilley and Weyman-Jones, 1999) and a few studies 
were concerned with methodological issues (e. g. Weyman-Jones, 2001 a; Bums and 
Weyman-Jones, 1996). Some studies compared the efficiency of urban versus rural 
electric utilities, and generally found the urban firms to be more efficient than the rural 
utilities (see, e. g. Chen, 2002; Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass, 1992a and Millotis, 1992). 
Regarding the evaluation of power sector reforms, several studies have analysed its impact 
on efficiency and productivity, but with differing results (see, e. g. Pardina and Rossi, 2000; 
Tilley, 2000; Tilley and Weyman-Jones, 1999; Honkatukia and Sulamaa, 1999; Forsund 
and Kittlesen, 1998; Scully, 1998; Bums and Weyman-Jones, 1996 and Bums and 
Weyman-Jones, 1994). However, there is an absence of studies that had examined its 
impact on quality of service. 
The UK DNOs experienced productivity growth after the reforins and privatisation but 
found a greater dispersion of performance than before privatisation (Hattori et al., 2002; 
Tilley, 2000; Tilley and Weyman-Jones, 1999; Bums and Weyman-Jones, 1996 and Bums 
and Weyman-Jones, 1994). Productivity growth was also found in Norwegian utilities 
(Forsund and Kittlesen, 1998). The main source of productivity growth for the UK and 
Norway was technological progress. New Zealand ESAs also experienced improved 
efficiency after the reforins. Similarly, in Latin American distnbution utilities, better 
performance was found among utilities operating in counthes that have implemented 
power sector reforrns (Pardina and Rossi, 2000). Conversely. the Finnish distribution 
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utilities did not observe any productivity change due to the reforms (Honkatukia and 
Sulamaa, 1999). Thus, the effect of the reforms on efficiency and productivity of the 
electricity sector seems highly dependent on the specific economic environment of each 
country. 
Because of the differences in the employed methodology and the characteristics of the 
distribution utilities and their environment (e. g. different ownership, countries, regulatory 
system), the results of the studies are often conflicting. Thus, they cannot be generalized 
beyond the specific setting in which they were derived. The studies in the UK setting that 
are relevant for making comparisons with the present evaluation are discussed in detail 
later in the empirical part of the thesis. 
Finally, most studies are straightforward applications and in fact there is only one study 
that has tested methods such as weight restricted models (i. e. Goto and Tsutsui, 1998). 
However, the application of weight restrictions was based on the consideration of price 
and thus the interpretation of the efficiency and productivity scores secured is problematic 
(this is discussed in detail in Section 4.3 in Chapter 4). Also, absent from the literature are 
studies that examine the impact of mergers on performance. 
Apart from that, the literature has also neglected to reflect trade-offs between inputs and 
outputs that exist in the production process in performance measures. This may result in 
possible inappropriate or unreliable estimates of performance, giving doubt to the 
relevance of the results to the question of policy. The value of modelling for policy 
analysis can be increased by correctly reflecting the technological realities of the 
production process to obtain more accurate and reliable results. 
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2.7, Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the main concepts of efficiency and productivity and the 
methods for their evaluation. The DEA method for the evaluation of efficiency in 
organisations is presented in detail. The theory underlying the construction of the 
production possibility set and the efficient frontier of a DEA assessment was described. 
The basic DEA models were reviewed and the associated efficiency estimates described. 
The extensions to the DEA literature were also presented. The Malmquist index approach 
for the measurement of productivity and some relevant extensions were also presented. 
Because the input distance functions of the index are reciprocal to DEA-efficiency 
measures,, the index is computed using DEA. 
This chapter also reviewed the literature, summarising the main methodologies, inputs and 
outputs used and the conclusions of the previous studies. The number of studies which 
seek to measure electric network utility's efficiency and productivity has increased 
substantially and there is now an extensive literature that reflects this growing interest. 
The information gathered from the literature review contributed to the identification of 
issues that deserve further attention. Some of these issues are addressed in the empirical 
part of the thesis by proposing extended models and methods for efficiency and 
productivity assessment. 
The accuracy of the estimated perfon-nance measures depends on the use of appropriate 
and well specified models, the inclusion of relevant inputs and outputs, and the use of 
accurate data. The choice of an appropriate model is an important methodological issue. 
Different approaches ha,,,, e different advantages and disadvantages and the choice of the 
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most appropriate method should depend on the type of organ' isation. its characteristics. the 
perspective taken and the quality of the data available. DEA is a non-parametric method 
and is a popular approach for performance measurement in electricity distribution. This is 
due to the minimal assumptions underlying the DEA model, the ease of handling multiple 
inputs and output, its ability to accommodate small data sets and its usefulness in the 
measurement of productivity. However, measurement errors may bias results and data 
quality is an important issue. A further line of enquiry is of more advanced DEA models 
which allows for sufficient discrimination even in small sample sizes with many variables. 
Chapter 3 addresses the issue of the choice of an appropriate model, the inclusion of 
relevant inputs and outputs, and the refinement of data to improve its quality. 
Because of the special features of electricity distribution, DEA methods must be tested 
rigorously and developed further to provide reliable results that can be utilized in 
management and policy making. Currently, DEA is most useful for identifying general 
trends in performance over time, investigating the association of performance with 
organisational characteristics and their environment, in testing general hypothesis about 
utility performance and studying the impacts of reforms. Nevertheless the results have 
policy implications. Thus, more rigorous and sophisticated tools are needed in order to 
provide 'real' measures of utility performance that is useful for guiding policy. A 
discussion of the enhanced DEA and Malmquist models that improves discrimination as 
well as captures the details of the production technology by applying weights restrictions 
based on trade-offs is included in Chapter 4 and 5 respectively. 
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13 This is input dominance but also can be defined on the output side In a similar manner. 
14 CRS occurs in cases where output increases proportionally to Input. IRS where output 
increases proportionally more to input and DRS where output increases proportionally less 
than input. 
15 Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982a) named the index after Sten Malmquist, who 
established its theoretical underpinnings with a seminal paper on consumer theory in 1953 
(see Malmquist, 1953). 
16 These issues were presented by the author of this thesis at the following conferences: 
(1) OR42 Conference, Swansea, Wales in Sept. 2000, (11) The European Operational 
Research Conference, Rotterdam, Netherlands in July 2002, and (111) Seventh European 
Workshop on Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, Oviedo, Spain in Sept. 2001. The 
author proposed plausible measures of quality in electricity distribution and their 
appropriate treatment in DEA evaluations. 
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Chapter 3 
Developing DEA Models For the Evaluation of Quality, Efficiency and 
Productivity Changes in UK Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we model the electricity distribution production process for DEA efficiency 
assessment. The core issue in modelling the electricity distribution process is ensuring that 
the model used is representative of the electricity network utilities such that all the 
resources consumed are captured and the outputs/performance delivered is well specified. 
Another issue is the robustness and coherence of the model (Cubin, 1993). In contrast to the 
econometric approach to efficiency and productivity measurement, the non-parametric 
approach does not offer any tools that can aid researchers to specify the most appropriate 
model or to test its robustness. To deal with this drawback, researchers usually pay a lot of 
attention to the selection of input-output set, giving emphasis to what is postulated by 
theory and what has been done so far in research. Also, some authors (see for example 
Pollitt, 1995; Bagdadioglu et al., 1996 and Tilley, 2000) study the robustness of the results 
to different model specifications by adding or withdrawing inputs and outputs from the 
model. This is a kind of sensitivity analysis in a DEA framework. Some others have used 
conventional statistical tools such as correlation and regression analysis (see Pollitt, 1995 
and Korhonen and Syrjanen, 2003) as a prelude to the DEA analysis to select variables 17 
Kittlesen (1993) used a stepwise procedure emploYMg stat'stical tests of model 
specification to select variables and Banker and colleagues (see Banker, 1993,1996) have 
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developed various hypothesis and misspecification tests for DEA, where the latter indicate 
whether an extra variable has a statistically significant impact on efficiency scores. 
In order to maximise robustness and to ensure the model is appropriate and well-specified. 
a structured approach to the modelling process was taken in this study. First, a conceptual 
model was developed and next suitable measures of the required variables were obtained. 
The model was developed after examining the model specification approaches applied in 
previous studies of electricity distribution activities (a review is in the previous chapter). 
Many of the variables used here are in line with the literature although the input-output set 
was expanded to include quality variables. 
A further issue is that of quality of data. The data must be accurate and collated on a 
consistent basis across companies. Any comparative assessment made using inaccurate or 
inconsistent data is weakened. This is particularly important exercise when using DEA, 
which is 'data-orientated' (as described by Cooper and Tone, 1997) in that it effects its 
evaluation and inferences directly from observed data. In this study, considerable 
refinements were made to the data in to ensure data was reflected consistently across 
companies. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 develops DEA models of the electricity 
distribution production process in order to evaluate quality, efficiency and productivity 
changes within UK DNOs. The dimensions of quality in electricity distribution are defined 
and then plausible measures of quality are proposed. The preferred model specification 
used in the study, and some key specification issues are presented. Section 3.3 presents the 
adjustments to the cost and quality data. The adjustments are in tenns of regional, 
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definitional and measurement differences. as well as accounting differences. Section 3.4 
surnmarises and concludes. 
3.2 Modelling the Electricity Distribution Production Process 
To model the relative efficiency of the distribution network operators (DNOs), it is first 
necessary to define a production function that captures the key features of the electricity 
distribution production process. This is the conceptual modelling stage and involves 
identifying and measuring the main resources used by the companies (inputs) for acquiring 
the main goods and services produced (outputs). The inputs and outputs comprising the 
production function should be measurable, consistent across companies, relate to the key 
objectives of the companies, and capture the most significant activities and environmental 
factors impacting on their operation (PART, 1999). 
One must also recognise the fact that benchmarking would inevitably shape the efforts and 
directs considerable resources of the DNOs towards the variables included in the model 
(Jamasb, Nillesen and Pollitt, 2003). Therefore, it is important to ensure that only 
significant and acceptable variables are included in the model (Rossi and Ruzzier, 2000) 
and no perverse or distorted incentives are created. In addition, one must also not lose sight 
of the fact that the aim of the regulator is to give customers value for the price they have to 
pay for the products and services (OFGEM, 1999b). The 'value for money principle' is also 
important in choosing the variables for a benchmarking model. The outputs that are 
ng, included should therefore also be valued by customers. In so dol efficiency and 
productivity will be balanced with perceived value. 
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Essentially, the DNOs produce electricity distribution services, which is transportation of a 
certain amount of electricity of a certain quality (both in tenns of product quality and 
reliability of supply) in a certain period of time over a certain distance bemeen an 
electricity producer and an electricity consumer such that the demands of consumers are 
met. From the activities of the distribution service described above it is apparent that the 
key outputs of a distribution business are the quality of service it provides, the quantity of 
electricity delivered to customers, the number of customers and the simultaneous maximum 
demand it can meet. These outputs represent the different dimensions of the distribution 
services and products provided by the DNOs in tenns of their nature as cost drivers. 
The inputs that are required to meet these outputs are the costs associated with building, 
maintaining, operating and refurbishing the system of mains, service lines and transformers 
which make up the network, i. e. the operating expenditure and the capital costs are 
therefore inputs into this process. 
One also needs to capture the nature of the environment in which the companies operate. 
DNOs serve different geographic areas, the extent of which is an exogenous operating 
characteristic of the company's environment. Service area is a major cost driving factor 
since many parts of UK are sparsely populated. If efficiency analysis is conducted in their 
absence, this would result in unfair evaluation of companies operating in relatively 
unfavourable environments. 
Ideally, then, we would want to include variables in our DEA model that capture these 
aspects of the provision of electricity distribution services. A simple model might contain 
the following potential vanables: 
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Inputs. - Outputs: En viron men talfactor: 
I Operating 1. Total customers (number) 1. Service area (sq. km) 
expenditure (Em) 2. Total units distributed (GWh) 
2. Capital inputs (fin) 3. Maximum demand (MW) 
4. Quality of service measure(s) 
The specification of the distribution inputs and outputs is considered in more detail below 
and suitable measures of the required variables are obtained. 
3.2.1 Inputs 
The inputs fall into two categories. The first category consists of variables reflecting 
4 recurrent resources' such as operating expenditure and the second category consists of 
4capital resource' variables such as capital costs. The 'capital resource' variables, it is 
assumed are mutually substitutable and offer trade-offs with the 'recurrent resource' 
variables in the first category. 
The majority of the previous efficiency benchmarking' 8 studies use physical measures of 
inputs such as labour and capital stock as proxies for the operating and capital costs. Hence, 
these studies focus on the technical efficiency of finns. Benchmarking using physical 
quantities of inputs measure the potential for improvement in efficiency in ternis of 
reductions in physical units. However, the primary aim of regulators when using 
benchmarking is to promote cost reductions in the distribution network utilities so that 
prices to consumers can be lowered (OFGEM, 1999b). Therefore, the appropriate approach 
with respect to benchinarking for electricity distribution, as pointed out on page 59, is to 
focus on costs rather than production which will enable the cost efficiency of the regulated 
firms to be assessed. Also, physical quantities of inputs do not tend to capture the real cost 
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of maintaining, operating, refurbishing or replacing the network. Labour input omits other 
physical inputs used in the maintenance and operation of distribution systems, and of 
course, is subject to contracting-out policies. It is also recognised that physical inputs, in 
some instances, may not reflect differences in the quality of labour and assets (for example, 
the mix of technical and non-technical staff and the different material used to construct the 
mains), and the differences in the asset age and composition (IPART, 1999; Carrington, 
Coelli and Groom, 2002). Another significant problem of using physical inputs is that the 
assets are of too many types to arrive at a meaningful small number of asset categories to 
use in the assessment (Bosworth, Stoneman and Thanassoulis, 1996). Hence, physical 
measures of inputs cannot capture all the capital equipment used in the production process 
(Canington et al., 2002). 
It is also acknowledged that there is a conceptual problem when using capital stock as an 
input. Capital inputs have a multi-period dimension (Sengupta, 1994,1996a, 1996b, 
Emrouznejad, 2000). The problem that arises is that current outputs depend on past inputs 
in addition to current inputs, and that current inputs yield future outputs in addition to 
current outputs. However, classical DEA methodology does not acknowledge the dynamic 
nature of the production process since it relies on the assumption that input-output 
correspondence are contemporaneous, in the sense that the output levels observed in a time 
period are the product solely of the input levels observed during that same period. Since the 
impact of capital cannot be apportioned to a single period, input-output correspondence for 
each period cannot easily be established and thereby breaking down the standard approach 
to assessing relative efficiency. 
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The study by WART (1999) uses a variant approach. They use a rmx of operating 
expenditure as one of the inputs and physical units of capital assets as the rest of the inputs. 
Nevertheless, this approach is fraught with the problems of using physical measures of 
capital as described above. 
The foregoing approaches do not lead to estimates of cost efficiency. Most of the previous 
studies measure only technical efficiency. 
Contrary to all the earlier studies, the Dutch Electricity Regulator (DTe) (2000) uses 
operating expenditure as a single monetary input in one of its various DEA-models. This is 
particularly advantageous from a regulatory point of view, as monetary values of input can 
measure the relative cost efficiency of utilities. However, they looked only at distribution 
operating costs, leaving open the question of capital costs which supports operating costs in 
the procurement of outputs. Nillesen and Telling (2001) argue that because key variables 
(i. e. capital) were not assigned as inputs into the production function, their DEA model was 
mis-specified. Also, it was not compatible with DTe's long run view that companies can 
have managerial control over the scale of their operation. Given that they looked only at 
operating costs, this may lead to extensive underestimation of differences in efficiency 
between different companies. 
In another variant of the model, the Dutch Regulator uses operating expenditure plus 
tangible depreciation as a single monetary input. This was a move towards the total cost 
benchmark, by including a measure of capital consumption. However, depreciation could 
gi-ve a misleading impression of a company's use of capital. It has been pointed out by 
Graharn and Steele (1995) that, in the case of long lived assets the cumulative effect of 
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even low rates of inflation is that annual depreciation charges are seriously underestimated 
compared to current costs and the older are the assets in the industry the greater the blas Is. 
In electricity distribution, for the purpose of calculating depreciation, the different classes 
of distribution assets have been generally depreciated over the life of a limited number of 
asset categories rather then each components particular operational life. This may also lead 
to an understatement of depreciation which will result in a downward bias in the estimation 
of capital consumption. Stainer (1997) argues that the use of accountant's depreciation 
should be avoided even though it correctly aims to reflect capital consumption. 
The latest studies by Jamasb and Pollitt (2003), Hattori et al. (2002) and Agrell, Bogetoft 
and Tind (2002) uses total expenditure (i. e. the sum of operating and capital expenditure) as 
a single input in their DEA-model. However, their early attempt at modelling total costs has 
at least two weaknesses. First, they use annual capital expenditures (investments) to reflect 
the value of capital stocks. They acknowledge the shortcoming of using capital 
expenditures due to the cyclic and 'lumpy' nature of investments in distribution network 
utilities. Capital expenditure is a largish lump of expenditure which often only repeats after 
several years/decades. This is due to the feature of capital expenditure where it can be 
subject to delays. Delaying capital expenditure can create apparent savings in one period 
only to be offset in a subsequent period. Thus, delayed capital expenditure may lead to an 
extensive overestimation of the scale of efficiency within a period. And when the utilities 
make a large investment in a subsequent period, the scale of efficiency would be grossly 
underestimated. Secondly, when combining all costs into a single input reflecting total 
ies are facing the same relative inputs, which expenditure, one is assuming that all compani 1111 
is not necessarily true in all cases. 
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In this study, monetary values of input variables are used rather than physical indicators as 
they better reflect the labour and capital used in the production process and, according to 
Stainer (1997), it is the only practical way that inputs can be aggregated. This is also 
beneficial from a regulatory point of view, as monetary values of input that reflect all 
operating and capital costs examine the cost implications of inefficiencies in the utilities 
and estimate the potential savings from improving efficiency. Another consideration for 
using monetary values is that we postulate that greater capital expenditure will result in 
increased quality. Capital expenditure reflects the asset base (which is the accumulation of 
capital) and therefore, shows the commitment of companies to invest in order to deliver a 
good level of quality. 
This study uses both operational and capital inputs as inputs in the DEA evaluations 
because these represent the real costs of delivering services to consumers, which is a 
product of operating costs and capital costs. A distinctive feature of the electricity 
distribution industry is its' relatively capital intensive production process. As such, they 
require massive amounts of capital in the form of cables and equipments. Thus, capital 
costs are a significant component of total costs and need to be given careful attention in 
evaluating their contribution to efficiency and productivity. 
Taking into account both the operating and capital inputs ensure that a company is not 
encouraged to substitute operating and capital expenditure. If substitution possibilities exist 
(due to different capitalisation policies) whereby capital may be substituted for other inputs 
(and vice \,, ersa) one may find that companies with higher capital costs may have lower 
operating costs whereas companies with lower capital inputs may have higher operating 
costs. In such circumstances, to judge comparative efficiency solely on the ground of 
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operating costs may give a misleading picture of the overall efficiency of companies with 
respect to the use of all inputs (Bosworth et al.. 1996). 
In the last distribution price control review in 1999, OFGEM used econometric methods for 
the assessment of efficiency and they were with reference to operating costs only, ignoring 
capital costs (see OFGEM, 1999b). However, there is a pressing concern that if efficiency 
is primarily assessed on the basis of operating costs, then DNOs may have an incentive to 
substitute capital expenditure for operating expenditure (OFGEM, 2003b, 2002c). This may 
mean DNOs will have the incentive to adopt practices and interpretation of accounting 
standards that give rise to greater capitalisation of costs, and may adapt an inefficient mix 
of operating and capital expenditure in operating their networks. A further concern is that 
the incentives for achieving capital efficiencies would be weaker than for operating costs 
(OFGEM, 2002c). This is because investment is capitalised and enters the regulatory asset 
base and therefore earns a return equal to the allowed cost of capital19 for the duration of 
the assumed life of the asset. This means that DNOs can increase their level of allowed 
revenue by incurring additional capital expenditure. In fact, Bums and Davies (1998) have 
observed that UK DNOs have become more capital intensive since privatisation, and show 
evidence that some of the DNOs are capitalising a significant proportion of operating 
expenditure. In the forthcoming distribution price control review, OFGEM believes that it 
would be beneficial to judge 'overall' or 'total' efficiency without reference to the 
individual cost components in order to balance the incentives for efficient capital 
investment and operating expenditure management (OFGEM, 2003b). 
Ignoring substitution possibilities or trade-offs can also cause problems in performance 
measurement studies when individual costs (say, just operating expenditure) are 
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benchmarked and targets for improved perfon-nance established. These targets may be 
unrealistic and can be dangerous because, as pointed out in the introduction (page 16), this 
may result in companies being incapable of financing their ftinctions. Thus operating 
expenditure and capital costs should be reviewed together to account for the trade-offs that 
exist between them so as to avoid misleading results and avoid creating incentives to over 
invest in the network. Therefore, in this study, the comparative evaluation of DNOs is 
undertaken using all inputs (operational and capital) as opposed to just operational inputs. 
3.2.1.1 Operating Inputs 
Operating inputs include labour costs and expenditure on repairs and maintenance, 
purchase costs of electricity, use of system charges, rates and so on. In this study, these are 
measured by annual expenditure and derived directly from the company's regulatory 
accounts. 
Management can only influence the efficiency of a company with respect to those factors 
that are under its control within the assessment period. If cost categories contain items 
which are beyond the control of the companies it would be appropriate to remove them 
from the DEA benchmarking exercise (DTe, 2000). This is to avoid unfairly penalising 
companies for high costs attributable to factors that are beyond the company's control. 
Also, if uncontrollable costs are not eliminated it will lead to targets that would be 
unrealistic. 
Part of the costs of providing and operating the network that lies beyond the control of 
disti-ibution business management is the transmission connection point exit charges paid to 
National Grid Company (NGC)20 and distribution system business rates levied by the 
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government. These make up around one third of the distribution business operating costs 
but are recovered from customers. These ought to be removed from the operating costs of 
the DNOs to enable the analysis of controllable operating costs. The transmission charges 
and the local taxes do not affect the amount of output produced in our preferred model 
(described in page 99). However, it is worth noting that had prices or revenues been 
included on the output side, the NGC exit charges and business rates need not be removed. 
This is because the higher costs will be offset by the higher prices charged or revenue 
earned by the companies. 
Further, there are regional variations among the DNOs which impact the company's cost 
but is beyond the control of management. Factors beyond management control are the 
geographic location and the inherited (i. e. pre-privatisation) capital stock that includes the 
design and configuration of the network. DNOs have no choice over the physical location 
of their customers and their production activity, and their physical capital is to a large 
degree determined by their history under public ownership. Thus, further adjustments for 
actual regional variations across DNOs need to be carried out in order to make costs more 
comparable. These adjustments are in respect of higher labour costs faced by London and 
for the different arrangements in Scotland, where the 132 kV networks are part of 
transmission, in contrast to England and Wales where they are part of distribution. Section 
3.3.1 below sets out the adjustments of the operating cost data to remove uncontrollable 
dimensions of cost and to normalise for regional differences. The adjustment made for 
London brings it in line with the input price faced by all the other DNOs which is assumed 
to be at the same level in a particular year. For all the other DNOs, the operating cost data 
is used directly for the evaluation of their efficiency in 1999/00. 
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3.2.1.2 Capital Inputs 
The stock of capital inputs used by network operators to provide distnbutIon services 
typically includes poles and cables, transforiners and switch-gears, buildings. vehicles and 
other equipments. In this study, the stock of capital is measured in monetary terms. One 
approach to measuring the physical quantity of capital is using an economic value measure 
i. e. using the perpetual inventory method. The perpetual inventory method involves the 
accumulation of past flows of fixed capital expenditure after the deduction of the estimated 
value of the depreciation of the asset to derive net capital asset measures 21 . An alternative 
approach is using the book values to approximate the economic value of the capital asset. In 
our analysis, we have chosen to use the net book value of tangible fixed assets (i. e. gross 
book value minus depreciation) calculated on a net current cost or replacement cost basis as 
the measure of capital value. This approach was adopted in OFGEM (2003) in measuring 
the productivity improvements in DNOs to inform the forthcoming price control review. 
The net book values are drawn from the company's regulatory accounts. We assume all 
DNOs face the same input prices for capital in a particular year and use the net book values 
directly for the evaluation of DNOs in 1999/00. 
To evaluate the dynamic performance of DNOs over time, we need to harmoMse the 
operating and capital costs data 22 of different years so that the effects of inflation are 
corrected. Otherwise, this might give a false reading of movements in relative efficiency 
and productivity for different productive units. Costs are presented in constant year 1999 
pounds to allow for a meaningful comparison among the different years without 
inflationary effect. The pound values are converted into the 1999 price levels using the 
Consumer Pnce Index (CPl) changes. 
79 
In addition, because we are using accounting infon-nation, we need to make adjustments for 
definitional and accounting differences. These are set out in Section 3.3.2 below. 
3.2.2 Outputs 
Neuberg (1977) suggests four factors on which total distribution costs may be seen to 
depend: amount of electricity sold, number of customers, miles of distribution lines and 
square miles of service territory. It should be emphasised that length of distribution lines is 
not an output, at least not in the sense that companies should strive to maximise network 
length. Miles of distribution line may be regarded as a capital input. Studies that have taken 
length of distribution lines as an output, regard this variable as a kind of proxy for a "linear 
measure of territory" (Neuberg, 1977) or customer dispersion (DTe, 2000). 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) review the frequency with which different input and output 
variables are used. They find that the most frequent measures of outputs used in the 
previous studies are units of energy delivered, number of customers, maximum demand and 
the size of service area. These outputs drive the electricity distribution costs. Bums and 
Weyman-Jones (1996) discuss the detenninants of cost level in electricity distribution and 
show that system security, an aspect of quality of service, also affects distribution costs. 
One could imagine that fewer and shorter duration of failures in the network and quicker 
restoration of failures requires use of more resources. To compare fairly different utilities, 
we need to incorporate quality of service into the production model. 
We specify five outputs that may be relevant to the benchmarking analysis of UK DNOs 
i. e. energy delivered, number of customers, maximum demand, quality of service and 
service area. 
80 
3.2.2.1 Total Units Distributed 
Electricity distribution is about the transportation of electricity from the transmission 
system (a higher voltage network) and the delivery to customer's premises through the 
lower voltage distribution system. 
The total units of electricity delivered is an important operating characteristic of each 
utility. It is important to the specification of the production model for electricity 
distnbution as: 
* it reflects the energy delivered on the network and captures the important differences in 
level of electricity demand; 
e combined with the number of customers, it indicates relative energy density; and 
* along with maximum demand, it indicates the overall capacity of the distribution system 
to deliver electricity. It is assumed that greater deliveries imply a greater capacity to 
deliver electricity. 
3.2.2.2 Maximum Demand 
Maximum demand is an operating environment characteristic and captures the peakiness of 
demand (Bums and Weyman-Jones, 1996). Maximum demand provides a proxy for the 
network and transforiner capacity required by DNOs to allow the delivery of electricity to 
customers at peak time. This reflects the fact that the distnbution system must be 
constructed with sufficient capacity to meet maximum demand at its incidence, even 
though this is well above average demand. The inclusion of maximum demand ensures that 
ively high demand i a distribution network utility that requires more inputs to meet relati 1 is 
not penallsed in the efficiency assessment. 
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3.2-2.3 Total Number of Customers 
DNOs costs are affected by the number of connection points that they must construct and 
service. Customer numbers indicates the number of connection points supplied and captures 
the extent of the system. In addition, the ratio of customers to units distributed accounts for 
energy density. Number of customers and units of electricity distnbuted captures the 
demographic factors that impact on performance. 
There are three output categories based essentially on the type of customer i. e. domestic, 
commercial and industrial customers. The type of customers may affect costs. It is more 
costly to distribute to small volume customers, such as domestic and commercial business, 
than it is to distribute to industries (see EA, 2002). However, including these customer 
categories separately in the DEA model requires too many variables or dimensions to have 
effective discrimination among the fourteen DNOs in the UK. Hence, it was necessary to 
aggregate the homogenous customer categories into a single variable i. e. the total number 
of customers 
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3.2.2.4 The Operating Environment 
The costs of operations may differ structurally from one utility to another as a result of the 
differences in the operating environment such as the climate and geographical areas served 
by different utilities (see, e. g. Filippim and Wild, 2001). Hence, the operating environment 
may influence the utilities' efficiency. Therefore, it is important that inter-utility 
'ch the util' comparisons take into account the environment in whi ity operates when 
measuring comparative efficiency. To account for the constraints of the operating 
environment of the different DNOs, we will use area of the DNOs7 service territory. 
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Service area proxy customer sparsity or the spread of its customers and combined with 
customer numbers reflects customer density. As such, customer density captures the 
demographic factors which impact on performance. Service area is an exogenous operating 
charactenstic of the company's environment. Neuberg's justification for including it is that, 
whilst being neither an output variable nor an input variable, it is a control variable that 
captures important physical differences in distribution systems between firms that have 
implications for the cost incurred (Neuberg, 1977). Service area is a major cost driving 
factor since much of UK is sparsely populated. Increases in service area might lead us to 
expect higher capital and operating expenditures. One can expect that more cables are 
needed to supply electricity to customers in a large area than in a small area, other things 
being equal. Also, a greater labour input from greater repair-team travel time is needed due 
to the greater distance travelled in a large area. If efficiency analysis is conducted in their 
absence, utilities operating in a large area would be considered to be inefficient and the 
managers of these utilities will rightly object that performance evaluation is unfairly 
affected by geographical factors. 
Service area will be incorporated as an output in our DEA model since an increase in the 
area served would either increase the use of resources (inputs) or reduce the quality of 
supply (outputs). The latter is due to the fact that a large area with rural circuits' which is 
predominantly made up of overhead lines is more susceptible to adverse weather than a 
smaller area with 'urban circuits' which has mostly underground cables (e. g. London). A 
larger number of interruptions are likely to happen, particularly when there is bad weather. 
Service area also captures geographical factors that have significant effects on performance. 
However, geography and network design, such as proportions of overhead lines to 
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underground cables, the length of network and the degree of interconnection, are closely 
related. Therefore it is reasonable to capture network design by using geographic factors 
such as service area. 
3.2-2.5 Quality of Service 
DNOs provide a service - the distribution of electricity from the transmission network to 
customers' premises. Quality of service is a key outcome in service production. Thus, 
service production is not totally described by observed inputs and outputs but is also 
defined by the differences in the quality of service. In electricity distribution, the quality 
difference arises from varying levels of services provided in terins of customer 
interruptions, customer minutes lost, fault rates and voltage fluctuation. One would expect, 
on the average, that better quality may require an increase in the use of resources. If not 
taken into account, they appear as cost increases that will bias estimates of efficiency and 
productivity (Olesen and Petersen, 1995) by understating quality increases. Thus, 
companies providing service of higher quality may have lower efficiency scores, not 
because they are less efficient but because they use more resources to provide better service 
to their customers. It is important to measure the efficiency and productivity of the DNOs 
while controlling for quality. Moreover, measuring efficiency without including quality 
would leave out one of the key outcomes of the production process. 
Although there is much concem about quality of service provided by DNOs, the difficulties 
that surround the conceptualisation and operational 1 sati on of quality measures have led to 
its omission in the measurement of electricity distribution efficiency and product'vItY. 
Thus, we attempt to define electricity distribution quality in principle and point to possible 
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operational isati on of quality that is useful for comparative assessment of efficiency and 
productivity. 
The definition of quality is different depending upon the different perspective taken. From 
the operations management perspective (relating to the manufacturing sector), quality is the 
degree of conformance to operating specifications. From the services marketing perspective 
(relating to the service industry), quality is the extent to which a product or service meets 
and/or exceeds a customer's expectation (Gronroos, 1990; Zeithaml, Parasuraman and 
Berry, 1990). The second definition is more customer-orientated, while the first is product- 
orientated. 
The development of the marketing perspective of quality stems from the fact that the 
conformance-to-specification definition of quality failed to address the unique 
characteristics of services. Parasuraman et al. (1985) and Zeithaml et al. (1990) note that 
knowledge about operations quality is not sufficient to fully understand service quality 
because of four unique characteristics of services: their intangibility, heterogeneity, 
inseparability of production and consumption, and perishability. 
In an attempt to describe how customers perceive service quality, Gronroos (1984) 
introduced a model of service quality. He conceptualised service quality with two distinct 
dimensions, technical and functional quality. The technical dimension of quality is what the 
customer actually receives as an outcome of the service. In the electricity distribution 
service, the speed of restoration of failures, the reliability of supply and the stability of 
voltage levels would be measured on the technical dimension of the quality of service. 
However, quality evaluations are not made solely on the outcome of the service, they also 
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involve evaluation of the process of service delivery. The second dimension of quality 
proposed by Gronroos (1984) is the functional quality dimension, and involves the manner 
in which the service is performed and delivered. It reflects the human interaction between 
the customer and the service unit during the service encounter and essentially measures 
how the customer experiences the service encounter. For example, whether appointments 
are kept as scheduled, the response time to phone calls, the response time to complaints and 
enquiries, the courteousness and helpfulness of the staff are all aspects of functional 
quality. 
The roots to service quality measurement date back to the work of Parasuraman et al. 
(1985). Parasuraman et al. (1985) operationallsed the service quality concept and 
developed a comprehensive measurement instrument, called SERVQUAL for evaluating 
customer's assessment of service quality. SERVQUAL consists of five generic service 
quality dimensions - tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance (competence and 
credibility) and empathy (caring individualised attention). For each of these attributes, 
SERVQUAL measures the service expectation of the customer and his perception of the 
service received. The difference between these two is assessed and used as an indication of 
service quality. 
Despite Parasuraman's et al. (1988) initial claim that their five service quality dimensions 
are generic, it is generally agreed that this is not the case, and that the number and 
definition of dimensions vanes depending on the context (Cannan, 1990; Babakus and 
Boller, 1992). Babakus and Boller (1992) conducted a large empincal. study on an electric 
and gas utility company using the SERVQUAL instrument. They concluded that the 
dimensionality of SERVQUAL may be problematic and in the industry under investigation 
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service quality probably is unidimensional on the basis that customers of utility services 
rarely have close contact with the provider. Babakus and Boller believe that that this is due 
to the service being delivered on a continuous basis without face-to-face contact, by a 
monopolistic company. 
The more recent study by Mels, Boshoff and Nel (1997) provided empirical evidence that 
the SERQVUAL instrument consist of two empirical factors (which they termed intrinsic 
and extrinsic service quality) and not five as suggested by Parasuraman et al. (1988). The 
study supported the original perspective by Gronroos (1984) who argued that service 
quality perceptions are largely determined by two dimensions. 
To define the dimensions of quality in electricity distribution, it is worth looking at the 
system of regulation of quality of service in the UK. The privatisation of the electricity 
supply industry in 1990 saw the introduction of controls on the quality of service through 
the implementation of the Guaranteed and Overall Standards of Performance (GOSP). 
These standards relate only to the distribution and supply functions of the industry. Key 
aspects of control on the quality of service were: 
* product quality - for example the voltage and frequency of electricity; 
e reliability of supply - for example minutes off supply and frequency of interruptions, 
speed of restoration of supply following failures and speed of provision of new services; 
* customer interface/service - for example, billing procedures, appointment keeping, 
supply of infon-nation, responses to complaints and enquiries. 
These three key aspects of control were encapsulated in Bowderys' (1994a, 1994b) 
categorisation of service quality. He categonsed the quality dimensions within the four 
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utilities - telecommunications, gas, water and electricity - as product integrity, standards of 
supply and firm/customer interface. In a study by The Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) (2001) to compare quality levels, standards and regulation strategies for 
electricity distribution and supply in European countries, they identified that the EU 
countries have a broadly similar approach to the types of standards used to define service 
quality. These include commercial quality standards relating to customer service, continuity 
of supply standards which mainly related to the reliability of electricity supply and voltage 
quality standards which define the level of quality of delivered product. Based on this, they 
proposed that quality of service in electricity distribution and supply has three dimensions: 
commercial quality, continuity of supply and voltage quality (CEER, 2001,2003). These 
three dimensions are similar to those suggested by Bowdery (I 994a, 1994b). 
The first dimension proposed by CEER refers to the service quality produced by the 
interaction between the customer and the provider (resembling what Gronroos called 
functional quality) and the last two dimensions correspond to the outcomes of the service 
(resembling technical quality). Therefore, the continuity of supply and voltage quality can 
be consolidated into a single scale. We define the two dimensions of quality in electricity 
distnbution as the quality of customer service and the quality of supply. Hence, the 
preferred model for service quality of electricity distribution is a two-dimensional service 
quality model. 
We can define plausible measures of quality to reflect the two dimensions of quality. 
However. it may not be a comprehensive measure that accounts for all the facets of quality 
provided in electricity disti-ibution. 
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The quality of customer service covers many aspects of a relationship between a 
customer and a supplier. It includes the perfori-nance of the phone centre (speed of 
telephone response, quality of telephone response which includes the politeness and 
helpfulness of staff and the accuracy and usefulness of infori-nation supplied, busy signal 
rates, abandoned calls), competence and performance of field personnel (appointment 
keeping, installation and repair delays, delays in estimating installation charges), response 
time on customer complaints and the provision of information. The intangible elements are 
difficult for an organisation. to assess and measure since they may depend on the 
expectations and internal satisfaction value of the customer. These elements are usually 
measured by organisations by the analysis of customer complaints and surveys of customer 
satisfaction (Fitzgerald et al., 1989). 
OFGEM has published data on the number of complaints handled by OFGEM and the 
Electricity Consumer Committees and on the number of penalty payments made by the 
DNOs to customers for failing to meet the related standards as laid down in the Guaranteed 
and Overall Standards. However, the number of complaints and the number of penalty 
payments are poor indicators of customer satisfaction. This is because, not many customers 
are aware of the existence of an overseeing body and mechanisms for appeal, or the 
existence of the system of penalty payments when companies fail to comply with standards. 
Findings from a survey conducted on the Attitudes of Business and Domestic Electricity 
Customers on the Quality of Supply by MORI for OFFER (1999) indicate that only half of 
business customers are aware of the system of penalty payments and this proportion fell to 
one-third among the domestic customers. Moreover, awareness that the system exist is no 
guarantee that customers would know how to make a claim or make an appeal. The 
findings of the study also show that Just eight per cent of domestic customers and six per 
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cent of business customers say that they would know how to claim a penalty payment from 
their supplier. 
The survey conducted by MORI on behalf of OFGEM on the Experience of the 
Competitive Market (OFGEM, 2001b), provides some information on the satisfaction level 
of customers with their current supplier. However, this related to overall satisfaction levels 
and not company specific and, thereby, of limited use in the comparative assessment of 
DNOs (OFFER, 1999). 
With the recent introduction of the quality of service incentive scheme in April 2002, 
OFGEM has imposed a requirement on DNOs to collect information on the speed and 
quality of telephone response in order to assess the performance of the phone centre. These 
will be included into the incentive scheme from April 2004 to reward companies with 
above average perforinance and penalise those below the average of all companies 
(OFGEM, 2001 a). However, data collection has only recently been initiated and there is no 
data available on the past perfonnance of phone centres. 
Due to the lack of adequate data, the quality of customer service dimension will be omitted 
in the measurement of efficiency and productivity in this study. This is not a serious 
omission however, as in the electricity distribution sector quality of supply is the dominant 
dimension. Thus, in this study we adopt a definition of quality provided by the dimension 
of quality of supply. 
ii) In electricity distribution, reliability measures have been often used as indicators of 
qualiO, of supp4v. Reliability measures are considered to be the measure that customers 
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place the most importance or care most about. The major concern of customers is to have a 
continuous uninterrupted supply (OFFER, 1999: OFGEM, 2001b). In a survey on the 
Experience on the Competitive Market by OFGEM (2001b), customers rated the duration 
and frequency of interruptions to supply as the most important aspects of quality. 
Generally, a high emphasis was placed on reducing the duration of interruptions followed 
by reducing the number of interruptions. Frequent but shorter interruptions can have serious 
adverse consequences on commercial and industrial customers such as damage to 
equipment and production and/or financial loss. Reliability metrics gauge the frequency and 
duration of interruptions to supply. The most common measures include: Cl, the Customer 
Interruption index or the average number of occasions per year when customers could 
expect to experience an interruption and CML, the Customer Minutes Lost index or the 
average minutes that a customer could expect to be without electricity in a year. These 
measures relate to overall quality of supply perfon-nance. However, averages for a 
companies' network as a whole may fail to identify unacceptable poor quality of supply 
suffered by a minority of customers e. g. customers who are frequently inconvenienced by 
interruptions or who are always the last to have power restorations (they are referred to as 
the worst-served customers). In order to address reliability from a more customer-onentated 
point of view, other measures are the percentage of interruptions restored within 3 hours 
and within 24 hours. These require companies to restore service within a specific time 
frame and reflect the speed with which the company responds to faults. In fact, the 
customer survey by Accent (2003) for OFGEM found that one of the most important 
aspects of a distributor's service is the rapid restoration of power supplies. We prefer to use 
the percentage of interruptions restored within 3 hours of fault to reflect reliability of 
service as there is very little variability in performance with regard to the measure on the 
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percentage of interruptions restored within 24 hours of fault since most interruptions are, in 
fact, restored within 24 hours. 
However, the existing quality indicators in electricity distribution may be problematic for a 
DEA evaluation. These quality measures are in the form of indices or percentages and are 
not compatible with the other inputs and outputs which are in the form of volume measures. 
By doubling the size of all volume inputs and outputs, when the index/percentage is treated 
as an output, does not mean that the index/percentage output has to be doubled for equal 
efficiency (Dyson et al., 200 1). DEA models run with indices or percentages mixed with 
volume measures may provide misleading results and, in addition, give meaningless targets 
for the index/percentage measures. 
Thus, it is necessary to operationalise the existing quality indicators and derive a plausible 
set of quality measures that is compatible for DEA evaluations. The derivation of suitable 
quality measures from the available information (i. e. Cl, CML and the percentage of 
interruptions restored within 3 hours of fault) and their incorporation in the basic DEA 
model is addressed below. 
a) Percentage of Interruptions Restored Within 3 Hours of Fault 
An approach suggested by Dyson et al. (2001) to include percentages in the DEA model is 
to separate the numerator and denominator and include the numerator as an output and the 
denominator as an input. For example, Thanassoulis, Boussofiane and Dyson (1995) in the 
assessment of perinatal care units perceived infant survival rate to be a key variable, and 
included babies at risk as an input and survivals as an output. This is because survivals can 
only be defined with reference to the number of babies at risk. We -will adopt the same 
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approach in this study. Since percentage of interruptions restored within 3 hours of fault is a 
nested measure we will treat the total number of interruptions restored within 3 hours of 
fault as an output and the total number of interruptions as an input. 
second issue with the use of the above quality measures is in relation to the total 
weighting freedom possessed by the standard DEA model in determining efficiency. The 
total freedom of choice of weight may be unsuitable with the use of the above quality 
measures. This is because interruptions restored within 3 hours of fault appearing as an 
output is directly linked with the total number of interruptions, the corresponding input, and 
together they define the percentage of interruptions restored within 3 hours of fault. 
Therefore, the weights for the two variables must be equalised or at least strongly linked 
through the use of weight restrictions. Otherwise, the weighting freedom of DEA would 
allow, for example, a company to ignore or attach low weights to interruptions restored 
within 3 hours of fault but attach a high weight to number of interruptions in order to 
improve its efficiency rating. This may not correspond to the desire for a high percentage of 
supply restoration (Thanassoulis et al., 1995; Allen, Athanassopoulus, Dyson and 
Thanassoulis, 1997; Dyson et al., 2001). Therefore, we impose weight restrictions to link 
the weights of these two variables using the trade-off approach devised by Podinovski 
(2000,2002). The trade-off approach and the detailed analysis of the incorporation of 
weight restrictions based on trade-offs is discussed in Chapter 4. 
b) Customer Interruptions Index (CI) and Customer Minutes Lost Index (CML) 
The use of these quality measures also necessitates two problems to be handled before 
execution of the DE A models so that the results make managerial sense. 
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First is to eliminate the problem of handling index measures in DEA. One of the methods 
for eliminating the problems of handling index measures in DEA is by replacing it with 
surrogate measures (Dyson et al., 2001). For example, Thanassoulis, Dyson and Foster 
(1987) in a study of UK local authorities used surrogate measures such as number of 
summons and distress warrants issued to recalcitrant payers of local tax in place of the 
index for social deprivation. These surrogate measures were volume measures, which were 
compatible with the rest of the inputs and outputs in the study. In this study, we use volume 
measures such as the total number of interruptions and the total duration of interruptions in 
place of Cl and CML. These quality measures will be derived directly from CI and CML by 
multiplying them with the total number of customers. 
A second issue is that the classical DEA models assume that inputs have to be minimised 
and outputs maximised. However the total number of interruptions and total duration of 
interruptions (output quality) have the characteristics of larger values being less preferable, 
i. e. larger values are not desirable. In the electricity distribution context, these output 
quality measures quantify the lack of quality as opposed to improved quality. They are 
negatively valued and need to be minimised. In the literature, outputs that need to be 
minimised are usually tenned as 'bad' or 'undesirable outputs' (Fare, Grosskopf and Roos, 
1995) and 'anti-isotonic' (Dyson et al., 2001). 
The DEA literature has proposed several ways of integrating undesirable outputs in DEA. 
The different ways of integrating undesirable outputs in DEA has been classified by Scheel 
(2001) as indirect and direct approaches. Indirect approaches transfonn the values of 
undesirable outputs in such a way that the transforined data is regarded as usual or normal 
outputs afterwards to be included in the DEA model. The DEA model is applied without 
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any modification. In contrast, direct approaches use the original output data but modify the 
classical DEA assumptions in order to treat the undesirable output appropriatek. 
An indirect way of incorporating undesirable outputs is by introducing these quality 
measures as outputs negative in sign, of which the algebraic increase (i. e., the absolute 
reduction) is deemed desirable. This approach is called additive inverse (i. e. the 
multiplication of the values of undesirable outputs by -1). This method was suggested by 
Koopmans (195 1) and applied, e. g. by Berg, Forsund and Jansen (1992). Another approach 
is to treat the undesirable outputs as classical DEA inputs. In this approach the variables are 
moved from the output side to the input side of the model. This approach generates the 
same technology as the additive inverse approach. The only difference is the sign of the 
undesirable outputs. This method was suggested and tested by Tyteca (1997). A third 
possibility is to transform the data by translation, i. e. by adding a sufficiently large scalar 
to the additive inverse of the undesirable output such that the resulting output values are 
positive for each assessment unit. The transformed data is regarded as normal outputs. The 
drawback of using this method is that it moves the zero to a different position and the 
choice of the scalar can alter the efficient frontier. This problem has been defined as 
'translation variance'. Instead of translating the undesirable outputs, another option is to 
treat them as normal outputs after inversing or taking their reciprocals. This method was 
suggested by Golany and Roll (1989) and applied, e. g. by Lovell, Pastor and Turner (1995). 
Taking the inverse of the undesirable outputs has the disadvantage that it destroys the ratio 
or interval scales of the original data. In addition, the inverse of zero value does not exist. 
Furthem-lore, the efficiency classification when choosing inversion can differ from the 
alternative approaches. Either for inversion or translation, the resulting data has to undergo 
further transfonnation x,,,, hen interpreting the results. 
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The foregoing approaches are based on the classical DEA assumption of strong 
disposability where desirable and undesirable outputs are considered separately (i. e. it is 
always possible to reduce undesirable outputs without decreasing the desirable outputs or 
increasing the inputs). Another variant approach suggested by Scheel (2001) is where the 
undesirable outputs are incorporated as outputs negative in sign in a way that considers the 
desirable and undesirable outputs jointly i. e. where decreasing the undesirable outputs will 
decrease desirable outputs as well (but without modifying the classical DEA assumption of 
strong disposability). This approach yields different efficiency scores and rankings but 
appears to be more 'restrictive' then previous approaches. However, this approach is 
limited to the situation where there is only one output negative in sign. 
Some of these indirect methods of transformation of data may not provide a meaningful 
managerial interpretation or may give rise to computational complexity. In the electricity 
distribution context, the translation of 'total minutes of interruptions' i. e. the total 
uninterrupted minutes (i. e. 365 days * 24 hours * 60 min * number of customers - total 
interrupted minutes) results in data that is so large that there would be lack of variability 
among the units. By rescaling, the data is transformed into long decimal numbers, without 
improving variability but giving nse to implementation issues. Even if the number and 
duration of interruptions are modelled by inversing or translating them (and treated as 
normal outputs) but the measurement of efficiency is conducted in the input-conserving 
orientation, inefficiencies in clearing up interruptions will go unnoticed. 
In contrast to the indirect approach, the direct approach of Incorporating undesirable 
outputs modifies the classical DEA assumption of strong di 11 of undesirable 
96 
Outputs. This approach suggested by Fare et al. (1989) replaces strong disposability of 
outputs by the assumption that undesirable outputs are weakly disposable. I. e.. their 
production can be reduced only at the expense of joint reduction in some other outputs, or 
an joint increase in the use of some inputs. The efficient frontier created by the weak 
disposability approach differs from all the previous approaches. Dyckhoff and Allen 
(2001) warn against using this approach unless there is absolute certainty about the 
relationship between the undesirable output and certain inputs and outputs. 
The alternative ways of integrating undesirable outputs can lead to different efficiency 
scores and different efficient units (Dyson et al., 2001). According to Scheel (2001), a unit 
which appears efficient under the weak disposability or the multiplicative inverse approach 
would remain efficient in the additive inverse, input and translation approaches, although 
the radial efficiency scores may change. Scheel (2001) made these connections based on 
variable returns to scale technology (BCC model). 
In this study we will treat the number and duration of interruptions as classical DEA inputs 
as it appears to be a more natural approach since the onginal data is used. Furthen-nore, as 
percentage of interruptions restored within 3 hours of fault Is considered to be an important 
output quality measure and is nested, the total number of interruptions need to be treated as 
an input whilst the total number of interruptions restored within 3 hours of fault has to be 
treated as an output (refer to discussion in the previous section (page 92)). Treating the total 
duration of interruptions as an input can be justified by the fact that to remedy failures on 
the distribution network one needs time and time is a type of resource. Maintenance time 
cannot be eliminated and is a price to pay for the outputs. It is similar to service time where 
longer time taken is deemed not desirable. Since we are using an input -savings orientation 
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(as discussed in Section 3.2.4 below), this will further enable the calculation of the 
efficiency in service delivery (i. e. in clearing up interruptions) when cost variables are held 
fixed. 
There have been some concerns that the output quality data such as Cl and CML are not 
measured consistently and accurately over time. Some DNOs manually estimated the 
number of customers affected by any fault while others have installed sophisticated IT 
systems which provide an accurate number. The accurate data in effect tapped an increase 
in the number as well as the duration of interruptions to supply, thereby adversely affecting 
the performance of the DNOs with IT systems installed. Apart from measurement 
differences, definitional differences also affect the quality of the data. The output quality 
data (Cl and CML) thus need to be adjusted for definitional and measurement differences to 
standardise them in order to make them comparable across DNOs. These issues and 
adjustments are presented in Section 3.3.3 below. 
3.2.3 The Preferred Model 
Following the above discussions, the preferred model in this study is presented in the 
following table. The preferred model was selected on the basis that: key inputs of the 
capacity to distribute electricity are included in the model; the model's output measures 
provide the best representation of activities associated with electricity distribution, the 
quality of service measures reflect what customers actually value, and the nature of the 
operating environment which impact on performance is captured in the model. These 
inputs, outputs and quality measures are quantifiable and relate to the key objectives of the 
DNOs. 
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Inputs: Outputs: Quality measures: Environ mental 
controlfactor 
I. Operating costs 1. Total number of customers 1. Total number of 1. Service Area 
(EM) interruptions (as input) (sq. km) (as 
2. Total units distributed output) 
2. Capital (Em) (GWh) 2. Total duration of 
interruptions (hours) 
3. Maximum demand (MW) (as input) 
3. Total number of 
interruptions restored 
within 3 hours of 
failure (as output) 
3.2.4 DEA Model Orientation 
Efficiency can be assessed either on input mimmising or output maximising basis. In the 
current study, an input-conserving orientation will be used for estimation of efficiency and 
productivity of the DNOs. The measurement of efficiency in the input-conserving 
orientation takes outputs as given and seeks to reduce inputs (proportionately) as much as 
possible given technology. This choice is rationalised by the indication of the regulator 
(OFGEM, 1999b) in its final proposals on the review of the distribution price control that 
"... the primary objectives of this price control review have been to strengthen 
the incentives on companies to increase efficiency and reduce costs, so that 
prices to customers can be lowered, while recogrusing that sufficient revenue 
must be raised to maintain an appropriate quality of supply... " 
The DNOs are obliged to meet their customers' requirements for electricity with a goal of 
minimising the amount of resources they use in doing so whilst maintaining an appropriate 
level of service quality. The DNOs provide a universal service. The managers do not seek 
to maximise the customers connected (since the network is saturated) nor do they seek to 
24 
maximise the amount of energy delivered . In addition, the 
DNOs operate in defined 
teITItOI-ICS. Given the universal service obligations and defined temtories of DNOs, the 
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level and mix of output is wholly external or exogenous to the utilities. It may therefore be 
input conserving meaningless to suggest that output be raised to increase efficiency. The i 
orientation appears to be more consistent with the regulated context of electricity 
distribution. In fact, the previous studies in electricity distribution have all employed input- 
based DEA measures to evaluate the efficiency and productivity of distribution network 
utilities (as pointed out in Chapter 2 page 59). 
In addition, an input-conserving orientation will allow measurement of the relative cost 
efficiency of the DNOs when the quality variables are fixed (as non-discretionary). The 
cost efficiency model examines the cost Implications of inefficiencies in DNOs and 
estimates the potential savings from improving efficiency. The efficiency would reflect the 
interest of shareholders. 
In this study, the total number of interruptions and the total duration of interruptions are 
treated as inputs. By using an input-saving orientation, we will also be able to calculate the 
efficiency in service delivery (i. e. in clearing up interruptions), when the cost variables are 
fixed (as non-discretionary). The all quality model examines the efficiency of DNOs 
within the costs. The absolute reduction in these undesirable outputs that will be necessary 
to be efficient can also be measured. This would be in the customers' interest. 
3.3 Data and Adjustments 
3.3.1 Adjustments to Operating Cost Data 
The operating cost was defined as operating expense excluding one-off restructuring and 
other charges and depreciation. Operating expenses include the following cost items: cost 
of sales, distribution and administration cost, and monetar-y working capital (MWCA )25. 
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Depreciation was excluded from operating costs as this is not a cash outlay. Cost associated 
is with one-off restructuring and other charges (exceptional costs) was also excluded. Thi 
resulted in net operating costs. 
As pointed out on page 77, we need to remove the part of operating costs that lie beyond 
the company's control. About one third of costs of providing and operating the network is 
considered to be largely outside the control of the DNOs, including the transmission 
connection point exit charges paid to National Gird Company (NGC) (transmission 
charges) and distribution system business rates (local taxes) levied by the governinent. The 
twelve DNOs in England and Wales pay the transmission charges to NGC (in Scotland 
transmission charges are paid by generators and suppliers, in contrast to arrangement in 
England and Wales). The distribution system business rates are levied by the government ID 
on all the fourteen DNOs. The transmission business charges and business rates charged on 
distribution systems costs were stripped out from operating costs to enable analysis of 
DNOs' controllable operating costs. It is worth noting that had prices or revenues been 
included as an output, this may have been unnecessary. This is because the DNOs are 
allowed to pass-on these costs to customers by charging higher prices which offset the 
uncontrollable element of costs. 
In addition, there are regional variations among the DNOs which impact company costs 
and quality of supply but are beyond the control of management. Factors beyond 
management control are the inherent and inherited differences such as the geographic 
location of their production activity and the inherited capital stock that include the design 
and configuration of the network. In order to make costs more comparable, further 
adjustments are made to the controllable operating costs to normalise for regional 
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differences across DNOs. The adjustments are in respect of higher labour costs faced by 
London and for the different arrangements in Scotland, where the 132 kV networks are part 
of transmission, in contrast to England and Wales where they are part of distribution. 
Adjustments to controllable operating costs due to regional variations in these two 
circumstances are as follows. 
a) Labour Costs of London Electricity 
Wages paid by DNOs are determined largely by labour market conditions and, therefore, lie 
outside their control. As wage rate or labour costs may vary strongly between regions, we 
may be identifying (labour costs) inefficiencies of some DNOs that are not within their 
control. We therefore need to correct for wage rate differentials where possible, by re- 
scaling labour costs. Amongst all the fourteen regional DNOs, London Electricity faces the 
highest wage rates. We re-scale the labour cost of London Electricity by the ratio of 
London to Great Britain (GB) wage rates. 
The labour costs adjustments are performed in the following manner in accordance to the 
approach used by OFGEM (I 999a): 
1. Labour costs data. The information on labour costs were taken from the Review of 
Public Electricity Suppliers 1998-2000: Business Plans, Consultation Paper by OFFER 
(1998) which provided data for 4 years from 1994/95 to 1997/98. The labour costs for 
the rest of the periods (i. e. 1990/91-1993/94 and 1998/99-1999/00) were extrapolated 
from the available data by regressing staff costs against controllable operating costs. 
. 
Tcost. To assess the appropriate staff costs, the different grades of staff 2. Assessing the stqf 
within London Electricity were examined. The table below shows the grade types that 
were used and the percentage of staff in each grade. The table also shows the 
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corresponding Group classification in the 1999 New Earnings Survey classification, 
from which average weekly earnings for each grade were obtained. 
I Calculating the average earnings per employee per week in London and Great Britain. 
Multiplying the weekly earnings of each grade by the percentage of staff in that grade 
gives average earnings per employee in GB of L428 per week. Based on the above 
grading of staff, the average weekly earnings in London area is f-494.60 per week. 
Table 3.1 Analysis of DNOs' Manpower Figures for 1999/00 
GRADE GRADE GRADE GRADE GRADE 
OFFER SEMI SENIOR 
DESCRIPTION UNSKILLED SKILLED INDUSTRIAL PROFESSIONAL PROFESSIONAL 
NEW EARNING 
SURVEY GROUP ALL MANUALS GROUP 4 GROUP 56 GROUP2A GROUPIA 
AVERAGEWEEKLY 
EARNING GB 335 299.1 411.6 563.3 696 
AVERAGEWEEKLY 
EARNING LONDON 376.9 335.4 484.6 623.6 867.7 
% OF STAFF 
IN GROUP 4% 26% 44% 19% 7% 
Weekly earning figures are as at April 1999 obtained from the New Earnings Survey by the 
Office for National Statistics (Office for National Statistics, 2000). 
The different grades of staff and the percentage of staff in group are from Review of Public 
Electricity Supplier 1998 - 2000: Distribution Price Control Review: Consultation Paper, May 
1999 (OFGEM, 1999a). 
4. Deriving the index q earning. This was done by dividing the average earnings per )f 
employee in London with the average earnings per employee in GB giving the figure 
1.16. Therefore, London's labour costs might be expected to be 16% above GB 
average. 
5. Adjusting labour cost. London's staff cost in 1999/00 was estimated to be f60.6m. The 
labour cost is adjusted by dividing the staff cost with the index of earning to arrive at a 
figure of E52.2 million. In other words, on a GB basis the labour costs might have been 
expected to be f 52.2 m (f 60.6m. /l. 16), implying a labour costs adjustment of f 8.4 m. 
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So, London Electricity's controllable operating cost in 1999/00 was downgraded by f8.4 
million. The same procedure was used to adjust the controllable operating costs of London 
Electricity for the rest of the period of analysis i. e. 1990/91 to 1998/99. It is worth noting 
that had price or revenue been an output in the DEA model, this adjustment may have been 
unnecessary. 
b) The Different Arrangements in Scotland 
There are two DNOs in Scotland - Hydro-Electric (covers the south of Scotland) and 
ScottishPower (covers the north). In these DNOs, the 132 kV networks are part of 
transmission, in contrast to England and Wales where they are part of distribution 26. To 
adjust for the different arrangement in Scotland, the controllable operating costs per total 
length of distribution lines of the two DNOs were multiplied with the length of their 132kV 
lines. Subsequently, the controllable operating costs of the Scottish DNOs were grossed up 
by this amount. 
3.3.2 Other Adjustments to Cost Data 
(a) Using a Consistent Definition for Fixed Assets 
The valuation of fixed asset was different among three categories of DNOs: some had 
deducted customers' contribution (network connection charges paid by customers) from 
fixed assets (i. e. Yorkshire, SEEBOARD, Midlands, Northern, SWEB, EastMidlands, 
Eastern and London), others had changed the treatment of customer contribution in 
subsequent years in which customer contribution was treated as deferred income and 
released to the profit and loss account over the operational life of the related asset (i. e. 
Southern, NORWEB and SWALEC), and the rest followed the latter treatment from the 
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initial point of vesting (i. e. Manweb, Hydro-Electric and ScottishPower). The deduction of 
customers' contribution from fixed asset is not in accordance with the Companies Act 
1985, which requires fixed assets to be included at their purchase Price and hence 
customers' contribution would need to be presented as deferred income. Furthermore, 
contributions from customers relate directly to the cost of fixed assets required to provide 
electricity supply and therefore in our opinion should not be excluded from fixed assets. In 
order to maintain a consistent approach across companies and over time to the valuation of 
fixed assets for comparative assessment purposes, we adjust the net book value of fixed 
assets of all DNOs to conform to the treatment of customers' contributions in accordance to 
the Companies Act 1985. Thus, total fixed assets include customers' contributions. 
The adaptation of the new accounting Standards, Financial Reporting Standard 15 (FRS 
15), by Southern in the year ended 31 March 1999, has resulted in a revision of the useful 
economic lives of distribution assets. The financial impact of the changes was af 15.1 m 
increase in depreciation. The net book value of fixed asset at I April 1997 was reduced by 
E140.8 m (see the 1998/99 company regulatory accounts). The necessary adjustments were 
made to the 1998/99 and 1999/00 depreciation and net book value of fixed assets figures to 
eliminate the effect of FRS 15 in order to have a consistent definition with previous years. 
Yorkshire and SEEBOARD adopted the FRS 15 in the year ended 31 March 2000; 
however no adjustment were made to the 1999/00 figures as the amount was nominal. 
(b) Using a Consistent Accounting Convention 
Some of the companies within the sample of DNOs in the analysis have had their financial 
statements prepared in historical cost format, in particular ScottishPower, Hydro-Electric 
and Manweb (partly, i. e. from 199-5/96). As the calculation of costs in the analysis is to be 
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on a current cost basis, adjustments need to be done to conforrn the financial statements to 
the current cost format. Since the net book values of tangible fixed assets were also 
provided in the current cost forinat in the accounts, these were extracted directly. The 
necessary adjustments were made only to the HCA operating costs based on the adjustment 
factors provided in the Regulatory Accounts of the relevant DNOs. 
3.3.3 Adjustments to Quality of Supply Data 
The distribution businesses were not using consistent definitions to collate quality of supply 
information or had made significant changes to the measurement systems over time. As a 
result, the number of interruptions and the duration of interruptions have not been measured 
consistently or accurately over time. It was estimated that the DNOs may have been as 
much as 30 per cent off mark in their reported performance (OFGEM, 2000a). This would 
undermine relative judgements of efficiency. The differences in these performance 
measures across DNOs are due to definitional difference and the way it was measured by 
the DNOs. 
The distribution businesses were not using consistent definitions to collate quality of supply 
information, particularly on the number and duration of interruptions to supply. For 
example, there are differences in how duration of interruption to supply is defined. Some 
DNOs were waiting until the second or third call received before recording the incident 
start time rather than the first notification (e. g. via telephone) that they receive from 
customers. These inconsistencies accounted for a large proportion of the reported 
differences in quality of supply perforinance across DNOs. 
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The distribution businesses have different measurement systems in place. Some DNOs have 
sophisticated IT systems and a detailed map of the network. The measurement system is 
more fully automated and more able to assess the impact on customers of the performance 
of their network. Faults tend to be automatically detected and if it is a temporary fault, 
supply is restored immediately via remote control. Only in the circumstance where the fault 
is caused by damage to the network, is an engineer dispatched to the location. Customer 
infori-nation is directly connected to their physical distribution networks (this is often called 
4 connectivity'), so that, in the event of an interruption, customers that have been affected by 
a fault in the network are identified with more accuracy and the length of time supply is 
interrupted is recorded automatically. 
In contrast., there are other DNOs that only operate manually by dispatching an engineer as 
soon as customers report supply interruptions. Most faults are not reported iminediately and 
the company only becomes aware when a customer informs that supply has been 
interrupted. There is no link between customer information and the physical network. The 
engineer would have to identify the affected circuit, repair the fault and provide inforination 
on the estimated number of customers interrupted and the restoration times. Much was done 
by averaging or estimating, leading to unreliable and inaccurate results. Hence, the 
accuracy in reporting varied across DNOs- 
The appendix to this chapter (page 253) summarises, in broad tenns, the different levels of 
connectivity and where distribution businesses were in relation to each other prior to 
'1001/02. Briefly, three DNOs had no connectivity, whilst most had connectivity models at 
least to the HV/LV transformer level (HV - high voltage, LV- low voltage) and only one 
had connectivity at the LV node level. 
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In order to improve the consistency of information, in April 2001, OFGEM introduced 
consistent definitions for collating quality of supply inforination for the application of the 
National Fault and Interruption Reporting Scheme (NaFIRS). These are set out in the 
Regulatory Instructions and Guidance document (OFGEM, 2001 c). To facilitate 
improvements in the accuracy of information, OFGEM has put in place minimum levels of 
accuracy that DNOs must meet for reporting on the number and duration of interruptions to 
supply. Since April 2002, all distribution businesses must meet a minimum level of overall 
accuracy of 95% and a minimum level of accuracy of 90% at the LV level in reporting 
number and duration of interruptions to supply (see Table 3.2). To meet these accuracy 
levels, the DNOs were required to make changes to their measurement systems and to 
introduce a connectivity model linking customer infori-nation down to the LV circuit 
leve, 27 . At present, all DNOs have some form of connectivity model in place that will allow 
customer information to be associated (either automatically or manually) with the network 
down to the LV level (OFGEM, 2002a). However, these were only initiated in 2001/02. 
Table 3.2 Minimum Levels of Reporting Accuracy 
Minimum Level of Accuracy Minimum Overall 
for LV System Interruptions Level of Accuracy 
Number of interruptions to supply 90 95 
Duration of interruptions to supply 90 95 
Source: OFGEM, IIP: Output Measures and Monitoring Delivery between Reviews. Final 
Proposals. Sept. 2000 (OFGEM, 2000a). 
In order to achieve homogeneity and make the data more comparable across DNOs and 
ovei, time, it is necessary to adjust the historic data on quality of supply for the definitional 
and measurement differences. The adjustments were based on OFGEMs' estimate of the 
108 
percentage change in performance due to historic changes in measurement system i. e. prior 
to 2001/2002 and the percentage change in performance for the changes in definitions 
introduced in April 2001 (OFGEM, 2001a). OFGEM derived these estimates based on the 
impact of the changes in definition and measurement systems on quality of supply 
performance, particularly the number and duration of interruptions to supply. The impact of 
changes in definition differs for the number and duration of interruptions to supply. 
Broadly, it has been estimated that there would be a fall in the reported number of 
interruptions to supply and an increase in the duration of interruptions to supply. On the 
contrary, the impact of the changes in the measurement system was to deteriorate both the 
performance, in the sense of increasing the number, and duration of interruptions to supply, 
all other things being equal. 
The percentage changes to the number and duration of interruptions to supply were 
extracted from OFGEM's publication (OFGEM, 2001 a) and are presented in the Table 3.3 
and Table 3.4 below. 
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Table 3.3 Percentage Changes to the Number of Interruptions to SupplY 
Company Changes to performance 
Due to changes in 
measurement systems 
rior to 2001/02 
Due to 2001/02 changes in 
definition 
Eastem (a) (b) 
East MidlandsTýT- -4.4 
London (a) (b) 
Manweb 13.2 -3.5 
Midlands 23.6 -10.8 
Northem (b) -7.9 
NORWEB (b) -6.1 
SEEBOARD 16 -5.1 
Southem (a) (b) 
SWALEC (b) -3.5 
SWEB (b) -4.3 
Yorkshire (b) -8.7 
Hydro-Electric (b) -3.5 
ScottishPower 3 -1.2 z (a) Changes in definition did not lead to changes in reported performance 
(b) Company did not implement significant changes to the measurement systems prior to 2001/02. 
Source: OFGEM, IIP: Incentive Schemes. Final Proposals. (OFGEM, 2001 a). 
Table 3.4 Percentage Changes to the Duration of Interruptions to Supply 
Company Changes to performance 
Due to changes in 
measurement systems 
prior to 2001/02 
Due to 2001/02 changes in 
definition 
Eastern (a) (b) 
East Midlands (a) (b) 
London (a) (b) 
Manweb (a) 12.7 
Midlands 18.4 0.5 
Northern (b) 6.2 
NORWEB (b) 0.5 
SEEBOARD 10.5 0.1 
Southern (b) 5.6 
SWALEC (b) 1.7 
SVv'EB (b) 2 
- (b) Yorkshire -2.1 
Hydro-Electric (b) 0.4 
ScottishPower (a) 22.8 
(a) Company had collated information consistent with the definition of incident start time recently 
introduced. Incident start time is from the first notification (e. g. via telephone) of supply 
interruption received from customers. 
(b) Company did not implement significant changes to the measurement systems prior to 2001, '02. 
Sourcc: OFGEM, IIP: Incentive Schemes. Final Proposals. (OFGEM, 2001a). 
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Whilst the definitional differences do not vary much over the years since vesting, the 
measurement system of some of the DNOs have significantly changed over the years. In 
particular, Manweb, Midlands, SEEBOARD and ScottishPower introduced changes to their 
measurement system in 1997/98, whereby they implemented some form of connectivity 
model that captured with much more accuracy the impact on customers of incidents on the 
network. Hence, these DNOs recorded higher number and duration of interruptions to 
supply since the implementation of changes to their measurement system. 
In order to be able to make robust comparisons of performance across DNOs, it is 
necessary to adjust the quality of supply data i. e. the total number of interruptions, total 
duration of interruptions and total number of interruptions due to distribution faults restored 
within 3 hours of fault to compensate for the definitional and measurement system 
differences across DNOs and over time within the DNOs. We consider the impact of the 
changes in the definition and the measurement system on the number of interruptions due to 
distribution faults restored within 3 hours of fault to be similar to that of the number of 
interruptions and use the same adjustment factors. 
The adjustment differs between DNOs that had implemented significant changes to the 
measurement systems and those that have not done so or before doing so. Eastern, East 
Midlands, London, Northern, NORWEB, Southern, SWALEC, SWEB, Yorkshire, and 
Hydro-Electric had not made any significant changes to their measurement system prior to 
2001/02 whilst Manweb, Midlands, SEEBOARD and ScottishPower had not implemented 
the changes to their measurement systems before 1997/98. The time-series data for the 
number of interruptions, duration of interruptions and number of interruptions restored 
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within 3 hours of fault for this group of DNOs during the corresponding periods -ývere 
adjusted for the definitional differences only. This was done by multiplying the data for the 
total number of interruptions, total duration of interruptions and total number of 
interruptions restored within 3 hours of fault with the percentage change for the changes in 
definition in 2001/02 (from the rightmost column in Table 3.3, Table 3.4 and Table 3.3 
respectively). 
The second group of DNOs, Manweb, Midlands, SEEBOARD and Scottish-Power made 
significant changes to their measurement system in 1997/98. The data for the total number 
of interruptions, total duration of interruptions and total number of interruptions restored 
within 3 hours for these four DNOs were adjusted from 1997/98 onwards for both the 
definitional and measurement differences. The revised data were calculated using two 
steps. The data was first adjusted by multiplying it with the percentage change for historic 
changes in measurement system (from Table 3.3, Table 3.4 and Table 3.3 respectively). 
This was with the aim of making the data more comparable to the previous years where the 
changes to measurement systems were not implemented as well as with the other DNOs 
that did not make any changes to their measurement system. The second step was to 
multiply the resulting figure from step one with the percentage change for the changes in 
definition (from the rightmost column in Table 3.3, Table 3.4 and Table 3.3 respectively) to 
derive the revised data. 
The quality of supply data includes interruptions from all sources, including those resulting 
fi-om periods of severe weather and planned interruptions from DNOs' maintenance 
activities. During periods of particularly bad weather, overhead electricity distribution 
networks can suffer widespread and prolonged interruptions. These unusual weather 
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conditions are purely random shocks to the DNOs and are not Inefficiencies. Therefore it is 
important to separate genuine inefficiencies from purely random events. However, we do 
not have the data relating to severe weather conditions to exclude them from the analysis. 
To help smooth the uncertain impact of weather patterns, a rolling 3-year average is applied 
to the time series data of total number of interruptions, total duration of interruptions and 
total number of interruption restored within 3 hours of fault. It is worth noting that an 
alternative way would be to include climate as an environmental variable. However. there 
is no evidence of a systematically worse weather condition in some parts of the country. 
3.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has modeled the electricity distribution production process for DEA efficiency 
assessment. This chapter has identified the input-output and environmental variables used 
in the assessment of comparative performance of the DNOs. The input-output set reflects 
both the quality as well as the quantity of distribution services. Taking into account both 
the quantity and quality of outputs that a company delivers will provide a balanced 
assessment of a company's overall performance. This chapter has, ffirthermore, defined the 
dimensions of quality in electricity distribution, namely the quality of supply dimension 
and quality of customer service dimension, and pointed to possible operationalisation for 
DEA evaluations. A methodological advancement presented in this study is the 
incorporation of quality in a more advanced manner. 
This chapter also reflected upon which factors can be considered as inputs and which as 
outputs, and which inputs and outputs can be conceived as given (non-discretionary) and 
which inputs and outputs are controllable (discretionary) to derive a meaningful efficiency 
measure. Labelling a variable as an output while it is actually an input (or vice versa) can 
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seriously distort the analysis. The DTe (2000) study production process specification 
included network length and number of transforiner as outputs. But, NIllesen and Telling 
(2001) argued that their DEA model was mis-specified as it was not compatible with the 
regulators long-run view that companies can determine their scale of operation and operate 
at optimal level. This mis-specification arose because the network length and number of 
transformers were not assigned as inputs in the production ftinction. Also, the specification 
of a variable as non-controll able should relate to the aims of the efficiency measurement. 
The study by Korhonen and Syjanen (2003), which informed the regulation of distribution 
pricing in Finland, treated quality as a non-controll able factor in the DEA mode, 29. One of 
the aims of the efficiency measurement was to direct the distribution network utilities 
towards more efficient network operation in terms of the quality of supply provided to the 
consumers. If quality is treated as a non-controll able factor, inefficient performance in this 
area cannot be identified (the DEA evaluation will not give any targets for inefficient 
performance). This may not provide sufficient encouragement for the company to make 
improvements in quality, and thereby, the defeat the aim. 
This chapter argued that DNOs performance, ideally, should be benchmarked in terms of 
both operational and capital inputs rather than just operational inputs. The DNOs inputs 
were the operating expenditure and capital in monetary terms. The outputs were quantified 
in terms of the number of customers, the units of electricity distributed and the 
simultaneous maximum demand. DNOs service quality was measured in terms of the total 
number of interruptions, the total duration of interruptions (treated as inputs since they are 
negatively valued and need to be minimised) and the total number of interruptions restored 
within 3 hours of fault (treated as output). The nature of the environment in which the 
DNOs operate in was captured by the senice area in sq. km (treated as non-discretionary 
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output). By accounting for quality and using both operational and capital inputs, we will 
obtain a comprehensive view of efficiency. A comprehensive definition of efficiency 
should encompass measurement of actual service levels, in terms of quantity as well as 
quality, and actual costs. 
The final part of this chapter presented the adjustments to the data to make a meaningful 
comparison of DNOs. The operating costs data were adjusted for factors beyond 
managements' control. Thus, the operating cost data included controllable dimensions only 
and reflected the labour price differences in London and the different arrangements in 
Scotland in terms of the classification of distribution and transmission lines. The other 
adjustments made to the costs data were for a consistent definition of fixed assets, a 
consistent accounting convention and the conversion to a common reference year. The 
quality data were adjusted for definitional and measurement differences to standardise them 
in order to make them comparable across companies. The quality data were also treated for 
the uncertain impact of weather. 
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17 However, it must be noted that this approach may be problematic, for example, a 
resource that is used in very varying degrees of efficacy may show to be not significant but 
as it is a resource used it must be in the efficiency model by definition. 
18 Benchmarking efficiency identifies the most efficient firm in the sector and measures the 
relative performance of less efficient firms against these. 
19 The cost of capital is the cost to borrow or invest capital i. e. the rate that a company must 
pay for its capital. 
" Only the 12 England and Wales DNOs pay transmission charges. 
21 The perpetual inventory method is discussed by Christensen and Jorgenson (1969) and 
applied in their study of U. S. real capital input and their more recent study of private sector r 
economic performance (Christensen and Jorgenson, 1995). 
22 It should be noted that the cost data used in this study covering the post-privatisation 
years (1990/91 - 1999/00) are on the basis of the definition of DNOs prior to the separation 
of distribution and supply business which came into effect upon the commencement of the 
Utilities Act 2000. The definition then allowed for the provision of joint services between 
the distribution and supply businesses in terms of the inclusion of metering costs (for the 
provision of meters and its maintenance) within the distribution businesses. 
23 Due to the small number of DNOs, it was impossible to introduce all the different 
customer classifications in the model specification. An increase in the number of variables 
implies an increase in the number of criteria upon which the DNOs can be evaluated as 
efficient. Thus, a large number of variables would produce no discrimination in the relative 
efficiency score. The majority of the previous studies reported in the UK literature have 
used aggregate customer numbers (see e. g. Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003; Hattori et al. 2002; 
Tilley, 2000; Tilley and Weyman-Jones, 1999; Bums and Weyman-Jones, 1998; Pollitt, 
1995; Burns and Weyman-Jones, 1994). 
24 It is possible in the long run that DNOs may offer a set of tariffs that encourage higher 
demand at peak hours in order to increase allowable revenue. 
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25 Cost of sales broadly reflects purchase cost of electricity, use of system charges and all 
other costs incurred to the point of sale. Distribution costs represent the cost of transporting L-- 
units of electricity from the National Grid through the distribution network to customers. It 
includes the cost of metering, billing and debt collection. Administrative expenses comprise 
the rates and the indirect employee costs. MWCA represents the amount of additional 
internally generated finance needed for monetary working capital as a result of changes in 
input prices of goods and services used and financed by the company. 
26 There are four voltage levels within a distribution network: Low Voltage - LV, High 
Voltage - HV, Extra High Voltage - EHV and 132 kV. A LV system operates at a nominal 
voltage level of I kV or less. A HV system refers to voltage levels above I kV up to and 
including 22 kV and EHV refers to voltage greater than 22 kV but below 132kV. 
27 There is a link between customer information and the physical network at the outgoing 
circuit from the HV/LV transformer. 
28 The new definition excludes short interruptions from the number of interruptions to 
supply. However, the relevant companies had no connectivity (see Appendix A3.1) and 
therefore supply could not be restored immediately in the event of temporary faults to be 
recorded as a short interruption. Hence, changes in definition of short interruption from 0- 
I minute to 0-3 minutes did not lead to changes in reported performance. 
29 Climate can impact upon quality of supply. Rain and flooding, thunderstorm and gales, 
and heavy snow can all cause electricity failures. However, utilities can and are indeed 
expected to by the regulator to improve their performance in terms of supply quality either 
by changing their management practices (e. g. dispatching repair teams immediately to the 
point of power failure and monitoring the clearing of treesibranches that have close 
proximity to the overhead lines) or increase spending on advanced technology (e. g. 
installing automated supply restoration systems). Thus the argument that quality of supply 
is beyond the control of the utility is not acceptable to the regulators. 
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Chapter 4 
Evaluating DNOs Efficiency Using DEA 
4.1 Introduction 
Having identified an appropriate set of input-output variables for modelling the electricity 
distribution network utilities in the previous chapter, the efficiency and productivity of the 
UK DNOs can be now evaluated using the DEA method presented in Chapter 2. The focus 
of this chapter is the evaluation of the 14 UK DNOs efficiency in 1999/2000 while the 
following chapter deals with the evaluation of their quality and productivity changes over 
the post-refonn and post -privatisation period 1990/91 to 1999/00. 
At the time of the reforms and privatisation of the electricity supply industry in the UK in 
1990-91, it was thought that the new system would gradually lead to efficiency, 
productivity and service quality improvements. Since then, the regulatory reform and 
prIvatisation has attracted considerable attention and provided researchers with good 
opportunities for estimating the efficiency and productivity gains of the DNOs. The 
published studies are summarised in Table 4.1. 
Of these studies, Bums and Weyinan-Jones (1994) and Tilley and Weynian-Jones (1999) 
were the only ones primarily concerned with evaluating the refom-is and privatisation, 
whereas Bums and Weyrnan-Jones (1996) and Weyrnan-Jones (2001a) were concerned 
with methodological issues, Bums and Weyman-Jones (1998) considered periodic 
regulatory revicw issues, and WART (1999), Hatton et al. (2002) and Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2003) engaged in cross-country comparative studies. Thus there is a dearth of studies that 
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have analysed the impact of the reforms on DNOs efficiency. Table 4.1 also shows that 
DEA has been a popular methodology in exploring the performance of the DNOS. 
Table 4.1 Previous Published Studies on UK DNOs Performance 
Authors Country (no. of DNOs) Period Analysis Function Technology 
Bums and England and Wales (12) 1971/72- DEA- Non-parametric Frontier 
Weyrnan-Jones 1993/94 Malmquist 
(1994) 
Bums and England and Wales (12) 1980/81- OLS Cost Average 
Weyrnan-Jones 1992/93 SFA Cost Frontier 
(1996) 
Bums and England and Wales (12) 1971/72- DEA- Non-parametnc Frontier 
Weyman-Jones 1996/97 Malmquist 
(1998) 
Tilley and England and Wales (12) 1990/91- DEA- Non-parametric Frontier 
Weyman-Jones 1997/8 Malmquist 
(1999) 
IPART (1999) Australia (13), England 1990/91- DEA- Non-parametnc Frontier 
and Wales (12), New 1996/97 Malmquist 
Zealand (38), USA(I 56) (E&W) 
Weyman-Jones England, Wales and 1997/98 DEA Non-parametnc Frontier 
(200 1 a) Scotland (14) SDEA (linear programming) Frontier 
Non-parametric (non- 
linear programming) 
Hatton et al. Japan (9) 1985/86- DEA- Non-parametnc Frontier 
(2002) England and Wales (12) 1997/98 Malmquist Cost Frontier 
COLS, Cost Frontier 
SFA 
Jamasb and Italy (1), Norway (25), UK Single DEA, Non-parametric Frontier 
Pollitt (2003) (14) , Portugal 
(1), Spain period COLS, Cost Frontier 
(4), Netherlands (18) SFA Cost Frontier 
However, as been pointed out previously (page 13 and page 60), this literature did not to 
take into account quality of service when measuring DNOs efficiency and productivity and 
the measurement of efficiency and productivity has completely been based on the quantity 
criteria. The exception to this is the studies by Bums and Weyrnan-Jones (1998) and Tilley 
(2000) (doctoral study) who made early attempts to incorporate quality in the specification 
of productivity. 
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In recent years, there has been a dramatic surge in the focus on quality issues in electricity 
distribution. In the UK electricity distribution sector, there has been pressing concerns that 
in the future DNOs may have an incentive to under-invest in quality under the price-cap 
regulation and eventually cause deterioration in service quality (as theorized by many 
authors, see Spence, 1975; Vicker and Yarrow, 1988; Rovizzi and Thompson, 1992; Liston, 
1993; Armstrong et al., 1995; Agrell et al., 2002 and Kiclokoro, 2002). There are several 
reasons for this, as noted in the introduction to this thesis (page 6). Under the price-cap 
regulation a monopoly firm cannot raise its price even if it makes investments to improve 
service quality, unlike under the cost-of-service regulation (Kidokoro, 2002). Thus, the 
DNO has no incentive to invest to upgrade service quality. This may result in the 
postponement of innovations in quality and a decline in the actual quality of service. 
Further, the price cap regulation places emphasis on price or revenue a firm is allowed to 
recover and less emphasis on the outputs that the firm is expected to deliver (OFGEM, 
1999a). Consequently, the DNO may attempt to reduce costs by reducing the investments 
that upgrade service quality thus leading to degradation of service quality. In addition to the 
disincentives provided by the price cap regulation towards quality development, mergers 
and acquisition in the sector may affect the usage of financial and management resources 
by the new management structure such that they prioritise the new areas acquired and focus 
on revenue rather than fulfil their obligations to ensure appropriate levels of service quality. 
Additionally, DNOs that know that they will be taken over may hold back on investments 
on quality improvements. 
Currently, the focus of regulation, as we saw in the introduction to this thesis (page 9), has 
broadened in order to protect the interests of consumers not only in terms of price but also 
quality of service. The traditional approach of productivity and efficiency measurement 
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which ignores quality is inapproPriate under the environment where quality of service is 
gaining paramount importance. Cost minimisation and a high level of quality are the 
objectives set upon the DNOs by the regulator (OFGEM, 1999b). As such, it is important 
that the DNOs performance measurement take both these aspects into account. This will 
enable a judgement on the performance of a company to be made on the basis of both 
quantity and quality criteria so that a 'balanced' assessment of a company's overall 
performance is obtained. Also, this will be consistent with modem regulation where quality 
of service has become the centre of regulatory attention. In addition, by taking into account 
the objectives of the company, performance measurement will evaluate effectiveness, i. e. 
the extent to which the company succeeds in achieving its goals. 
The above makes it clear that a more comprehensive evaluation of the DNOs performance 
is needed. This is embarked upon in this thesis. In this chapter, the DEA method described 
in Chapter 2 is used to evaluate the efficiency of the UK DNOs in 1999/00. This study 
builds on and extends the existing literature through accounting for quality of service to 
provide a more comprehensive evaluation of efficiency and productivity of the UK DNOs. 
The present study is distinctive in its treatment of quality as a multi -dimensional 
phenomenon and ensures that it is effectively accounted for in the efficiency and 
productivity measure. 
The evaluation of DNOs efficiency was first conducted using the standard DEA models. 
However, as already noted on page 15 of this thesis, there are two problems with the above 
standard approach to efficiency measurement, these being the declining discriminatory 
power of the model when the number of variables increases, and the disregard of the 
technological realities of the production process by the model. 
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The need to improve the discriminatory power of the model and more generally to obtain 
efficiency measures that reflect the technological realities of the DNOs production process 
motivated the improvements to the standard DEA model for the DNOs efficiency 
assessment. This chapter extends the standard model by incorporating weight restrictions 
constructed using the trade-off approach developed by Podinovski (2000,2002). The 
extended model is referred to as the 'weight-restricted' DEA model. Weight restrictions not 
only improve discrimination but also prevent undue advantage to be taken of the weight 
flexibility in conflict with the trade-offs that exist in the production process. Thus, the 
assessed efficiency will be consistent with the economic notion of input and/or output 
substitution/transformation and thereby be compatible with economic theory. 
Since the 'weight-restricted' model reflects the technological realities of the DNOs 
production process more accurately, it is more appropriate for evaluating DNOs who have 
to make trade-offs between competing production factors. The assessment of efficiency 
here is more demanding than the standard model, since our model requires information on 
trade-offs between variables in addition to input and output data. Nonetheless, exact rates 
of sub stitution/transformation are not required. 
This chapter unfolds as follows: Section 4.2 presents the data set and evaluates the DNOs 
efficiency using the standard DEA models. The evaluation was conducted using different 
model variations. This is in order to (a) investigate the impact of quality in performance 
measurement and (b) address the existence of different stakeholders' interest (customers 
and shareholders) in performance measurement in electricity distribution. The potential cost 
savings and reductions in the duration and number of interruptions for the DNOs are also 
presented. Section 4.3 develops the 'weight-restricted' DEA model that incorporates weight 
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restrictions and illustrates the construction of the weight restrictions using information on 
production trade-offs. This extended model is applied to the DNOs to re-evaluate their 
efficiency. This is followed by an empirical comparison of the standard (i. e. free-weights) 
and 'weight-restricted' DEA models. The re-evaluation provides more accurate and reliable 
measures of efficiency, since the trade-offs between variables have been taken into account. 
Section 4.4 surnmarises and concludes. 
4.2 Evaluating the Efficiency of the UK DNOs Using Standard DEA Models 
4.2.1 Data 
The efficiency of the 14 UK DNOs was assessed under the constant returns to scale (CRS) 
assumption using the inputs and outputs shown in Table 4.2 (page 126). The data relates to 
the financial year 1999/2000. It is observed that Hydro-Electric uses the least amount of 
resources and also produces the lowest quantity of outputs. This is because it operates in the 
more remote part of the UK, i. e. in an area with low population density. It also has the 
largest service area. 
We assume that the DNOs operate on a constant return to scale size. In the regulatory 
context, one can argue that the assessment should be under constant returns to scale 
irrespective of the actual scale size the DNOs are operating at. This is consistent with the 
primary duty placed on the regulator to protect the interest of the customers, where DNOs 
that operate at an uneconomical scale size are not allowed to pass on to the customers cost 
inefficiencies and customers need fund only the efficient cost of operation. Thus the 
customers would not be affected by the wrong size of the operation. Although scale size is 
largely inherited on privatisation in 1990-91 and so not controllable by DNOs. however, 
since the expiry of Goverru-nent's golden shares in the DNOS in 1995, opportunities for 
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merger and acquisition have been enormous and in these circumstances management has 
had the opportunity to influence the scale size of the distribution business. Recent example 
of such merger and acquisition activities includes the acquisition of SEEBOARD by 
London Electricity. It is for the DNOs to identify the scale size that will enable them to 
operate at the lowest cost possible. Therefore, it is appropriate to assume that in the long 
run all the DNOs will be operating at the optimal scale of production (but not necessarily in 
the short run as scale cannot be altered in the medium term). This view is supported by the 
Dutch electricity regulator, DTe, that believes network companies can control the scale of 
their operations and operate at an optimal level in the long run (see Nillesen and Telling, 
2001). Thus, the production process is considered to exhibit constant returns to scale 
(CRS). In fact, Tilley's (2000) study on England and Wales DNOs found that scale 
efficiency was not evident in most of the DNOs. CEPA (2003) also found weak evidence 
for increasing returns to scale in the UK electricity distribution sector. Following these 
arguments, CRS is plausible and the model (specified in Chapter 3, page 99) is in terms of 
volume measures where a CRS assumption is more readily sustainable. 
The input variables are essentially two, OPEX (operating expenses) and CAPITAL. OPEX 
is the total of cost of sales, distribution and administration cost and monetary working 
capital. The one-off restructuring and other charges and depreciation have been excluded. 
The transmission connection point exit charges and distribution system business rates were 
also excluded as they are largely outside the control of companies (and they do not affect 
the outputs in our model). Adjustments were also made for regional differences among 
DNOs, which included the higher labour costs faced by London and the different 
arrangements in Scotland (the details are in Chapter 3). The CAPITAL is the current cost 
net book value of tangible fixed asset at the start of the year and derived from company 
124 
Regulatory Accounts. We use the value of tangible fixed asset since it supports the quantity 
and quality measures, rather than the physical capital inputs (such as circuit length or 
transformer capacity) in the period. We assume that the companies face the same input 
prices for CAPITAL. The use of both OPEX and CAPITAL as input variables will allow 
greater insights regarding the sources of inefficiency as well as the efficiency of DNOs in 
managing operating expenses and investing in capital. 
The output variables are CUSTNO (customer numbers), UNITSDIST (units of electricity 
distributed), and MAYD (simultaneous maximum demand). The quality variables consist 
of TOTINT (total number of interruptions), TOTDUR (total duration of interruptions) and 
TOTINTRES (total number of interruptions restored within 3 hours from fault). The 'bad' 
output quality measures i. e. the TOTINT and TOTDUR are treated as inputs as it is 
desirable to minimise them; whilst the 'good' output quality measure i. e. the TOTINTRES 
is treated as a normal output. AREA is used as an environmental control factor and is 
treated as a non- iscretionary output. 
The data of the inputs and outputs of Table 4.2 for the DNOs relates to the financial year 
1999/2000. The data for the above variables were collected from the Report on Distribution 
and Transmission System Performance published annually by OFGEM, the UK Electricity 
Industry: Financial and Operating Review and the Electricity Industry Review. The data 
was supplemented by additional financial data extracted from the Regulatory Accounts of 
the DNOs detailing operating expenditure and book value of capital assets. The appendix to 
this chapter (Table A4.1, page 254) surnmarises the sources of the input output data, the 
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The efficiency ratings of the DNOs were calculated for two DEA model variations. First, 
the efficiencies are calculated when quality variables are taken into account and then 
without them. The more comprehensive model that incorporates output quality in addition 
to the output quantities can be used to analyse the overall performance of the utility in both 
quantity and quality of service. The reduced model that uses only the quantity outputs can 
be interpreted as focusing on "pure" efficiency in delivering electricity (as if service quality 
was homogeneous throughout the DNOs). The use of both models provides more specific 
inforination on the characteristics of the DNOs. This will also enable us to observe the 
impact of the alternative models, with and without quality variables, on the results. 
The second variation involves evaluating performance by differentiating stakeholder 
intereStS25. We distinguish two different stakeholder groups, consumers and shareholders. 
The interests of the latter group are expressed in the input measures of operating expenses, 
capital, and labour, while those of the former are found in measures of quality dealing with 
product characteristics (i. e., voltage and frequency of electricity), service delivery (i. e., 
minutes off supply and frequency of interruptions) and customer service (i. e., billing and 
responses to complaints). DNOs have responsibilities and obligations to their stakeholder 
groups. To evaluate performance by the competing interests of stakeholders, only the 
variables expressing the interest of one stakeholder are treated as discretionary while the 
variables expressing the interest of the other stakeholder are designated as non- 
discretionary (whose values are held fixed and not minimised). Thus, performance from the 
perspective of shareholders is defined by minimising the costs, while treating the quality 
variables as nondiscretionary. This enables the measurement of the relative cost efficiency 
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of the DNOs and the assessment of the scope for cost savings through greater efficiency in 
operating and capital costs. This pattern is reversed to study perforinance from the 
consumers' perspective, treating quality variables as discretionary and costs as non- 
discretionary. This reflects the efficiency in service delivery, in particular providing reliable 
electricity supply, and enables the assessment of the potential improvements in qualit,, ' of 
service. 
Using the standard DEA model (suitably modified for each of the variations) yields the 
following relative efficiencies presented in Table 4.3. The DEA model was solved using the 
specialised software EMS version 1.3 (Efficiency Measurement System) developed by 
Scheel (2000). The DEA efficiency scores are presented in Table 4.3. In addition, the 
minimum and maximum as well as the average efficiency scores are also given. In 
particular, we compute the geometric averages. This is based on the argument by Fleming 
and Wallace (1986) that the geometric average is the only appropriate measure to 
summarise relative scores or benchmark results (this was later proved in theorems by 
Roberts (1990) and Aczel (1990))26. 
We consider first the results in Table 4.3 where quality was included in the model (refer to 
column one). The CRS efficiency scores indicate the presence and extent of inefficiency of 
input use and the potential for DNOs to reduce inputs while maintaining existing outputs. 
For example, the DNOs are, on average, 97.27% efficient. This suggests that they could 
reduce their inputs, on average, by about 2.73%. ScottishPower has the biggest potential to 
reduce inputs by as much as 10.25% as it is substantially below the efficient frontier. The 
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obtained discrimination is relatively poor as more than half (i. e. nine) of the DNOs ýý ere 
classified as efficient. 
Table 4.3 Summary of Results 
Efficie cy (%) 
With quality Without Quality Quality fixed Costs fixed 
DNO (comprehensive (reduced model) (comprehensive (comprehensive 
model) model) model) 
Eastern 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
East Midlands 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
London 100.00 92.80 100.00 100.00 
Manweb 100.00 92.90 100.00 100.00 
Midlands 100.00 97.21 100.00 100.00 
Northern 93.54 92.56 92.56 90.48 
NORWEB 93.87 86.05 92.14 90.48 
SEEBOARD 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Southern 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
SWALEC 90.34 88.34 90.34 80.01 
SWEB 95.35 80.68 85.94 94.61 
Yorkshire 100.00 89.70 100.00 100.00 
Hydro-Electric 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
ScottishPower 89.75 85.44 87.27 86.29 
Geometric Average 97.27 93.05 96.16 95.63 
Max 100 100 100 100 
Min 89.75 80.68 85.94 80.01 
Efficient DNOs (no. ) 9 5 9 9 
In the formulation which excluded quality variables from the model (refer to column two of 
Table 4.3) the discrimination between the DNOs improved since the number of variables 
was reduced. The number of efficient DNOs dropped to 5 from the earlier 9. SWEB is quite 
efficient under the comprehensive model, but rather inefficient in the reduced model, 
indicating that it may be good at delivering a high level of service quality but do not have a 
high output quantity. 
In the cost efficiency model, where the quality variables were held fixed (as 
nondiscretionary variables) (refer to the third column of Table 4.3), the same DNOs 
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dominate the efficient frontier (as in column one) though there are marginal changes in the 
efficiency rating of the other DNOs except SWEB. SVvIEB showed a significant decline in 
efficiency rating and its ranking fell to the last position. We can interpret each efficiency 
figure as the maximum allowable proportion of the DNOs' costs which should have been 
incurred to achieve at least the outputs the particular DNO achieves if it were to be 
relatively efficient. The operating cost savings potentially achievable for each DNO to 
attain relative efficiency are presented in Table 4.4. The potential savings for DNOs with an 
efficiency rating of 100% are estimated at zero. The potential operating costs savings for a 
DNO with efficiency under 100% equals the difference between its observed and estimated 
OPEX level and is computed as (OPEX - efficiency score *OPEX). Clearly there is scope 
for substantial savings in OPEX, ranging from 7.4% at Northern to 14.1 % at SVVEB. 
SWEB, the most cost inefficient company, has the greatest potential for reductions owing 
to the potential to catch-up. The potential OPEX savings across all the DNOs calculated on 
the basis of the efficiency score amounts to a total of E49.6 million. This amount accounts 
for 3.9% of the total operating costs of the ftill set of the UK DNOs. In a similar vein, the 
improvement in CAPITAL necessary for a DNO to achieve 100% efficiency is also 
presented in Table 4.4. The potential CAPITAL improvement amounts to a total of E627 
million (i. e. 3.7% of total capital of all DNOs). The potential gains in OPEX and CAPITAL 
show that inefficient DNOs can improve performance through economies in both inputs, 
though CAPITAL input is dominating. This suggests that the DNOs' relatively weak 
efficiency was in large part a product of capital inefficiencies or excess capital investments. 
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Potential Operating Costs 
Savings and Capital 
Improvements 
Eastern 0 0 0 
East Midlands 0 0 0 
London 0 0 0 
Manweb 0 0 0 
Midlands 0 0 0 
Northern 6.8 74.5 7.4 
NORWEB 8.9 123.7 7.9 
SEEBOARD 0 0 0 
Southern 0 0 0 
SWALEC 5.3 80.7 9.7 
SWEB 13.5 150.1 14.1 
Yorkshire 0 0 0 
Hydro-Electric 0 0 0 
ScottishPower 15.1 198 12.7 
Returning to Table 4.3, in the all quality model where the cost variables were held fixed (as 
nondiscretionary variables) (refer to the fourth column), the same DNOs dominate the 
efficient frontier (as in column one) though there are marginal changes in the ratings of the 
other DNOs except SWALEC. SWALEC's efficiency rating declined considerably and its 
ranking fell to the last position. The efficiency figure is interpreted as the maximum 
allowable proportion of the DNOs' interruptions and duration of interruptions necessary to 
achieve at least the outputs the particular DNO achieves if it were to be relatively efficient. 
The absolute reductions in the number of interruptions and duration of interruptions that 
will be necessary for each DNO to achieve relative efficiency is presented in Table 4.5 
below. Table 4.5 also presents the corresponding reductions in terms of customer-weighted 
average customer interruptions (Cls) and customer minutes lost (CMLs). 
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Table 4.5 Potential Reductions in Undesirable Outputs in 1999/00 











Reduction in the 
customer-weighted 
average minutes lost 
(CMLs) 
Eastern 0 0 0 0 
East Midlands 0 0 0 0 
London 0 0 0 0 
Manweb 0 0 0 0 
Midlands 0 0 0 0 
Northern 90339 171743 6.2 11.8 
NORWEB 105368 228811 4.8 10.4 
SEEBOARD 0 0 0 0 
Southern 0 0 0 0 
SWALEC 149059 249068 15.1 25.2 
SWEB 165380 245008 12.3 18.2 
Yorkshire 0 0 0 0 
Hydro-Electric 0 0 0 0 
ScottishPower 256969 71087 10.4 28.6 
From Table 4.5 it is clear that improvements in the average number of interruptions and 
average minutes lost is still possible, ranging from 4.8 Cls at NORWEB to 15.1 at 
SWALEC, and from 10.4 CMLs at NORWEB to 28.6 at ScottishPower respectively. 
SWALEC, the most inefficient company in terms of service delivery, has the greatest 
potential for reductions in undesirable outputs. 
Returning to Table 4.3 (refer to the two rightmost columns) we can identify 9 DNOs that 
are both cost efficient and efficient in service delivery (i. e. Eastern, East Midlands, London, 
Manweb, Midlands, SEEBOARD, Southern, Yorkshire and Hydro-Electric). These DNOs 
as well as Northern, NORWEB and ScottishPower to a lesser extent show 'balanced 
performance' between savings in costs and delivering a good level of service. The results 
suggest that SWEB is more efficient in providing a good level of service but is not as cost 
efficient. The reverse applies for SWALEC, wherein it is more cost efficient but less 
efficient in delivering a good level of service. 
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4.3 Evaluating the Efficiency of the UK DNOS Using Extended DEA Models 
Incorporating Weight Restrictions 
In the previous section, UK DNOs were evaluated using standard DEA models. The 
standard DEA model allows each unit under evaluation to choose its own most favourable 
weights in order to show itself in the 'best possible light'. Although the issue of weight 
flexibility and its restriction was already broached in Chapter 2, it requires ftirther 
elaboration. The advantage of total weight flexibility is that 'a prion' knowledge is not 
required. However, there are situations where additional inforination is available (Ali, Cook 
and Seiford, 1991; Thanassoulis et al., 1995) which should be taken into account in the 
evaluation. This infonnation could reflect how the factors of production used by the 
companies behave and the knowledge of trade-offs between production factors. In such 
cases, the weights chosen by the unit may be unrealistic weights, and may not accord with 
the prior view or additional managerial knowledge about the production process, if that will 
help them appear efficient relative to other units. This enables a unit to choose to ignore 
key activities and put their weight solely on say two activities that have the best ratio 
among the companies assessed. Thus, a unit that specialises in a particular task is classified 
as efficient irrespective of its performance in the other activities it undertakes. This 
conceals the inefficiencies in its key activities and enables the unit to appear more efficient 
then it really is. At the same time, other units are denied the opportunity to bring into the 
picture their better perforinance in areas other than those chosen activities of the assessed 
unit. The efficiency rating of the unit may thus say more about the prudent choice of 
weights the unit made rather than any intrinsic efficient practice. A high number of 
variables included in the model relative to the sample size compounds the problem because 
it becomes more likely that a certain unit will find some set of weights to apply to its inputs 
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and outputs which will make it appear efficient, leading to many units classified as efficient 
(as is apparent from the results of the comprehensive models In the previous section). 
Total flexibility for the weights has also been criticized on the ground that the relative 
efficiency of the unit may not reflect its performance on the inputs and outputs taken as a 
whole as a result of ignoring key activities (Dyson and Thanassoulis, 1988). It also offends 
common sense that some activities are irrelevant in the efficiency assessment when they 
were included in the analysis in the first place, after a meticulous selection process, because 
they were considered important. 
The total freedom of choice of weights is also unsuitable where output quality measures are 
incorporated in the output variables. This is because the significance of some output quality 
variable (e. g. desirable output quality measure) can only be gauged with reference to the 
level of some particular input variables (e. g. undesirable output quality measure) of the 
model. The standard DEA model can weight them in a counter-intuitive manner, by 
attaching a high weight to the undesirable output quality measure whilst assigning a low 
weight to the desirable output quality measure to improve its efficiency rating irrespective 
of the desire for a high percentage of the desirable output quality. 
The method to circumvent these problems is to impose 'weight restrictions' to curtail the de 
fault freedom of the standard DEA model. A number of reasons additional weight 
restrictions are often used are 
1. to incorporate prior views on the value of individual inputs and outputs, 
to relate the values of certain inputs and outputs. 
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3. to incorporate prior views on efficient and inefficient units, 
4. to be consistent with the economic notion of input/output marginal rates of 
substitution in assessing efficiency, 
5. to enable discrimination between efficient units, and 
6. not to allow either less favourable or key inputs/outputs to be disregarded. 
(see Thompson et al., 1990 and Allen et al., 1997). 
A number of authors have proposed extensions to the original DEA models that allow the 
restriction of weights flexibility (notable Thompson et al., 1986; Dyson and Thanassoulis, 
1988; Charnes et al. 1989a; Wong and Beasley, 1990; Thompson et al. 1990; Thanassoulis 
and Dyson, 1992; Roll and Golany, 1993 and Ali and Seiford, 1993). They have developed 
several weight restriction techniques, including assurance region analysis (Thompson et al., 
1990; 1994) and the cone-ratio approach (Chames et al., 1989a; 1990). Allen et al. (1997) 
provides a detailed survey of the alternative techniques of specifying weight restrictions in 
DEA models. These weight restrictions enhance the original DEA models with managerial 
knowledge by restricting the multipliers to convex polyhedral cones. 
There are different approaches used to construct the weight restrictions (i. e. in estimating 
the bounds for the weights). The most common approaches are where weight restrictions 
are based on the perceived importance or value of individual inputs and outputs, or reflect 
cost or price considerations (see for example, Thompson et al. (1986) (location of a High- 
Energy Physics Laboratory in the state of Texas); Banker and Morey (1989) (army 
recruiting battalions); Cook, Kazakov and Roll (1994) (highway maintenance patrols in 
Ontario); Thomson et al. (1990) (farms in Kansas); Beasley (1995) (university 
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departments); Thompson et al. (1992) (U-S independent oil/gas producers) and Thompson 
et al. (1997) (U. S. banks)). The major problem w1th these approaches Is that they generally 
do not represent the technological realities of a specific production process (Podinovski, 
2000,2002). Allen et al. (1997) noted that such weight restrictions generally Invalidate the 
radial nature of efficiency. Thus, using weight restrictions in DEA models without linking 
them to specific technological realities of the production process under consideration 
obscures the interpretation of the efficiency score (Podinovski, 2000,2002). 
The optimal weights in the dual formulation of DEA models Yields estimates of the 
marginal rates of transformation and substitution of the production set (e. g. Chames, 
Cooper and Rhodes, 1978; Lewin and Morey, 1981; Banker, Conrad and Strauss, 1986; 51 
Charnes, Cooper, Huang and Sun, 1990 and Kuosmanen, 2001). Therefore, the weight 
restrictions should rightly reflect technical information on marginal substitution or 
transformation rates, rather than economic information on prices or value. Podinovski 
(2000,2002) recently proposed the trade-off-approach in which the weight restrictions 
convey production trade-offs between input and/or output variables. The trade-off approach 
redefines the production possibility set (by expanding it) and preserves the radial nature of 
efficiency in the DEA model to enable a meaningful interpretation of the efficiency score. 
This is discussed in further detail in Section 4.3.2 below. 
In the next section, we recapitulate the efficiencies and examine the corresponding optimal 
weights obtained by using the standard DEA model (i. e. without weight restrictions) to 
highlight the drawbacks of total weight flexibility in the context of electricity distribution. 
We find a high incidence of zero/unrealistic weights, and lack of discrimination which led 
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us to extend the standard DEA model by incorporating weight restrictions in the subsequent 
section. We construct the weight restrictions using trade-offs and develop 'weight- 
restricted' models so as to obtain measures of efficiency that reflect the technological 
realities of the distribution production process. Then, we re-evaluate the efficiencies using 
the extended DEA models incorporating the weight restrictions in a step-by step manner. 
Finally, we compare the results of the standard and 'weight-restricted' models. 
4.3.1 The DEA Model without Weight Restrictions 
We assess the DNOs by means of the CRS model using the inputs and outputs shown in 
Table 4.2. We utilise the linear multiplier form in which the total weighted input is 
normalised. The model for the assessment of efficiency of Eastern is as follows: 
Maximise 3337629u, + 3310OU2+640OU3+ 2031170u4+2030OU5 (4.1) 
Subject to: 
2136.8v, + 98-8V2 + 2210309V3 + 322718OV4 : -- I 
3337629u, + ... + 203OOu5 - 
(2136.8v, + ... + 322718OV4) 
!! ý 0 
2400000ul+ .. -+ 
1600OU5 
- (1483. lvl + ... + 2907911 
V4) :! ý 0 
2060000ul+ ... + 
665U5 - (1417.3v, + ... + 1499789v4) : ý- 
0 
1401000ul+ ... + 
1220OU5 
- (1056.7v, + ... + 1801962v4) 
:! ý 0 
2260000ul+ ... + 
1330OU5 
- (1495.7vi + ... + 4965281V4) 
:! ý 0 
1460624ul+ ... + 
1440OU5 
- (1007.8v, + ... + 2308371 
V4) :! ý 0 
2203000ul+ ... + 
1250OU5 
-(I 574vi + ... + 2911077V4) 
:! ý 0 
2139000ul+ ... + 
820OU5 - (1235.3v, + ... + 3148061 
V4) :! ý 0 
2681057ul+ ... + 
16900u5 -(I 933.2v, + ... + 2578596V4) 
:! ý 0 
988700ul+ ... + 
I1 800u5 - (835.5v, + ... + 2578347V4) 










- (1457.9vi + ... + 1858466V4) ýý 
0 
640000ul+ 
... + 54390U5 - (759.7v, + ... +200800OV4) 
1880000ul+ ... + 22950U5 - (1555.8v, + ... +4225887V4) 
U15 U25 U35 U4ý U55 Vlý V2 ý V3 ý V4 
:: ý' 
The corresponding dual envelopment model is as follows: 
Minimise 0 
Subject to: 
3337629/kl+ 2400000/%2 +---+ 1880000A^, 14 ý! 3337629 
33100kl+ 26863/"'-2 + ... +22381X14 ý! 33100 
640OX, + 5019X2 ++ 4323,11,14 6400 I 
2031170/kl+ 1599712k2 + --. + 11340IR14 ý! 2031170 
20300, kl+ 16000k2 + ... +22950kl4 ý! 20300 
2136.8k, + 1483.1/X, 2 + ... + 1555.8XI4 -< 
2136.80 
98.8k, + 114k2 + --- +I I 8.7. k, 14 < 98.80 
221030W, j + 1837849^42 + ... + 1528667A^, 14 <- 
22103090 
3227180/kl+ 2907911 A^, 2 + ... + 4225887kl4 <32271800 
klq 44 k61 4 k8, ý495 XIOý kl IkI2ý k135 k14 ýý Oý 0 free. 4 k5, / 
(4.2) 
In the input minimisation dual envelopment model (4.2), the left hand-side of the 
constraints represents a composite unit feasible in the production possibility set of the CRS 
model. The right hand side of the constraints defines the 'target' unit on the frontier. The 
efficiency measure 0 defines a radial contraction in inputs necessary for efficient operation. 
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In model (4.2), Eastern will be projected in a radial fashion, by radial contraction of all it 
four inputs, on the feasible target unit on the frontier (3337629,33100,6400,2035603, 
20300,2136.80,98.801 221030905 32271800). Hence, the DEA efficiency measure is 
interpreted as a radial measure of efficiency. 
The efficiency of all the DNOs and the corresponding optimal weights are shown in Table 
4.6. In Table 4.6, nine out of fourteen DNOs are efficient. Thus, there seems to be a lack of 
discrimination power within the model. This is partly the consequence of the low number 
of DNOs relative to the number of input-output variables used. Another factor contributing 
to the low discrimination is the fact that total weighting freedom afforded by the model has 
allowed each of the DNOs to assign zero weights to some of the inputs and outputs. For 
example, Southern achieves its relative efficiency of 100% by putting weight solely on two 
variables (operating expenditure and maximum demand) and disregarding the rest of the 
key input/ output variables i. e. capital, total number of interruptions, total duration of 
interruptions, total number of interruptions restored within 3 hours from fault, customer 
number and units distributed by assigning zero weights. This means that Southern is very 
likely to have weaknesses in these items compared with the DNOs in the reference set. 
Also, Hydro-Electric puts all its weight on a single output, AREA. These are examples of 
units in the extreme that specialise in only one task and are classified as efficient 
irrespective of their perforinance in the other activities undertaken. This is inappropriate 
because all the key inputs/outputs are undoubtedly relevant to the efficiency assessment. 
Also, by ignoring certain activities, for example - service quality (e. g. Southern), the 
different objectives of the units are not reflected. 
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Also, many of the DNOs have placed zero weights on capital and/or operating expenditure. 
This is unrealistic as both resources are clearly needed for the procurement of outputs. For 
example, London attained 100% efficiency by ignoring both financial inputs whilst 
Midlands does so by placing weights solely on capital inputs, disregarding operating 
expenditure. This does not reflect the trade-offs between capital and operational inputs that 
exists in the production process of the DNOs. 
The total weight flexibility given to the DNOs has also enabled Eastern, London and 
Hydro-Electric to exploit their high number of interruptions to attain an efficiency rating of 
100%. This was achieved by attaching a zero weight to the total number of interruptions 
restored within 3 hours from failure but attaching a relatively high weight to total number 
of interruptions. This is not appropriate as it contradicts the desire for a high percentage of 
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4.3.2 The DEA Model with Weight Restrictions 
In the previous section, we saw that the DEA model lacked discrimination and it assigned 
implausible weights. The optimal weights of the model for DNOs contained many zeros as 
a result of its full freedom to assign weights. To reduce the unreasonable flexibility of the 
input and output weights and to improve discrimination as well as to relate the values of 
certain inputs and/or outputs to each other, additional weight restrictions are incorporated 
into the standard DEA model. The most commonly used weight restrictions are 
homogeneous weight restrictions, such as bounds on ratios of weights. These have been 
introduced by Thompson et al. (1986,1990) as assurance regions. In this approach, 
constraints are imposed on the relative magnitude of weights for special inputs and outputs. 





where cc, and P, are lower and upper bounds that the ratioVI/V2may assume. (In the CCR 
model, the ratio of optimal weights is 05 VI/V2< oo). This constraint limits the region of 
weights to some specified area, and extreme values of these weights are made infeasible. 
Generally, the DEA efficiency score in the corresponding envelopment model is worsened 
by the additions of these constraints and a DMU previously characterised as efficient may 
subsequently be found to be inefficient after such constraints have been imposed (Cooper et 
al., 2000). 
It is worth noting that the ratio of weights is likely to coincide with the upper or lower 
bound in an optimal solution. Hence, the bounds need to be carefully chosen and recourse 
to information such as price and unit costs is often used. However, as discussed above, 
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these approaches can invalidate the nature of radial efficiency and obscure the 
interpretation of the efficiency score. In this study, parameters of the bounds are assessed 
on the basis of production trade-offs between inputs and/or outputs by using the trade-off 
approach recently proposed by Podinovski (2000,2002). This approach overcomes the 
above problems. 
4.3.2.1. Formula for the Homogenous Weight Restrictions (Assurance Region Method) 
The assurance region (AR) method normally involves two weights and the resulting 
constraint can be written in the following form 
CLIV2 :! ý VI :! ý PIV2 ' (4.4) 
This constraint is added to the constraints in the multiplier CCR model (i. e. in (2.13) or 
(2.14) in Chapter 2) to formulate the AR model. 
Thompson et al. (1986,1990) developed the concept of an 'assurance region' and 
introduced separate and linked linear homogenous restrictions on input and output weights. 
Taking the weight of one input as input numeraire 32 and the weight of one output as output 
numeraire, ratios between the various weights are set using available information and 
expert opinion. For example, with the first input and the first output as numeraires, an 
assurance region is defined by: 
aivi :! ý vi :! ý pivi i= Z3 .... Im (input cone), 
(4.5) 
ArUl:! ý Ur :! ý Brul r=2,3,..., s (output cone), 
where aj, Pi, Ar and Br are non-negative scalars which must be supplied by the user. The 
above was termed as Assurance Region Type I (ARI). Note that effectively. the AR 
method introduces restrictions of the form: 
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(ii vi - V, :90 
-ßiv. + 
vi <0 
Arui - Ur <0 
- BrU1 + Ur < 0. 
The linked-cone assurance region links the input and output weights as below: 
'YiVi - Ur (linked cone) 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
where yj is a non-negative scalar which is user specified. This was termed as Assurance 
Region Type 11 (ARII). 
The application of these types of homogenous weight restrictions can be seen in Novaes 
(2001) (rapid-transit services), Taylor et al. (1997) (Mexican banks), Thompson et al. 
(1997) (U. S. banks), Thanassoulis et al. (1995) (perinatal care units in the UK), Thompson 
et al. (1996) (U. S. Oil Companies), Thompson, Lee and Thrall (1992) (Independent U. S. 
Oil/Gas Producers), Beasley (1990) (U. K. University Departments) and Thompson et al. 
(1990) (farms in Kansas). 
Podinovski (2000,2002) extended the weight restriction formulae in (4.5) and (4.7) to a 
more general form that can constraint all the values of the input and output variables in the 
following manner: 
jarUr -lbivi <0 
ri 
i=II... IM5 (4.8) 
where each of the coefficients a, and bi can be positive, zero or negative. If we have only 
two non-zero coefficients then the restrictions (4.6) and (4.7) coincide with the general 
formula (4.8). Although most often weight restrictions involve two weights at a time, the 
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above formula (4.8) allows us to specify weight restrictions involving more than two 
weights at a time. 
It is worth noting that although the general form of the weight restriction is similar to the 
form of the constraint for DMUs in the multiplier model in (2.13), the coefficients in the 
constraints for DWs in the multiplier model, yd and xij are all non-negative values, 
whereas the coefficients in the weight restriction, ar and bi, need not be non-negative. The 
former is specified by the input-output data of observed DMIJ whilst the latter is estimated 
using available information such as the production trade-offs between special inputs and 
outputs. 
In the following sections we will use the more general Podinovski (2000,2002) fon-nula for 
incorporating weight restrictions in the DEA model. 
4.3.2.2 Translating Weight Restrictions to Production Trade-offs 
In this section, we describe the link between weight restrictions, in the multiplier form, and 
the trade-offs, in the envelopment form of the CRS model (Podinovski, 2000,2002). We 
use this link to construct weight restrictions in the empirical analysis in Section 4.3.2.4 
below. 
We use homogenous weight restrictions to specify bounds on the ratio of weights to make 
extreme values infeasible. In our case , involving DNOs (four inputs and five outputs) the 
weight restriction (4.8) can be written as: 
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alul + a2U2+ a3U3+ a4U4+ a5U5- (biv, + b2V2+ b3V3+ b4V4) ýý 
where each of the coefficients a,, a2, ..., b4 can be positive, zero or negative. 
(4.9) 
If the weight restriction (4.9) is included into model (4.1) its dual envelopment transforms 
to the following model, where the new variable p is dual to weight restriction (4.9): 
Minimise 0 
Subject to: 
3337629kl+ 240000OX2 +---+ 1880000/%14 + alp ý! 3337629 
33100ki+ 26863k2+ ... +22381X]4 +a2P ý! 33100 
6400ki + 5019k2 + ... + 
4323kl4 + a3P ý! 6400 
203117N, j+ 1599712X, 2 +-.. + 
1134010k14 + a4P ý! 2031170 
20300XI+ 1600OX2 + ... +22950X14 + a5P ý! 20300 
2136.8k, + 1483.1 k2 + ... + 1555.8k14 +bip <2136.80 
98.8?, l + 114X2 + --- +I 
I 8.7XI4 + b2P < 98.80 
2210309kl+ 1837849k2 + --- + 1528667/k]4 + b3P < 22103090 
... + 4225887414 3227180kl+ 290791 
lk2 ++ b4P 
-< 
32271800 
X13) ^419 ý, 25 ý-35 445 X5,465 X75 X8, X105 XI IX12ý I X14, P ý! 0,0 free. 
(4.10) 
Adding the weight restriction generates the following trade-offs between inputs and outputs 
in the envelopment model: change of the inputs by the vector (bl, b2, b3, b4) is realistic in 
the production sense provided the outputs are changed by the vector (a,, a2, a3, a4, a5) 
simultaneously, in proportion p ý: 0. 
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In the envelopment model (4.10) above, the first fourteen terms on the left-hand side of the 
constraints represent a composite unit feasible in the production possibility set of the CRS 
model (as in the case without weight restrictions of model (4.2)). The last term on the left- 
hand side representing a technologically realistic (or feasible) trade-off modifies this 
composite unit. Applying the trade-off to the composite unit, creates a realistically 
produceable (or pseudo) unit on the left-hand side of the model, which is regarded as a 
member of the production possibility set. Hence, the target unit for Eastern (3337629, 
33100,6400,2035603,20300,2136.80,98.80,22103090,32271800) on the right-hand 
side is deemed produccable too, as it is dominated 28 by the unit on the left-hand side. The 
above suggests that weight restrictions that generate realistic trade-offs in the envelopment 
forin create realistically produceable target units on the frontier, which can be used to set 
targets for inefficient units to improve their performance. Also, since the target unit is 
deemed produceable, the measure of efficiency 0 is radial (exactly as in the case without 
weight restrictions) and its role as the radial input contraction factor is retained. In other 
words , if the weight restriction 
(4.9) generates a realistic trade-off in the envelopment form 
(4.10), then the radial nature of the efficiency measure 0 is preserved and the meaning of 
efficiency is retained (Podinovski, 2000,2002). 
4.3.2.3 Incorporating Production Trade-offs Using Weight Restrictions and the 
Change of Efficient Frontier 
Weight restrictions work implicitly on the envelopment DEA model in that they indirectly 
modify the PPS. The previous section demonstrated the economic role of weight 
restrictions as specific production trade-offs between inputs and outputs. Thus, weight 
restrictions can be used to capture production trade-offs in a DEA model. 
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A simple single-output two-input case, as portrayed in Figure I of Chames, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978), can be used to illustrate how including weight restrictions can implicitly 
capture production trade-offs. Figure 4.1 depicts the PPS generated by DMUs DI - D6 in 
the example (see Chames, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978). The inputs are normalized so that 











Figure 4.1 Expanded Production Possibility Set 
The Koopmans- effic lent frontier consists of the line connecting D5, D4 and D3. Inefficient 
DMUs whose radial projections are on the inefficient frontier segments i. e. the horizontal 
line spanning from D3 and the vertical line spanning from D5 would attain maximum radial 
efficiency rating by means of one input being given zero weight. For example, D6 whose 
radial projection is on the inefficient part of the frontier would attain maximum DEA- 
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efficiency rating (i. e. one in this case) by giving a zero weight to input I despite the slack in 
its input 1. (The weight is necessarily zero to satisfy the corresponding slackness 
condition). 
Suppose now that a technological trade-off exists between the two inputs, more precisely 
that a reduction of input 2 by one unit can be compensated by the increase of input I by one 
unit. The application of this trade-off to observed DMUs, say D4 in Figure 4.1, will create 
realistically produceable (or pseudo) DNWs, for example D4. Further applications of this 
trade-off in different proportions to this observed DW, D4, creates additional realistically 
produceable DMUs such as 134". Thus a single trade-off can generate a family of pseudo 
DMUs along the lines of input substitution defined by it. These DMUs are thus regarded as 
members of the PPS. This would implicitly extend the Koopman- efficient part of the PPS 
boundary and DN4Us such as D6 would no longer appear efficient. Since the PPS is 
expanded it is also possible that some of the other initially efficient DMUs, such as D3, will 
no longer be on the boundary. 
Conversely, suppose that a reduction in input I by one unit is compensated by the increase 
in input 2 by three units and the trade-off is applied to D5. The application of this trade-off 
would create additional produceable DMUs such as D5'. Therefore, we can see the 
influence of the realistic trade-offs on the efficient frontier. It extends the efficient frontier 
along the lines of input substitution as defined by the trade-offs and thereby expands the 
PPS. 
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An advantage of using the trade-off approach is that the radial target of an inefficient DMU 
is always produceable. The targets estimated for an inefficient DW will maintain the mix 
of its inputs or outputs or in other words allow proportional improvements. Consequently, 
the radial interpretation of efficiency is preserved. For example, D6 can attain efficiency by 
improving the absolute levels of its inputs without altering its mix to emulate target unit A 
which is produceable. 
The ideas illustrated in the above figure are generalised in Podinovski (2000,2002) to 
develop the trade-off approach to constructing weight restrictions. 
ight rest ct ons and pseudo units. At this point, it is possible to address the link between wel n1 
It was illustrated in Figure 4.1 that the introduction of weight restrictions and the 
corresponding trade-offs result in the introduction of pseudo units to the PPS. The 
assessment of efficiency using the 'weight-restricted' model is equivalent to using the 
standard DEA model with additional DMUs derived by applying the trade-off to the 
observed DMUs. This is illustrated in the discussion below. 
Using notation similar to that of formula (4.9), the first of the two trade-offs discussed 
above, i. e. a reduction of input 2 by one unit can be compensated by the increase of input I 
by one unit, gives bi =I and b2 = -1which translates into the following weight restriction: 
- IVI + IV2 :! ý O. We can thus see that the coefficients b, and b2 in a typical trade-off will 
have opposite signs. Referring to Figure 4.1, it can be seen that the weight restriction and 
the corresponding trade-off could be represented in the model by the introduction of the 
pseudo DMU D4". Hence introducing the DW x, = 4, X2 =0 within the model would be 
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an alternate way of representing the trade-off. This requires the introduction of the 
constraint Iu- (4v, - OV2) :! ý 0 which differs from the weight restriction but it can be seen 
from Figure 4.1 to have the same effect. 
Theoretically the model with weight restrictions includes pseudo DMUs with zero inputs 
and outputs such as D4". These are largely theoretical constructs. In a practical assessment, 
efficient targets of inefficient DMUs would have only strictly positive inputs and outputs 
(e. g. point A in Figure 4.1). 
4.3.2.4 Constructing Weight Restrictions Using Trade-offs and Evaluating DNOs 
Efficiency Using the 'Weight-Restricted' DEA Model 
In this section we establish trade-offs between variables and evaluate the coefficients a I, a2, 
and b4 based on the trade-offs. Then we construct homogeneous weight restrictions in 
the form (4.9) and re-evaluate the efficiencies of the DNOs using extended DEA models 
incorporating the weight restrictions in a step-by step manner. We begin with the variables 
OPEX and CAPITAL. 
a) OPEX and CAPITAL 
The efficiencies in Table 4.6 are a result of the DEA assessment using two cost inputs 
OPEX and CAPITAL. The DNOs were free to choose the trade-offs between OPEX and 
CAPITAL under which they wish to be compared to other DNOs. Under the full freedom 
for DNOs to value CAPITAL and OPEX, some have placed zero weights on capital and/or 
operating expenditure. This is unrealistic because both resources clearly are needed to 
achieve a particular unit of output. The real costs of delivering service to consumers are a 
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product of operating and capital costs. The DNOs have used the following marginal rates of 
substitution between CAPITAL and OPEX which simply equal to the ratio of the two 
weights given by the software (these weights are presented in Table 4.7). 
Table 4.7 How DNOs Trade-off OPEX and CAPITAL 
DNO If il of OPEX is valued at il then El of 
CAPITAL is worth the amount below: 
Eastern 0.00031024 0.00139985 0.22 
East Midlands 0.00060422 0 +00 
London 0.0 = undefined 
Manweb 0.00062931 . 0.0024401= 0.26 
Midlands 0.00066858.0 = +00 
Northern 0.00074927-., 0 = +00 
NORWEB 0.00049509., 0= +00 
SEEBOARD 0.00073647 0.00112301 0.66 
Southern 0 0.0 1306916 0 
SWALEC 0.00089111 . 0.00465421 0.19 
SWEB 0.000 12792 *0= +00 
Yorkshire 0.0 undefined 
Hydro-Electric 0.00010477 0.01628993 0.006 
ScottishPower 0.00051734 -*. 0 = +00 
From Table 4.7, it is observed that the DNOs have adopted widely varying marginal rates 
of substitution. Some of the DNOs' marginal rates of substitution are infinite or undefined 
as the weight of OPEX assigned by the model is zero. Where there are positive values, e. g. 
SWALEC and Eastern, the marginal rate makes sense if seen as cost of capital i. e. the rate 
that a company must pay for its capital. For SWALEC and Eastern, fI of CAPITAL is 
equivalent to 19 or 22 pence of OPEX. However, it is pointed out that what the DEA 
model actually says is that in terms of productivity (i. e. securing outputs) fI of OPEX is 
worth the amount of CAPITAL showing in Table 4.7. Bosworth et al. (1996) argue that the 
inarginal rates of substitution between OPEX and CAPITAL yielded by DEA, must be seen 
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as 'Imputed' costs of capital. Using this approach, Bosworth et al. (1996) in a DEA 
assessment of the UK sewerage and water industry constrained the relative worth of 
operating expenses and capital costs that can be adopted by the companies. 
The marginal rates of substitution in Table 4.7 may or may not reflect that cost in the 
financial markets. Although it is desirable that the DNOs have the freedom to claim 
different relative values of CAPITAL and OPEX within their particular production 
circumstance, however these values must bear some resemblance to the actual cost of 
capital in the financial markets. 
In the UK DNOs, the cost of capital is estimated to be part of the distribution price control 
review at the start of a price control period. In the last distribution price review in 1999, the 
assumed cost of capital was 6/2% for the period April 2000 to March 2005, industry wide 
(OFGEM, 1996b). In setting the previous price controls, OFFER (now OFGEM) used an 
estimate of 7% for the real pre-tax cost of capital (OFFER, 1994a; 1995a). We derive the 
utility specific cost of capital in order to get a range that would be acceptable to all DNOs. 
The related concepts and the estimation of the individual DNOs' cost of capital is described 
in the Appendix to this Chapter (A4.2). The actual costs of capital in 1999/00 estimated for 
the DNOs in the financial markets are presented in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8 Cost of Capital of DNOs (in 1999/00) 
DNO Cost of Capital 
Eastern 6.8 













From Table 4.8, it can be seen that the costs of capital for the DNOs in the financial market 
range from 6.2% to 9.7%. This is consistent with the industry averages estimated by the 
regulator, as has been seen previously. We make an assumption that any DNO will accept 
the suggestion that the worth of fI of OPEX is 6 pence or more but not more than 10 pence 
of CAPITAL. This generates the following trade-offs: 
(al, a2, a3 , 
a4, a5) = (0,0,0,0,0); (bi, b2, b3, b4) ý (19 -0.06,0,0) 
and 
(al, a2, a3 , 
a4, a5) = (0,0,0,0,0); (bij b2, b3, b4) ::::::::: (- 190.1 505 0). 








By solving the multiplier model (4.1) with weight restrictions (4.11) and (4.12), the 
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From Table 4.9, we calculate the relative values of OPEX and CAPITAL claimed by the 
DNOs when imposing weight restrictions constructed using trade-offs. The relative values 
of OPEX and CAPITAL and the corresponding efficiency ratings appear in the highlighted 
columns of Table 4.10. The efficiencies obtained under full freedom of DNOs to value 
OPEX and CAPITAL is also reproduced for ease of comparison. 
Table 4.10 Imposing the Weight Restrictions (4.11) and (4.12) within the DEA Model 
DNO il of OPEX is worth the 
amount of CAPITAL below: (f) 
Efficiency 
Without WR With WR Without WR With WR 
Eastern 0.22 0.1 100.00 100.00 
East Midlands +00 0.1 100.00 95.38 
London undefined undefined 100.00 100.00 
Manweb 0.26 0.1 100.00 100.00 
Midlands +00 0.1 100.00 100.00 
Northern +00 undefined 93.54 88.87 
NORWEB +00 undefined 93.87 90.48 
SEEBOARD 0.66 0.1 100.00 100.00 
Southern 0 0.06 100.00 100.00 
SWALEC 0.19 0.1 90.34 89.89 
SWEB +00 undefined 95.35 94.39 
Yorkshire undefined undefined 100.00 100.00 
Hydro-Electric 0.006 0.06 100.00 100.00 
ScottishPower +00 undefined 89.75 86.29 
WR = Weight restrictions (4.11) and (4.12) 
When weight restrictions were imposed and both the weights of OPEX and CAPITAL were 
positive, the relative values of OPEX and CAPITAL were within the permitted range in 
equations (4.11) and (4.12). From Table 4.10 we can observe that the DNOs have taken 
their values of capital to be either at the lower or higher end of the permitted range, namely 
either 6 or 10 pence of fI of CAPITAL is equivalent to fI of OPEX. In fact some 
companies can choose intermediate values of capital and still show up the highlighted 
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efficiency rating in Table 4.10. The software has merely selected one of these values (cost 
of capital) in Table 4.10. For example, Southern can also appear efficient using the OPEX- 
CAPITAL relative values used by SWALEC (that is fI OPEX is worth 10 pence of 
CAPITAL). This is deduced from the fact that Southern was still the efficient peer of 
SWALEC even under the weight restrictions (4.11) and (4.12). It could be argued that it 
does not matter what precise imputed cost of capital DNOs use to arrive at their efficiency 
rating once we have ensured through the use of weight restrictions (4.11) and (4.12) that the 
cost is acceptable. Ultimately, the efficiencies in Table 4.10 are the important results for 
ranking the DNOs. 
However, some of the DNOs have undefined relative values as both the weights of OPEX 
and CAPITAL assigned by the model are equal to zero, but formally satisfy equation (4.11) 
and (4.12). It is not meaningful for cost inputs to have zero weights while the outputs have 
positive weights, because this means that no resources are required to procure a particular 
unit of output. To eliminate zero weights attached to cost variables, we link OPEX and 
CAPITAL to other positive weights in the table. We begin by linking OPEX and CAPITAL 
to the quality variables, TOUNT and TOTDUR, by evaluating the cost of unit quality 
improvement. This will be addressed in the following section. 
The first column of efficiencies in Table 4.10 gives each DNO its largest rating, reflecting 
the fact that the company has the absolute freedom to choose the relative values of OPEX 
and CAPITAL that suits it best. As the relative values of OPEX and CAPITAL were 
restricted to lie within a given range, the efficiency rating of each of the DNOs deteriorated 
and East Midlands was removed from the efficient frontier. This is expected because, with 
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the imposition of weight bounds, DNOs may no longer disregard their less favourable 
inputs. This can lead to some DNOs, especially those strong on only a subset of inputs, to 
attain lower efficiency rating. On the contrary, other DNOs which are not dependent on a 
subset of inputs to achieve maximum relative efficiency will be allowed to appear with 
improved relative efficiency rating. 
b) CAPITAL, TOTINT and TOTDUR 
From Table 4.9 we observe that 6 DNOs place zero weight on both OPEX and CAPITAL. 
This would be unacceptable because resources are obviously needed to run the system. A 
way to remedy this situation is to link CAPITAL to the quality variables TOTINT and 
TOTDUR, by evaluating the trade-offs between capital expenditure and quality 
improvement. 
The trade-off between capital expenditure and quality was evaluated based on the estirnated 
cost of reducing an interruption and reducing an hour off the length of interruption. The 
estimated costs were extracted from the reports Third Distribution Price Control Review: 
Summary of the Review of the Operational Capital Expenditure Proposals by PB Power for 
each DNO (OFGEM, 1999d). These reports summarised the investment proposals of all the 
DNOs for the price control period running from 2000/01 to 2004/05. The proposed 
improvements in system performance and corresponding expenditures were provided by 
each of the DNOs. This information was used by PB Power to estimate the total 
expenditure of unit improvement in customer interruptions and customer hours lost. Total 
expenditure was expressed as the sum of discounted capital expenditure and operations and 
maintenance costs. The estimates are presented in Table 4.11 below. Most of the 
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improvement measures proposed by the DNOs were concerned with continuing installation 
of remote control, distribution automation, replacement and reconfiguration of the existing 
network, lightning protection, and undergrounding selective HV lines. We argue that a 
significant amount of the improvement costs are related to capital expenditure. 
Table 4.11 Estimated Costs of Specific Quality Measures (in 1999/00 Prices) 
DNO Total expenditure (f) per annual 
avoided customer interruption 
Total expenditure (f) per 
annual customer hour saved- 
Eastem 177 177 
East Midlands 292 188 
London' - 115 
Manweb 334 63 
Midlands 418 157 
Northem 177 31 
NORWEB 2348 428 
SEEBOARD 5720 188 
Southem 658 198 
SWALEC 73 21 
SWEB 1159 146 
Yorkshire 209 177 
Hydro-Electric 762 386 
ScottishPower 605 104 
Average 995 170 
a. London did not forecast any improvement in the number of customer interruptions, and therefore 
the cost of avoiding one customer interruption was not estimated. 
The costs associated with reducing the customer interruptions and total hours lost are fairly 
similar across all the DNOs and estimated to be around f 1000 per customer interruption 
and E170 per hour of supply interruption respectively. The costs associated with the 
improvements in customer interruptions in SEEBOARDs network in particular appears to 
be high compared with other DNOs (f5720 compared to f73 - f2348 per customer 
29 
interruption). SEEBOARD's expenditure is more than twice the rate of other DNOs . 
However, SEEBOARD did not forecast any improvement in customer interruptions or 
customer hour lost and proposed to concentrate on ensuring that the current level of 
performance is maintained 30 . 
The expenditure evaluation in the report was made based on 
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improving supplies to a particular group of consumers i. e. its worst served customers as 
opposed to improving the average indicators involving all consumers. Thus, we regard 
SEEBOARD as an outlier and exclude its data from the analysis. 
From Table 4.11, we can observe that NORWEB has the highest cost figures for both 
avoiding a customer interruption and decreasing an hour off supply. which is f2348 and 
E428 respectively (excluding SEEBOARD). We argue that all DNOs will accept that the 
capital expenditure of reducing the number of interruptions by one is not more than f2350 
and the capital expenditure of decreasing an hour off supply is not more than E430, which 
are realistic upper bounds. As the overall trend of companies has been for increased 
spending on quality of supply year on year, these upper bounds remain valid in the financial 
year 1999/000 although they are derived from investment proposals of the DNOs for the 
price control period running from 2000/01 to 2004/05. In actual fact, these upper bounds 
are less stringent in 1999/00. The above argument generates the following trade-offs: 
(a 1, a2, a3, a4, a5) = 
(0,0,0,0,0), 
and 
(a 1, a2, a3, a4, a5) = 
(0,0,0,0,0), 
(bi, b2, b3, b4) ý (0.00235ý Oý -1,0) 
(bil b2, b3, b4) : -- (0.00043,0,0, -1). 
This translates into the following weight restrictions: 
0.00235vcap -V totint 
>0 
and 




By incorporating the inequality (4.13) and (4.14), together with (4.11) and (4.12) in the 
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Adding the weight restrictions (4.13) and (4.14) to the DEA model (4.1) makes the weights 
of OPEX and CAPITAL strictly positive for all the DNOs. The results show a slight 
improvement in discrimination compared to those in Table 4.9, as the efficiency of East 
Midlands. ) Northern, NORWEB, SVVEB, Yorkshire and ScottishPower is lower compared 
to Table 4.9. The previously efficient Yorkshire is rendered inefficient. 
However, inequalities (4.13) and (4.14) allow the weights of OPEX and CAPITAL to be 
positive while the weights of TOTINT and/or TOTDUR are equal to zero (see Table 4.12). 
To address this, we introduce strictly positive lower bounds for the relative weights of 
quality variables and capital. 
In order to specify lower bounds for the relative weights of quality variables and capital we 
need an estimate of the savings (to the DNOs) associated with allowing some degradation 
in the quality (i. e. increase in customer interruptions and longer restoration times). 
According to Mr. David Bailey, the Specialist Consultant at PB Powers, the degradation in 
quality is likely to be due to allowing assets to age instead of replacing them or adding 
facilities such as automation. However, this is difficult to quantify. A possible pragmatic 
approach suggested by him, would be to assume that the regulatory regime is driving DNOs 
to incur costs in order to improve performance, given the performance targets set both for 
customer interruption indices and customer hour lost indices. Accordingly one could take 
as a norm the implementation of at least some of the DNOs' expenditure proposals and 
hence the saving would simply be to do less than intended. This tends to give some 
symmetry in costs i. e. the costs of deterioration and the costs of improvements to quality of 
supply performance can be regarded as symmetrical. 
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From Table 4.11, we can observe that SWALEC has the lowest cost figures for both 
avoiding a customer interruption and decreasing an hour off supply, which is f 73 and E21 
respectively (excluding SEEBOARD). We could agree with a general statement that the 
savings (in terms of capital expenditure) in increasing the number of interruption by one is 
not less than E70 and the savings in incurrIng an additional hour off supply is not less than 
L20, which are realistic lower bounds that will be acceptable for all the DNOs. Using the 
approach outlined in obtaining weight restrictions (4.11) and (4.12), this statement can be 
represented by the following weight restrictions: 
- 
0.00007vcap + Vtotint >0 
and 




Table 4.13 displays the results of the analysis incorporating all the inequalities (4.11) to 
(4.16) to the model (4.1). Adding the weight restrictions (4.15) and (4.16) to the model 
makes the weights of TOTINT and TOTDUR strictly positive for almost all the DNOs. The 
results show a slight improvement in discrimination than those in Table 4.12, as the 
efficiency rating of the inefficient DNOs fiii-ther deteriorated. Manweb is removed from the 
efficient subset and is now just below full efficiency. The number of efficient DNOs has 
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c) CAPITAL, TOTINT and TOTINTRES 
From Table 4.13, we can observe that the weights attached to total number of interruptions 
(TOTINT) by a number of DNOs (i. e. seven) is greater than the weight attached to total 
number of interruptions restored within 3 hours from fault (TOTINTRES). For example, 
the ratio of weights between TOTINT and TOTINTRES in the case of Eastern, London, 
Manweb, Southem and Hydro-Electric are infimte because a positive weight is associated 
with TOTINT while a zero weight is accorded to TOTINTRES. These DNOs are classified 
as efficient (Manweb is just below full efficiency) irrespective of the fact that the weight 
ratios do not correspond with the desire for a high percentage of interruptions restored 
within 3 hours from fault. To remedy this situation, we impose weight restrictions to link 
the weights of TOTINT, TOTINTRES and the associated capital expenditure of increasing 
the number of interruptions restored within 3 hours from fault by one. First we link 
TOTINTRES with CAPITAL followed by TOTINTRES with TOTINT. 
Seven of the DNOs have estimated the capital expenditure necessary to increase the 
percentage of supply restoration within three hours of fault (i. e. an interruption) by 3 per 
cent. These estimated costs were drawn from the Review of Public Electricity Supplier 1998 
to 2000: PES Business Plans: Consultation Paper (OFFER, 1998b) and are presented in 
Table 4.14. 
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Table 4.14 Estimated Capital Expenditure of Increasing the Percentage of Supply 
Restoration within 3 Hours from Fault by 3% 
DNO Capital expenditure (im) per annum 
of 3% increase in the percentage of 
supply interruptions restored within 3 








The data is transformed to derive the capital expenditure of increasing the number of 
interruptions restored within 3 hours from fault by one. This is presented in Table 4.15. 
Table 4.15 Estimated Capital Expenditure per Interruption Restored within 3 Hours 
from Fault 
DNO Capital expenditure (L) per annum 
per supply interruption restored 








Based on Table 4.15, we can make the judgement that the capital expenditure of increasing 
interruptions restored within 3 hours from fault by one is more than E80 but not more than 
E2050, which are realistic lower and upper bounds that will be acceptable to all the DNOs. 
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Using the approach outlined in obtaining weight restrictions (4.11) and (4.12), this 
judgement results in the following weight constraints: 
0.00205vcap - Utotintres >0 (4.17) 
and 
- 0-00008Vcap + Utotintres >0 (4.18) 
By incorporating all inequalities (4.11) to (4.18) in the model, we obtain the results as in 
Table 4.16. Adding the weight restrictions (4.17) and (4.18) to the model makes the weight 
of TOTINTRES strictly positive for all the DNOs. The weight restrictions have reduced the 
efficiency of some of the DNOs to a small extent and further improved the discrimination 
of the model. 
However, we can still observe that the weight attached to TOTINT by a number of DNOs is 
greater than the weight attached to TOTINTRES. In the case of London, the weight 
associated with TOTINT is 48 times as large as the weight associated with TOUNTRES. 
(This means that London is very likely to have weakness in this item). This ratio does not 
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In order to establish the trade-offs between TOTINT and TOTINTRES we present the 
following table on the percentage of interruptions restored within 3 hours from fault for 
each of the DNOs in the financial year 1999/00. This information is derived from the report 
Distribution and Transmission System Performance 1999100 (OFGEM, 2000b). 
Table 4.17 Percentage of Interruptions Restored within 3 Hours from Fault (1999/00) 
DNO Percentage of Interruptions 
Restored Within 3 Hours from 
Fault 
Eastem 93.83 













From Table 4.17, it can be seen that the percentage of interruptions restored within 3 hour 
from fault for the DNOs range from 84.5% (i. e. London) to 93.8% (i. e. Eastern). We argue 
that it is technologically realistic that if the number of interruptions is increased for any 
reason by 100 then the number of interruptions restored within 3 hours from fault would 
increase by 80 or more but not more than 100. 
This trade-off can be considered quite good since only 20 of the 100 interruptions will not 
be restored within three hours of fault. If the number 80 is increased, on one hand the 
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discrimination power of the model may increase, but on the other hand not all the DNOs 
may agree with the trade-off. Thus the figure 80 is considered to be safe. 
Using the approach outlined in obtaining weight restrictions (4.11) and (4.12), the above 
judgement translates into the following linked weight restrictions: 








Table 4.18 displays the results of the DEA analysis incorporating all inequalities (4.11) to 
(4.20). 
Adding the weight restrictions (4.19) and (4.20) to the model further improved the 
discrimination of the model. The previously efficient London and Midland are rendered 
inefficient, leaving only four DNOs to define the frontier (i. e. Eastern, SEEBOARD, 
Southern and Hydro-Electric). A significant decline is observed in Manweb's efficiency 
rating (from just under full efficiency 99.8 % to 89.91 %). The efficiency of East Midlands, 
Midlands, Northern, NORWEB, SWALEC, SWEB, Yorkshire and SottishPower is lower 
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d) OPEX and CUSTNO 
One of the important operating cost drivers of the distribution business is the number of 
customers served. However, as seen from Table 4.18, eight of the DNOs have a zero weight 
associated with customer number. This corresponds to a zero cost of servicing a customer 
(e. g. running call centres and maintaining customer records), which is one of the main 
activities of a DNO. By linking the weights of CUSTNO and OPEX in one inequality, this 
situation is eliminated. 
The following table presents the operating expenditure (controllable) per customer in the 
financial year 1999/00. 







Eastem 3337629 98.8 29.6 
East Midlands 2400000 114.0 47.5 
London 2060000 103.2 50.1 
Manweb 1401000 74.2 53.0 
Midlands 2260000 113.1 50.1 
Northem 1460624 91.5 62.6 
NORWEB 2203000 113.3 51.4 
SEEBOARD 2139000 80.4 37.6 
Southem 2681057 76.5 28.5 
SWALEC 988700 54.9 55.5 
SWEB 1344000 95.8 71.3 
Yorkshire 1995230 96.3 48.3 
Hydro-Electric 640000 49.3 77.0 
ScottishPower 1880000 118.7 63.1 
Average 51.8 
The controllable operating costs per customer vary between about f28 to E80 31 from one 
DNO to another, with an average of f 52. If a plausible assumption is made that it is 
possible for a DNO to drop one customer by reducing at least half of the average operating 
costs (i. e. f25) and on the other hand it can increase one customer by incurring an 
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additional costs of not more than twice the average operating costs (i. e. fI 10), then a set of 
lower and upper bounds for the weights on customer number can be obtained. This 
approach was adopted in Dyson and Thanassoulis (1988) in an assessment of Metropolitan 
and London Borough rates department using DEA to obtain 'sensible' lower bounds on the 
output weights. 
Using the above assumptions, we can formulate the following linked weight restrictions 
with the approach outlined in obtaining weight restrictions (4.11) and (4.12) above: 





op -U custno >0 (4.22) 
The efficiency ratings and the corresponding optimal weights when weight restrictions 
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When the DNOs were forced to allocate a minimum of E25 per customer, a positive weight 
was attached to the variable CUSTNO of all the DNOs and the efficiency of some of the 
DNOs (e. g. East Midlands, London, Manweb, Midlands, Northern, SWALEC, Yorkshire 
and ScottishPower) has declined slightly. Eastern, SEEBOARD, Southern and Hydro- 
Electric have remained relatively efficient as they could accommodate the weight 
restrictions imposed. The average efficiency score for the industry was 91.37%, although 
there are wide variations among the DNOs with a range of scores between 80.69% and 
100%. Eastern, London, SEEBOARD, Southern and Hydro-Electric were the leading 
performing DNOs with efficiencies of over 95%. East Midlands, Manweb, Midlands and 
Yorkshire were middle ranking with scores between 85% and 95%. The results further 
suggest that the poorest perfonners were Northem, NORWEB, SWALEC, SWEB and 
ScottishPower with scores between 80% and 85%. The DNO with the lowest score is 
ScottishPower with an efficiency rating of 80.69%. 
Comparing Table 4.6 and 4.20, the number of zero weights has been considerably reduced. 
To eliminate all zero weights we would need additional weight restrictions. However, our 
objective is not to eliminate all zero weights but to make the assessment incorporate as 
much reliable information on the production technology as possible. The limitation of the 
trade-off approach is that only realistic production trade-offs should be incorporated in the 
assessment. Unless there is a high degree of certainty of the trade-offs that exist between 
factors, zero weights cannot be totally eliminated. In our model some of the factors do not 
clearly substitute for each other, for example, number of customers and units of electricity 
distributed or even service area. Since it is difficult to get realistic or sensible trade-offs on 
some of the factors in our model and we do not wish to hypothesize, we stop the 
175 
incorporation of additional weight restriction. Even so, we have gone a long way in 
eliminating many of the zero weights observed in the standard model. 
4.4 Discussion and Comparison 
It is important to distinguish between technology related information on one hand, and 
price or value related infonnation on the other, both of which can be included in the DEA 
model by weight restrictions. In the above section, the weight restrictions were constructed 
using the information on technologically realistic production trade-offs. Certainly, if the 
weight restrictions were constructed using the information on prices or value, the results 
similar to Table 4.20 could be obtained, where zero-weights can be eliminated and weights 
would be within a specified range. However, the interpretation of the efficiency score 
differs. If the weight restrictions are consistent with technologically realistic production 
trade-offs, the model preserves the radial nature of efficiency. Consider for example, East 
Midlands, whose efficiency in Table 4.20 is equal to 94.38%. This means the existing 
consumption of input by East Midlands can be scaled down to 94.38%, while maintaining 
its current level of output. If the weight restrictions were constructed using the importance 
or monetary considerations, it would be wrong to say that the input consumption of East 
Midlands can be reduced to the level of 94.38% without any detriment to the output. This is 
because the left-hand side of the model (4.10) would not necessarily represent a 
technologically realistic member of the production possibility set. 
The cumulative impact of the weight restnctions is obvious from the companson of Table 
4.20 with the onginal Table 4.6, although the impact of each weight restnction may be 
small. The discrimination has improved considerably by the forced allocation of weights on 
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the basis of realistic production trade-offs. The average efficiency in 1999/00 is lower at 
91.37 % (Table 4.20) compared to 97.27% (Table 4.6). The number of DNOs that define 
the efficient frontier has dropped to four. Of the nine originally efficient DNOs, five (i. e. 
East Midlands, London, Manweb, Midlands and Yorkshire) have been rendered inefficient 
under weight restrictions. When weight restrictions on relative values between OPEX- 
CAPITAL were included, the previously efficient East Midlands was rendered inefficient. 
Subsequently, when the trade-offs between capital expenditure and quality concerns were 
accounted for using weight restrictions, this further removed London, Manweb, Midlands 
and Yorkshire from the efficient frontier. East Midlands, London, Manweb, Midlands and 
Yorkshire are classic examples of units that appear efficient owing to an unrealistic 
allocation of weights. We can draw a conclusion that East Midlands does not show a 
balanced performance between managing operating expenditure and capital investment 
while Manweb is relatively poor on the aspect of service quality (its efficiency score 
declined significantly to 88.97%). 
Four DNOs (i. e. Eastern, SEEBOARD, Southern and Hydro-Electnc) could accommodate 
all the weight restrictions imposed and remained relatively efficient. This can be expected 
as the DNOs may choose alternative optimal weights without even imposing the weight 
restrictions. Confidence in their efficiency measure is thus enhanced. Of these, Eastern and 
Southern were the dominant efficient reference firm, being peer for 8 and 6 inefficient 
DNOs respectively. Eastern has the nearest input-output mix of the inefficient DNOs and 
can be used as a role model for inefficient DNOs to emulate to improve their performance. 
The regulator can expect these inefficient DNOs to adjust their input-output mix to that of 
Eastem. 
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In the third distribution price control review (OFGEM, 1999a), OFGEM set out its 
efficiency assessment of the UK DNOs using 1997/98 data. Employing ordinary least 
squares (OLS), OFGEM regressed base operating costs against a composite (network) size 
variable, constructed by adjusting customer numbers f or differences in units distributed and 
length of network. In OFGEMs' analysis, Eastern and Southern were defined the frontier 
DNOs (OFGEM, 1999a) and the efficiency rating of all the DNOs ranged between 65-33% 
(NORWEB) to 101.8% (Eastern) (The Utilities Journal, 1999b) with a geometric average of 
79.8%. When the regression analysis was repeated using total costs 32 , Eastern and 
SEEBOARD emerged as the frontier firms (OFGEM, 1999a). Our efficiency study using 
DEA encompasses more input and output variables (that includes considerations of capital 
inputs and quality of supply outputs) and relates to the year 1999/2000. Thus it is unlikely 
that similar efficiency ratings and ranking of the DNOs would emerge from different 
methods using different data sets. The DEA approach gives higher estimations of the 
DNOs' efficiencies than regression analysis and the efficiency ratings ranged from 80.69% 
to 100% with a geometric average of 91.37%. Nevertheless, while there are some 
variations in the absolute level of efficiency and in the relative positions of the DNOs, the 
results of the extended model show evidence that Eastern, Southern and SEEBOARD have 
remained as frontier companies and NORWEB was one of the worst performing DNO. 
Thus, there is general agreement between DEA and the regulators method on who is 'good' 
and who is 'bad'. There are no DEA inefficient DNOs that the regulator deems efficient. 
Nevertheless, there are DEA efficient DNOs that the regulator scored quite low. The case in 
point is Hydro-Electric. However, Hydro-Electric may not be truly efficient as its efficiency 
classification may be influenced by the large area it supplies. 
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4.5 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has applied the standard and 'weight-restricted' DEA models to assess the 
efficiency of the UK DNOs in the financial year 1999/00. The total freedom of choice of 
weights in the standard DEA model can lead to unrealistic allocation of weights and hence 
misleading efficiencies for some DNOs. This factor, together with the existence of only a 
small number of DNOs relative to the number of input-output variables used, led to the 
need to introduce improvements to the standard DEA model. The 'weight -restricted' DEA 
model was developed by incorporating weight restrictions. The weight resti-ictions were 
linked to specific technological realities of the DNOs production process using the trade-off 
approach devised by Podinovski (2000,2002). This approach has several ments. First, the 
results should be acceptable to the DNOs in the sense that the most preferable weights for 
the DNOs were assigned within the allowable range defined by the trade-offs that is 
established by taking into account each DNOs' production circumstance. Secondly, the 
assessed efficiency is consistent with the economic notion of input and/or output 
substitution. Thirdly, this approach gives the benefit of preserving the traditional 
interpretation of efficiency as a radial improvement factor. Thus, the obtained efficiencies 
are radial in nature. Even though similar results can be obtained using non-economic 
subjective judgements, it cannot be claimed that the efficiencies are radial. Nevertheless, 
the price to pay for using weight restrictions constructed on the basis of trade-offs is the 
burden of establishing the trade-offs. The evaluation of trade-offs between inputs or inputs 
can be difficult in practice as they may not clearly substitute for each other, for example, 
number of customers and units of electricity distributed in our case, or they may be 
computationally demanding such as in the case of the trade-offs between operating and 
capital costs. The use of weight restrictions that were linked to specific technological 
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realities of the DNOs production process in this study is a novel application in the context 
of electricity distribution. In fact this is the first practical study that utilised the recently 
developed trade-off approach to incorporate realistic infon-nation on production technology. 
The correct reflection of the technological realities of the production process provides 
results that can be useful policy guidance. This increases the value of modelling for policy 
analysis. 
In general, the weight restrictions not only improve the discrimination of the model but by 
capturing the technological realities of the production process it also provide a better 
approximation of the PPS and thereby give a more valid estimate of the efficiencies of the 
DNOs. In our circumstance where monetary inputs were used, the weight restrictions also 
enable the comparison of DNOs from a cost-benefit point of view. 
OFGEM have used regression analysis to gain insights into the comparative efficiency of 
the DNOs during the last price control process. In our study, we have opted to utilise DEA 
to evaluate the efficiencies of the DNOs. DEA is a significant improvement to the 
regulators method because it takes into account many variables (and includes them 
separately in the model), offers targets for inefficient DNOs, identifies the strengths and 
weaknesses of the DNO and identifies efficient peers for inefficient DNOs which can be 
used as a guidance to improve. The peers can be used to identify the relative inefficiencies 
in input use of an inefficient DNO. Hence, DEA should be used to augment the regulators 
method. 
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Broad conclusions that can be made about the results are that there are three major clusters 
of perfonnance. Eastern, London, SEEBOARD, Southern and Hydro-Electric were the 
leading performing DNOs while East Midlands, Manweb, Midlands and Yorkshire were 
middle ranking and the poorest performers were Northern, NORWEB, SWALEC, SVv'EB 
and ScottishPower. The DNO with the lowest score was ScottishPower with an efficiency 
rating of 80.69%. 
The results of the standard DEA model show evidence that the potential operating 
expenditure savings across all the DNOs amounts to E49.6 million on base modelling 
operating expenditure of f 1280 million; that is almost 4% of the total. The potential OPEX 
savings calculated on the basis of the results of the 'weight-restricted' DEA model amounts 
to a total of E154 million (i. e. 12% of total OPEX of all DNOs). This is expected as the 
estimated efficiencies of the DNOs are lower when additional constraints are included in 
the standard model and this increases the potential the DNOs have to make savings in costs. 
The 'weight-restricted' model reflects the technological realities of the DNOs production 
process more accurately and as such the results obtained are more valid and reliable. 
The next chapter uses the 'weight-restricted' DEA models developed in this chapter to 
measure the quality and productivity change of the electricity distribution industry in the 
post-reform and post-privatisation period 1990/91 to 1999/00 employing DEA-based 
Malmquist indices. 
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30 A stakeholder is any group or individual who can effect, or is affected by, the 
achievement of the organisations purpose. The interests of stakeholders are wide and 
diverse and they have their unique set of expectations, needs and value. 
31 This is because the geometric average is the only average that preserves the 
multiplicative property (see Fleming and Wallace, 1986; Roberts, 1990; Aczel, 1990). 
32 Defined as a unit of account in terms of which all commodities (and services) are stated. 
33 Unit (XA, YA) is dominated by a unit (XBYB) if XA >- XB5 YA -< 
YB and (XA, YA) ý 
(XBNB)- 
34 According to Mr. David Bailey, the Specialist Consultant at PB Powers who prepared the 
report, a wide range of costs were identified because DNOs were simply invited to make 
proposals without any indicated assumptions relating to the possible valuation of the 
benefits of their proposals. He added that it may also have been that certain companies did 
not wish to take on anything other than essential capital works (due to constraints from 
their owners) and hence quoted excessive costs, whereas others may have been keen to 
invest and hence quoted low. 
35 The company intends to maintain the security and availability indices within stated 
ranges, the mid-point of which are the 1999/00 levels. 
36 In the Review of Public Electricity Suppliers 1998-2000, Distribution Price Control 
Review: Draft Proposal by OFGEM (OFGEM, 1999a: p24) the adjusted controllable 
operating costs per customer was reported to vary between about f 30 and f 85 amongst the 
DNOs in 1997/98 (1997/98 prices). This lends support to the above figures. 
37 The level of total cost was calculated using Total cost = base opex + average network 
capital expenditure with the average being taken over the period 1990/91 - 1999/2000. 
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Chapter 5 
Evaluating DNOs Quality and Productivity Changes: A Malmquist Index Approach 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the efficiency of the UK DNOs in 1999/00 was evaluated using 
DEA. This chapter explores the impact of the regulatory reforms and privatisation of the 
electricity industry in 1990-91 on the quality and productivity changes of the 14 UK 
DNOs. The methodology used is based on the Malmquist indices of productivity and 
quality change, as illustrated in Chapter 2. While DEA takes a 'snap-shot' of economic 
performance in a particular year (i. e. static performance), the Malmquist index measures 
performance over time. 
Before exploring the impact of reforms and privatisation, we develop an extension of the 
standard Malmquist index approach to productivity measurement by incorporating 
additional weight restrictions, based on production trade-offs, in the DEA models utilised 
to calculate it. The new index is referred to as the 'weight-restricted' Malmquist index. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, weight restrictions are constructed using production trade-offs 
between inputs and/or outputs to reflect the technological realities of the DNOs production 
process accurately. This provides a better representation of technological details, and 
result in a more accurate and reliable approximation of productivity change. Also, it leads 
to better discrimination between productive DNOs. For these reasons, the 'weight- 
restricted' Malmquist productivity index is a more appropriate tool for evaluating UK 
DNOs than the standard Malmquist index. 
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Like the standard Malmquist productivity index, the 'weight-restricted' index is broken I 
down into efficiency change and technological change, which provides insights into the 
root source of productivity change. Efficiency change indicates whether DNOs become 
more efficient over time; in other words, whether they are catching up with their 
technological frontier. Technological change captures the shift over time of the DNOs 
technological frontier. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 develops the 'weight-restricted' 
Malmquist (input-based) index; Section 5.3 presents and describes the data set and Section 
5.4 evaluates the productivity and quality changes based on the new approach. Further, 
productivity is decomposed into multiple components, namely technological change and 
efficiency change, to detect the changes in DNOs efficiency and the industry boundary 
over time. Section 5.5 analyses the impact of mergers and acquisition on DNOs 
performance and Section 5.6 summarises and concludes with some thoughts on the value 
of the 'weight-restricted' Malmquist index. 
5.2 Developing the 'Weight-Restricted' Malmquist Productivity Index 
There have only been two attempts in the literature to incorporate weight restrictions in 
dynamic DEA analysis for the measurement of productivity. These are Goto and Tsutsui 
(1998) and Giuffrida (1999). The former examined the productivity improvement among 
Japanese and US electnc utilities from 1984 to 1993 using an intertemporal efficiency 
index (obtained as part of Malmquist productivity index) to measure the intertemporal 
shift of an efficiency frontier. The latter analysed the efficiency of primary care provision 
in the English Family Health Service Authorities over the period 1990/91-1994/95 using 
Malinquist indices of productivity change. However, both used the traditional approach of 
assigning Nvelght restrictions based on prices and importance as opposed to trade-offs (i. e. 
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for the estimation of bounds for the weights). However, this procedure is not 
methodologically sound, as it contravenes the properties of the Malmquist index. We may 
recall that that Malmquist index applies the distance function approach. Several distance 
functions are estimated to calculate a Malmquist index. The value of the distance 
functions is computed by measuring the radial distance from a production bundle to an 
estimated production bundle on the efficient boundary. The distance functions are 
estimated using the linear programming method by exploring the fact that the value of the 
distance function is reciprocal to the Farrell measure of technical efficiency (and therefore 
can be computed using DEA). It is important to recognize that 
i) the input (output) distance function characterizes the production technology by 
evaluating the maximal radial contraction of the input vector (radial expansion of 
the output vector), given an output vector (input vector). Thus, the distance function 
corresponds with a radial measure of efficiency; and 
11) the distance ftinction projects the unit under assessment onto the boundary of the 
production possibility set. In other words, the efficient target of an inefficient unit 
must be on the boundary of the production possibility set. 
However, when weight restrictions are assigned on the basis of prices and importance, the 
efficiency measure obtained is non-radial and also it is not clear what frontier the units are 
projected to. As noted by Allen et al. (1997), the radial interpretation of the efficiency 
measure breaks down under such weight restrictions and the traditional meaning of an 
efficiency target is also invalidated since these weight restrictions may render parts of the 
efficient boundary of the production possibility set no longer efficient. Clearly, weight 
restrictions based on pnces or importance disregards the characteristics of the distance 
function. Therefore assigning weight restrictions on prices or importance is inappropriate 
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in the Malmquist index circumstance and the results may not be Interpreted in a 
meaningful way. 
Conversely, when the weight restrictions are incorporated on the basis of production trade- 
offs there are no methodological difficulties. Podinovski (2000,2002) showed that the 
incorporation of weight restrictions based on trade-offs redefines the production 
possibility set (by expanding it) and overcomes the problems. Consequently, the 
efficiency measure is radial and the unit is projected onto the boundary of the redefined 
production possibility set (a detailed discussion of this is in Chapter 4). This approach 
recognizes the characteristics of the distance ftinction. Therefore, in this thesis, the weight 
restrictions incorporated into the DEA models to estimate the distance function in order to 
calculate the Malmquist index are based on production trade-offs between inputs and/or 
outputs. The modified index is referred to as the 'weight-restricted' Malmquist index. 
We may recall that that the Malmquist index, as introduced in Chapter 2, is defined as the 
geometric mean of two Malmquist indices. The first is evaluated with respect to period t 
technology and the second with respect to period t+1 technology. Thus, production points 
are compared to two different technologies from two different time periods. 
Correspondingly, two different boundaries that belong to the technologies in period t and 
t+ I respectively are constructed. Weight restrictions constructed on the basis of 
production trade-offs participate in the building of these boundaries as they introduce 
additional production points to expand the production possibility set. Theoretically, 
production trade-offs corresponding to the particular period of time and technology should 
be used to construct the weight restrictions. In this way, the weight restrictions will be 
applicable to the technology at the particular period in time. As a result, a better 
approximation of the boundary can be obtained. A good estimation of the boundary is 
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important because the value of the distance function relies on measuring the distance of 
the evaluated production point from the boundary of the production possibility set. Thus, 
the values of the distance ftinction are dependent on production trade-offs used to 
construct the weight restrictions. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the difference of the 'weight-restricted' Malmquist index to the 
traditional Malmquist index for input-based distance functions, in the case where two 
inputs are used to produce a single output. Figure 5.1 illustrates one boundary at two 
different points of time To and T. The bold solid lines represent the unrestricted 
boundaries of the production possibility sets in the corresponding technologies i. e. To and 
T'. The thinner solid lines represent the restricted boundaries, i. e. the redefined boundaries 
by means of the technologically realistic trade-offs between x, and X2,, in the respective 
technologies. Two observations X0 and XI represent the input bundles in the 
corresponding year i. e. base year 0 and target year 1. The dotted lines illustrate the radial 








Figure 5.1 The Comparison of the Standard and the 'Weight-Restricted' Malmquist 
(Input-Based) Index 
The traditional Malmquist index compares X0 to the points E and G on the boundary, and 
similarly, X1 to A and C. The input-based Malmquist index is given by: 
I 
M(xo,,, yo, j) 
OX'/OA OX'/OC 2 
OXO/OE OXO/OG 
In comparison, the 'weight-restricted' input-based Malmquist index compares X0 to the 
points F and H on the boundary, and similarly, X1 to B and D. The 'weight-restricted' 
input Malmquist index is given by: 




Points F, H, B and D are the reference points on the expanded production possIbilitv set I 
which allows proportional contraction. Consequently, the radial interpretation of the 
efficiency measure is preserved. 
The 'weight-restricted' Malmquist productivity index has a similar interpretation with that 
of the Malmquist index in (2.22) and it can be decomposed in a similar fashion, into 
technical efficiency change and technological change. 
At this point it is worth noting that the Malmquist productivity index, which is based on 
distance functions that are reciprocals of DEA radial efficiency measures, ignores slacks. 
Slacks constitute a non-radial fonn of inefficiency. When slacks are present, radial 
efficiency measures overstate true efficiencies (see Torgersen, Forsund and Kittlesen 
(1996) for a review), the reciprocal distance function understates the distance to the 
relevant efficient subset, and the resulting Malmquist productivity index is adversely 
affected, although in an unknown way (Gnfell-Tatje, Lovell and Pastor, 1998) 38 . The 
incorporation of weight restrictions constructed on the basis of trade-offs reduces this 
problem. Slacks correspond to the sections of the piece-wise linear frontier that runs 
parallel to the axes, i. e. the vertical and horizontal segments. Weight restrictions based on 
production trade-offs remove some of the vertical and horizontal segments of the 
corresponding inputs and outputs as was illustrated by Figure 4.1 (in Chapter 4, page 148). 
More importantly, the information about the production trade-offs help us to construct a 
more accurate, and realistic efficient frontier of the technology under consideration. This 
also implies that the Malmquist index becomes more accurate and reliable. 
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5.2.1 The Trade-off Approach for the Malmquist Index 
Technologies are likely to evolve over time as new production processes are discovered 
(process innovation) and new products appear (product innovation). Since trade-offs are 
time and technology specific, it is emphasised that the production trade-offs used to 
construct the weight restrictions are linked to the technology of the particular period. 
However, in the electricity distribution sector, the technology employed in DNO networks 
has been remarkably stable over a long period of time (OFGEM, 2003e). The slow rate of 
technological change is in part due to the extended lifetimes that DNO equipment can 
achieve. It is also because the 1990's had been a time when regulation concentrated on the 
transmission sector. The employment of new technology in the distribution network has 
grown very slowly since privatisation. For example, in 1993/94 there was just 1.2 GW of 
embedded, independent generation (by the use of renewable and combined heat and power 
plants) (NGC, 1994) and at the end of 2001 total capacity installed stood at 4.8 GW (NGC, 
2003). Also, there appears to be no reason to believe that the production trade-offs have 
altered radically since the regulatory reforms and privatisation of the sector in 1990-91. 
This is supported by the fact that the trade-off between OPEX and CAPITAL, has not 
changed significantly over the decade. In the previous chapter we saw that the trade-off 
between OPEX and CAPITAL is reflected by the cost of capital which is the rate that a 
company must pay for its capital. In the first distribution price review in 1994, the cost of 
capital was estimated to be 7% (OFFER, 1994a, 1995a) and in the subsequent price 
control review in 1999 (OFGEM, 1999b) it was calculated to be 6.5% on average. In the 
absence of rapid technological progress and alterations to production trade-offs in the 
electricity distribution industry between 1990/91 and 1999/00, we use the same universal 
trade-offs for all the periods in this study. Nonetheless, we employ trade-offs that are more 
relaxed or undemanding. The weight restrictions constructed on the basis of these relaxed 
trade-offs will provide upper weight bounds that are sufficiently large and lower weight 
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bounds that are sufficiently small to ensure that all the specific trade-offs corresponding to 
each period in time are encompassed within the range. This also has the advantage of 
keeping the information requirement minimal and makes it computationally simple. 
In the following paragraphs, we establish undemanding production trade-offs between the 
variables, in order to construct homogeneous weight restrictions that will be applicable to 
all the periods under the evaluation. We use the same approach as in Chapter 4. The trade- 
offs here are considered to be less demanding as the bounds exceed the measures used 
before in Chapter 4. The undemanding trade-offs are, however safe as they cannot be 
argued against by the DNOs and yet they provide better discrimination than the 
unrestricted model. 
In the previous chapter (page 154) we derived the trade-offs between OPEX and 
CAPITAL based on the costs of capital of the DNOs. In a similar way, we derived 
the cost of capital for the individual DNOs in the financial markets for the entire period 
1990/91 to 1999/00. The costs of capital estimated for the DNOs in the financial markets 
during this ten-year period ranged from 3.2% to 10.7%. We argue that DNOs in all of the 
years evaluated will accept that the worth of El of OPEX is 3 pence or more but not more 
than II pence of CAPITAL. This trade-off between OPEX and CAPITAL is sufficiently 
lenient to be applicable to all the periods under evaluation. 
The trade-offs between cost and quality established in Chapter 4 were based on the 
estimated costs of reducing one interruption, reducing one hour off supply and increasing 
the number of interruptions restored within 3 hours of failure by one. The costs were 
estimated on the basis of the investment proposals of the DNOs for the price control 
period running from 2000/01 to 2004105. As the overall trend of companies has been for 
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increased spending on quality of supply year on year, we argue that the trade-offs 
established in Chapter 4 (related to the period 1999/00) are sufficiently lax to remain valid 
in all the prior periods in the analysis. 
On the other hand, the operating costs have been on a downward trend over the years as 
shown by Table 5.1 below. The controllable operating costs per customer range from L28 
to f 120 over the entire period (in 1999 prices). As in Chapter 4, we make the assumption 
that it is possible for a DNO to drop one customer by reducing at least half of the lowest 
operating costs (i. e. f 14) and on the other hand it can increase one customer by incurring 
an additional cost of not more than twice the highest operating costs (i. e. E240). This 
trade-off between operating expenditure and customer number is adequately lenient to 
include the trade-offs in the various periods under evaluation. 
Similarly, the percentage of interruptions restored within 3 hours from failure for the 
DNOs have improved over the years and vaned from 64% to 95% from one DNO to 
another over the entire period. Thus, we argue that it is technologically realistic that if the 
number of interruptions is increased for any reason by 100 then the number of 
interruptions restored within 3 hours from failure would increase by 60 or more but not 
more than a 100. The figure 60 is a very safe figure as a DNO in any point of time will not 
disagree. However, it is noteworthy that the more lenient trade-off will cause the 
discriminatory power of the model to decrease. 
Using the approach outlined in the previous chapter in constructing weight restrictions 
with trade-offs, the above trade-offs result in the following weight restrictions: 
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vcap - 0.03vo >0 (5.1) p 
Vcap -0.11 vop <0 (5.2) 
0.00235vcap -V totint ýý 0 (5.3) 
0.0043v cap -V totdur >0 (5.4) 
0.00007vcap +V 




totdur 0 (5.6) 
0.00205vcap -utotinucb >0 (5.7) 
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0.00024vop- U custno ýý 0 (5.12) 
The trade-offs between cost and quality (i. e. (5.3) to (5.8)) and between cost and customer 
number (i. e. (5.11) and (5.12)) are generated in 1999 prices. These trade-offs are valid in 
all the periods as the cost data has been inflation adjusted to 1999 prices (discussed in the 
section below). 
We derive new DEA models that incorporate weight restrictions (5.1) to (5.12) as 
additional constraints for computing the 'weight-restricted' Malmquist productivity and 
quality index. 
5.3 Data 
The data in this study consists of annual observations from the UK DNOs that cover the 
financial years 1990/91 to 1999/00 inclusive, the period for which consistent data was 
available. The sample of firms used in this study consists of 14 UK DNOs. The input- 
output set that we use is as in Table 4.2. It consists of 2 inputs, 3 outputs, I environmental 
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variable and 3 quality variables (Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the variables 
used). Descriptive statistics of the input, output, environmental and quality variables for 
each year are provided in Tables 5.1,5.2 and 5.3 respectively. Before discussing the data 
in detail, we may recall that all cost data were inflated to 1999 prices using the CPI 
(Consumer Price Index) changes (see page 79). This is to isolate the real productivity 
change from the effects of inflation. An analysis based on unadjusted monetary data 
would consider the effect of inflation as productivity regress. 
It is possible to draw some broad conclusions about the operating characteristic and 
service quality performance from Tables 5.1,5.2 and 5.3. Looking at Table 5.1, on 
average, the operating expenditure has been quite stable during the first price control 
period 1990/91 to 1994/95 and has declined since then. The downward trend from 
1995/96 reflects the continuing drive to reduce costs in response to regulatory pressure. 
Further, the downward trend may also be a result of the DNOs slimming their work force 
through mergers and take-overs in order to benefit from economies of scale. On the 
contrary, average capital has increased over time since the reforms in 1990-91 as a result 
of growth in the main outputs as we shall see below. Some of the DNOs deviate 
signifilcantly from the averages. This may reflect to a certain extent the different 
geographical area of the DNOs, wherein DNOs operating in larger area would have an 
extensive network infrastructure and incur higher operating and capital costs compared to 
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Table 5.2 describes the output and environmental variables. This shows that the number of 
customers and the units of electricity distributed, on average, have increased steadily but 
marginally over time. On the other hand, maximum demand is quite stable through time. 
Since the DNOs are monopolies that operate in defined regions, the service area is constant 
over time. 
In Chapter 3, we defined plausible measures of quality to assess the service quality 
provided in electricity distribution. The quality measures included the total number of 
interruptions, the total duration of interruptions (i. e. undesirable output quality) and the 
total number of interruptions restored within 3 hours from failure (i. e. desirable output 
quality). These measures of service quality are within the ambit of quality of supply 
dimension (the two dimensions of service quality defined in this study, namely quality of 
supply and customer service quality are discussed in Chapter 3). We should note here that a 
rolling three year average has been applied to the data of the service quality measures so 
that the impact of uncertain weather is smoothed. It is apparent from Table 5.3 that the 
three service quality measures have all peaked in 1991/92 and declined sharply until 
1993/94. However, since then they have moved in different directions where, on average, 
the total duration of interruptions show a gradual decline, the total number of interruptions 
has been nearly flat and the total number of interruptions restored within 3 hours from 
failure show a marginal increase. Over the ten year period studied, there has been a 
decrease, on average, in the total duration of interruptions and the total number of 
interruptions but no real change in the total number of interruptions restored within 3 hours 
of fault. The decrease in the total duration of interruptions and the total number of 
interruptions indicate an improvement in quality of service. Broadly, the increase in the 
service quality performance of the DNOs reflects both Increased investment in the networks 
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by the DNOs and a growing awareness of the importance of the quality of supply dell-vered 
to the customers. However, at the individual utility level, some of the DNOs show a 
significant deviation from the average for all the quality measures (see the minimum and 
maximum in Table 5.3). 
5.4 Evaluating the Performance of the UK DNOs Using the 'Weight-Restricted' 
Malmquist Index 
Using the 'weight-restricted' Malmquist index developed in Section 5.2, we can now 
evaluate the DNOs dynamic performance. While the productivity change is computed using 
the 'weight- restricted' Malmquist productivity index, the quality change is calculated with 
a corresponding 'weight-restricted' Malmquist quality index. The orientation adopted was 
one that minimised inputs, as the emphasis was intended to be on minimising costs and 
undesirable output quality. As shown in Chapter 2, the indices are easily computed using 
the non-parametric mathematical programming approach of DEA. Because of its features it 
has become a popular approach to DNOs efficiency and productivity measurement. The 
results were computed using EMS (EMS, Scheel (2000)), a specialised software for 
efficiency and productivity measurement. The results were further confirmed by 
programming using AMPL (Fourer, 1993), a mathematical programming software for 
general use. 
5.4.1 Evaluation of Productivity Changes 
The evaluation of productivity change is based on the input-output set, as detailed in Table 
5.1, Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 (i. e. OPEX, CAPITAL, customer number. units distributed, 
maximum demand, service area, total number of interruptions, total duration of 
interruptions and total number of interruptions restored in 3 hours of fault) assuming 
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constant returns to scale technology. Since in the long run all DNOs are expected to be 
operating at optimal scale of production, it is appropriate to assume that the technology 
exhibits constant returns to scale (refer to the discussion in Chapter 4). 
Here, it was found that separability 39does not hold in electricity distribution services. This 
suggests that inputs and outputs in the electricity distribution technology are not separable 
for quality. This is because quality is an integral part of the electricity distribution services, 
and is jointly produced with quantity, while quality and quantity are jointly affected by 
technological change. To simplify the presentation of the results only one set of results - 
those relate to no-separability - are presented. Productivity, in this case, was computed by 
the index in (2.26), which was decomposed to a similar fashion to that in (2.23). DEA 
models that incorporate weight restrictions (5.1) to (5.12) were used to calculate the 
distance functions in the index. The models with weight restrictions imposed are illustrated 
in the appendix to this chapter (page 265). 
The productivity changes are reported over the period 1990/91 to 1999/00, and are 
calculated from the comparisons between each consecutive financial year. In addition, the 
productivity changes between the two endpoint years 1990/91 and 1999/00 are also 
calculated to give an overall picture. 
Table 5.4 presents the results of the productivity change obtained by using the 'weight- 
restricted' Malmquist productivity index that is based on 'weight-restricted' DEA models. 
The geometric means of the 14 DNOs' productivity indices are computed to obtain sample 
average results. The geometric means are used to preserve the multiplicative 
decompositions of the Malmquist productivity Index (Fare, Grosskopf and Roos, 1995). 
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Aczel's (1990) theorem shows that if the multiplicative decomposition must be preserved 
(given two other conditions) the geometric mean is the only mean that can be used in 
averaging results. We may recall that that since we are computing input-orientated 
measures of productivity change, the value of Malmquist index or any of its components 
that is less than one denotes progress or improvement in performance, whereas values 
greater than one denote a deterioration in the relevant perfonnance. Values of one reflect no 
change in performance. 
Looking at Table 5.4, after an initial regression in the immediate two years after reforms 
and privatisation, productivity progressed in the succeeding pairs of years. Overall, the 
results suggest that there has been productivity progress. This is also indicated in the 
rightmost column in Table 5.4, which compares the two endpoint years of the period under 
evaluation i. e. 1990/91 and 1999/00. It is indicated that there has been productivity growth 
of as much as 6.6% over the entire period for the industry as a whole. This implies that 
DNOs could, on average, deliver certain outputs using approximately 6.6% fewer inputs in 
1999/00 compared to 1990/9 1. 
In comparison with other DEA based productivity studies of the UK DNOs, show that the 
number is in no way extreme - given the different number of inputs and outputs, different 
sample sizes, different time-frames and the utilisation of variables in monetary units. The 
study by PART (1999) found the average productivity growth among England and Wales 
DNOs over the period 1990/91 to 1997/98 was approximately 3.5% per annum. The study 
by Tilley and Weyman-Jones (1999) observed an annual average productivity growth of 
6.3% between 1990/91 to 1997/98, while Hattori et al. (2002) reported the average annual 
productivity improvement to be between 3.25 - 6.5% over the period 1986/87 to 1997/98. 
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The recent study by the Cambridge Economic Policy Associates for OFGEM (OFGEM. 
2003f) found the average productivity growth to be 4.3% over the period 1991/92 to 
2001/02. 
40 These trends in productivity are also displayed in Figure 5.2 , from which it is clear that 
there has been a much faster productivity growth after the period 1991/92-1992/93. Table 
5.4 also confirms that the highest rate of productivity growth occurred after the first 
distribution price review in 1994, with a growth of 4.1% in the period 1994/95-1995/96. 
This confirms the findings of Tilley and Weyman-Jones (1999) study of the England and 
Wales DNOs where a much faster productivity growth after the regulatory price control in 
1994 was observed. 
The industry averages may mask the more complex underlying patterns in the individual 
DNOs. In reviewing the individual estimates of productivity change, there exist wide 
variations across DNOs where only a small number showed no change in productivity 
while the rest either regressed or progressed. Over ten years, Hydro-Electric did not show 
any change in productivity, while NORWEB and ScottishPower regressed and all the other 
DNOs progressed. In terms of rank comparisons, over the ten years, Southern showed the 
highest rate of productivity progress (14.2%) and Scottish. Power exhibited the greatest 
productivity regress (1.5%). 
Table 5.5 displays the decomposition of productivity change into its component measures, 
efficiency change and technological change. There are remarkable differences at an 
n d' ormat, on, we focus on the geometric ividual utility level but, to avoid overflow of inf 
mean which reflects industry perforinance. 
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We may recall here that technological change shows the extent to which the boundary of 
efficient production shifts over time (see page 5 1). Thus, this component reflects changes in 
the performance of best (i. e. efficient) DNOs as opposed to the performance of those DNOs 
which operate at the interior of the production boundary (i. e. those that are inefficient). 
Referring to Table 5.5, it appears that the production boundary regressed in the initial years 
after privatisation and then reversed to progress in the subsequent pairs of years. Thus, 
overall the DNOs experienced a positive shift of the production boundary. In the rightmost 
column, it is indicated that this advancement was up to 11.6%. This implies that over the 
period considered efficient DNOs became 11.6% more efficient, which in turn implies that 
they could produce certain outputs using 11.6% less input. 
We may recall that efficiency change shows the extent to which individual DNOs are 
getting closer to (catching up) the industry boundary (see page 5 1). Therefore, this 
component of productivity reflects the performance of DNOs which operate on the intenor 
of the production boundary relative to those that operate on it. It may be seen in Table 5.5 
that, in general, efficiency is moving in an opposite direction to that of technological 
change (except in the immediate years after privatisation). Efficiency improved only 
between the financial years 1994/95-1996/97 while it regressed at the beginning and the 
end of the. decade. Because of the sharp regress in the period immediately after the reforms 
and again towards the end of the decade, there was an overall net efficiency regress. In the 
rightmost column in Table 5.5 it is indicated that efficiency regress was 5.7%. This implies 
that whilst efficient DNOs were becoming more efficient, inefficient DNOs did not keep up. 
The above results are graphically depicted in Figure 5.2. Figure 5.2 also illustrates 
graphically that it is mainly the shifts of the technological boundary rather than changes in 
DNOs efficiency that defined productivity trends. It is clear that the 6.6% gains in 
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productivity must be attributed to technological change. There is a clear trend of 
technological progress. Tilley and Weyman Jones (1999) also found productivity growth 
associated with the technological progress in the distribution sector. 
An interesting insight into the performance of the DNOs after the regulatory reforms and 
privatisation in 1990 may be gained by looking at Table 5.6, which shows the static 
efficiency of the DNOs for each of the years considered. The analysis indicates an average 
efficiency of 97.28% in 1990/91, which decreased to 92.05% in 1999/00, a decrease of 
5.23%. This provides further evidence to support the findings that there is a trend of decline 
in efficiency in the UK DNOs. 
If we look at particular DNOs we find evidence that SWEB belongs to those DNOs that 
show considerable inefficiency. Two DNOs, Eastern and Hydro-Electric are rated 100% 
efficient across the whole period. One DNO, Yorkshire is either on the frontier or has a 
high efficiency score, and then three DNOs, Manweb, NORWEB and ScottishPower start 
out as efficient, but fall behind over time, and two DNOs, Southern and SEEBOARD start 
as inefficient and increase performance over time. 
This pattern is reflected in the individual DNOs productivity measures. Referring to the 
rightmost column in Table 5.4 that measure the productivity change for the total period, the 
overall productivity change has been positive or improving over time for all DNOs that are 
efficient or have improved their performance over time, and negative for units with falling 
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5.4.2 Evaluation of Quality Changes 
Quality change was computed by the index in (2.27). The computation of this index 
requires the use of some modified DEA models, proposed by Fare et aL (1995). These are 
adopted and applied here. The models are further extended to include additional weight 
restrictions based on trade-offs. These are illustrated in the appendix to this chapter (page 
265). Table 5.7 displays the results on quality change obtained by using the 'weight- 
restricted' quality index that is based on 'weight-restricted' DEA models. 
Looking at Table 5.7, it may be seen that on average quality had regressed sharply in the 
aftermath of privatisation but progressed significantly in 1992/93-1993/94 and from 
thereon showed a steady progress, although at a declining rate. On the whole, there was a 
significant quality improvement over the entire period. This is also indicated in the 
rightmost column in Table 5.7 which shows quality improved as much as 2.2%. The overall 
trend in quality change is also depicted in Figure 5.3. However, it is again noticeable that 
there are variations at the individual utility level as shown by the minimum and maximum 
index values. Over the ten years, one DNO (Hydro-Electric) did not register any change in 
quality, and from the rest ten progressed and three regressed. SWEB showed the biggest 
quality improvement (6.6%) while SWALEC revealed the greatest quality deterioration 
(5.2%). 
The relationship between productivity change and quality change in DNOs over the decade 
1990/91-1999/00 is illustrated in Figure 5.4. Figure 5.4 shows that high productivity is 
associated with high quality. The figure can be separated into four quadrants in order to 
identify different movements in quality and productivity of DNOs. The boundaries are at 
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Only for one DNO (SWALEC) did the improvement in productivity come at an expense of 
quality during this period. Only two DNOs (NORYVEB and ScottishPower) have worsened 
their quality and productivity while the rest have maintained or improved in both. Also, a 
comparison between Table 5.7 and Table 5.4 indicates that quality and productivity, on 
average, have moved in the same direction in the entire period. Thus improvement in 
productivity is associated with improvement in quality. This empirical evidence is at 
divergence with Rust and Metters' (1996) theoretical prediction on the existence of trade- 
offs between productivity and quality, particularly in services. The immediate conclusion is 
that dropping quality as a way of improving productivity has fortunately not been the 
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5.5 Analysis of the Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on DNOs Performance 
The changing structure of the electricity industry has prompted a wave of mergers and take- 
overs among the DNOs. The aim of these has been to enhance shareholder value by 
efficiency improvement and savings. Every utility has been involved in some form of 
merger or take-over since the expiry of the Government's golden shares in the electricity 
DNOs in March 1995. The mergers can be broadly identified in three categories: 
* merger between groups comprising two DNOs (for example ScottishPower/ 
Manweb, Southern/Hydro-Electric); 41 
mergers between groups comprising a DNO and another regulated utility business 
in the UK (for example ScottishPower/Southern Water, Welsh Water/ 
SWALEC(Hyder); and 
* mergers between a group comprising a DNO and another group with no other 
regulated utility business in the UK. 
Energy companies are looking to mergers and take-overs to obtain critical mass, exploit 
economies of scale, enter new markets, and/or diversify in an environment that is 
increasingly competitive. Mergers also help energy companies to exploit efficiency saving 
potential and enhance their strategic position in the market by changing their scale and 
scope of operations (Nillesen, Pollitt and Keats, 2001). An analysis conducted at the time of 
the 1999 Distribution Price Control Review suggested that mergers typically saved the 
merging DNOs a total of around f 12m in fixed costs, or almost half of average OPEX fixed 
costs (OFGEM, 1999b: p57). However, mergers and take-overs operations involve two 
sources of concern for regulators: (1) they result in a diminution in comparators available 
and limit the scope for effective comparative competition between DNOs (OFGEM, 2002b) 
and (11) the operations may intend to influence the relative position of the firin without 
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achieving matenal efficiency gains (Jamasb, Nillesen and Pollitt, 2003). The former could 
result in the efficiency frontier being pushed forward more slowly than would otherwise be 
the case, with efficiency savings being passed back to customers more slowly. The latter 
could increase the scope for gaming the regulatory system where a merged group could 
collaborate among themselves to allocate costs in such a way that allows them to achieve 
the most favourable benchmarking outcome for the group. 
There has been ample evidence of relationships between mergers and performance (see for 
e. g. Nillesen, Pollitt and Keats, 2001; Bogetoft and Wang, 1999; Berger, Rebecca and 
Philip, 1999). However, absent from the literature are studies which have explored the 
impact of DNOs mergers and take-overs on their performance. Hence, in this study we 
examine the impact of merger and take-over operations ex post on the efficiency and 
productivity of the DNOs. 
Table 5.6 gives an insight into the efficiency of the DNOs after the merger and takeover 
operations. The merger and takeovers of UK DNOs since 1995 showed a mixed result with 
respect to efficiency. Referring to Table 5.6, SWEB, SEEBOARD, Midlands, London, 
Manweb and NORVVEB experienced improvements in efficiency after their respective take- 
overs, although the efficiency gains expenenced by London, Manweb and NORWEB 
appear to be a short term benefit. Specifically, the take-over of SWEB, SEEBOARD, 
Manweb and NORWEB took place in 1995/96 while the take-over of Midlands and 
London occurred in 1996/97. The efficiency improvements occurred within the first two 
years after the completion of the take-over. The merger of Southern and Hydro-Electric in 
1998/99 and the take-over operations of Eastern and Northern in 1995/96 and 1996/97 
respectively did not have any significant impact on their efficiencies. In the case of 
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Southern, Hydro-Electric and Eastern, they were already operating on the frontier prior to 
the merger/takeover operation and remained so afterwards. It may be the case that these 
DNOs have become super-efficient. However, the takeover operation of ScottishPower in 
1995/96 resulted in the decline of its efficiency. SiMilarly, SWALEC, East Midlands and 
Yorkshire experienced a decline in their efficiency after their take-over in 1995/96,1996/97 
and 1997/98 respectively. On the industry level, the consolidations in the sector have 
promoted greater efficiency (94.91 % in 1996/97 compared to 93.3 1% in 1995/96). The 
highest efficiency gain occurred in SVvlEB, from 74.14% in 1995/96 to 82.89% in 1996/97. 
Nevertheless, the efficiency gains are concentrated in the first year after the consolidations, 
1996/97. This may be the effect of the loss of the number comparators which has worked to 
diminish the sense of rivalry once the merger was completed. Another possible reason is 
the inefficient reorganisation of the industry by means of mergers and acquisitions. 
Efficient reorganisation would allow the weakest finns to be taken over. Greater efficiency 
benefits could be offset if the past perfonnance of the party finns was weak (Porter, 2002). 
An analysis of the productivity change pattern in Table 5.4 reveals that the companies that 
experienced improvements in their efficiency after the consolidation showed significant 
productivity enhancement immediately afterwards but it appears to be more of a short term 
benefit rather than on going as observed earlier. It is generally presupposed that mergers 
create the potential for considerable savings, but as pointed out by Porter (2002), what this 
has really meant in many cases is the elimination of redundant overhead costs. According 
to Porter (2002), this form of cost reduction does not affect the inherent operating cost of 
producing and delivering a product or service and is a one time-benefit. It seems reasonable 
to justify a merger by the elimination of one-off costs - provided that the lost of 
comparators does not lead to higher prices/profits at the expense of customers. However, to 
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exceed the static gains observed in the short run, DNOs would have to continue to innovate 
in ways they have not done before. 
Apart from evaluating the effects of mergers ex post, the efficiency analysis can also be 
used to assess potential cost savings and efficiency improvements a priori from merger or 
acquisition activities for companies. The efficiency scores can be used to identify best- 
value merger and take-over target companies within a converging market. Further 
combining data and rerunning the analyses can help assess the relative position of a 
hypothetically combined entity, allowing the purchaser to assess the potential cost savings, 
as well as help determine whether the combined entity's strategic position will be enhanced 
(see for e. g. Bogetoft and Wang, 1999, Nillesen, Pollitt and Keats, 2001, Nillesen and 
Pollitt, 2001). However, we will not explore these issues in the electricity distribution 
sector as they are beyond the scope of this study. 
5.6 Summary and Conclusion 
The introduction of refonns and privatisation into the UK electricity industry had the 
expectations of extensive efficiency, productivity and service quality gains. This chapter 
has tested this expectation by measuring the performance of the DNOS from the time of the 
introduction of the reforms and privatisation in 1990-91 to 1999/00, the period for which 
consistent data was available 42 . This study encompasses a 
larger number of DNOs than 
before 
, including as well the two 
Scottish DNOs- 
The tool for evaluating the input-output relationship of DNOs' resources and services 
provided was the Malmquist productivity and quality indices. This chapter formulated the 
'weight-restricted' Malmquist models which are similar In spirit to the standard Malmquist 
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models, but they additionally capture the technological realities of the production process 
not captured by the former. The 'weight-restricted' models are considered to give a better 
representation of technological details and provide a more accurate approximation of 
productivity and quality change compared to the standard models. 
In general, it was found here that DNOs showed moderate gains as far as quality of service 
is concerned (i. e. 2.2%) but more extensive gains in terms of productivity (i. e. 6.6%). The 
improvement in productivity was dominated by technological change rather than changes in 
individual DNOs efficiency. This is to say the efficient level of production improved over 
time while individual inefficient DNOs' efficiency actually declined in spite of the reform 
initiated in 1990. (We may recall that productivity change reflects changes over time in the 
amount of inputs used to deliver certain outputs). The findings also suggest that the 
merger/take-over operations in the UK electricity distribution sector have had a one-off 
impact on efficiency and productivity. 
The 'weight-restricted' Malmquist productivity index developed here takes into account 
both the quality and quantity of outputs and the trade-offs that occur in the production 
process. Taking into account both quantity and quality of outputs delivered within a total 
cost framework, provides a balanced assessment of a company's overall performance. 
Taking into account the trade-offs in the production process provides a more 
comprehensive and appropriate framework for assessing efficiency and productivity. The 
empirical results indicate that the model developed here is a useful tool in evaluating 
productivity and quality change in a case where, in addition to input-output quantity and 
quality, the information on trade-offs between variables is available (though precise 
information is not necessary). In most studies, at least some information on trade-offs is 
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available from theory or practical knowledge of the industry under evaluation. The model 
developed here can promote insights that can, indeed, provide useftil policy guidance as it 
captures what organisations actually do. 
It has been acknowledged that the small sample size cause by a small (and declining) 
number of utilities is problematic in regulatory studies (see for e. g. Weyman-Jones, 2001 a; 
Grifell-Taje and Lovell, 2003). The 'weight-restricted' Malmquist productivity index is 
useful in such circumstances where the sample size is small and yet it is important to 
include several inputs and outputs in the model. This index has an enhanced power of 
discrimination and will differentiate the units in terms of their performance and thereby, 
enable a meaningful interpretation of the results. 
The 'weight-restricted' Malmquist productivity index also provides additional insights into 
productivity and its root source. 
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38 Grifell-Tatje et al. (1998) has proposed a solution to the problem by developing a new 
index called the Quasi-Malmquist productivity index that is based on slack-corrected 
efficiency measures. This index is based on quasi-distance functions that multiply the radial 
efficiency score by a factor which does not exceed one, which is based on value of slacks. 
Cooper, Thompson and Thrall (1996), Cooper, Park and Pastor (1999) and Thrall (2000) 
have taken a different approach based on additive DEA models which provide an efficiency 
measure that incorporates slacks. 
39 We may recall that separability in inputs/outputs and quality implies the factorisation of 
the distance function D(y', bt, x', a') as G(bt, at )*D'(yt, x'), where xt is the inputs, yt outputs, 
at input quality and bt output quality at period t. 
40 The figure displays the geometric mean of the productivity change of UK DNOs which 
range from -3.3% (in 91/92-92/93) to 4.1% (in 94/95-95/6). These rates are significant 
considering that the productivity growth of the UK economy as a whole is about 1.3 % per 
annum (OFGEM, 2003f). 
41 The number of independent groupings in the sector in 1999/00 was 12. Since then there 
has been four further mergers between DNOs (London/SEEBOARD, London/Eastern, 
Northern/Yorkshire and SWEB/SWALEC), reducing the number of independent grouping 
to eight. 
42 From 2000/01 onwards, the Regulatory Accounts were required to be prepared in the 
historical cost format in contrast to the period before this. 
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Chapter 6 
Summary, Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
6.1 Research Objectives 
As set out in the introductory chapter, performance measurement is the basis or the 
building block of incentive regulation. Incentive regulation is increasingly the dominant 
regulatory way forward to incentivise distribution network operators (DNOs) to give 
customers what they want, for example, having continuous lights without interruption. 
Performance measurement will help set adequate regulatory incentives, and in addition, 
encourage greater efficiency and quality. Thus, the issue of the use of perforinance 
measurement is at the forefront of regulatory concern. 
This thesis has contributed to the debate on performance measurement in electricity 
distribution network utilities in three ways. Firstly, it has reviewed the necessary inputs 
and outputs to develop new models based on the DEA techniques for the assessment of 
DNOs. Secondly, it has developed more sophisticated models called 'weight-restricted' 
DEA and Malmquist models to restrict the weights of the input output variables to be 
consistent with the trade-offs that exist in the production process and thereby provide a 
more accurate and meaningful estimation of performance. Thirdly, it has applied these to 
assess the impact of the regulatory reforms and privatisation of the electricity industry in 
the UK on DNOs quality, efficiency and productivity. The new models and methods 
reflect the service quality and the technological realities of the DNOs production process 
and are therefore more appropriate for their evaluation. Furthermore, the performance 
measurement tool developed in this thesis is useful to the new regulatory design 
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mechanism. This thesis, therefore, has the potential to advance regulatory policy and 
regulatory reform. The models and methods developed are generic and applicable to other 
organisations. 
The efficiency of the fourteen UK DNOs was evaluated in the financial year 1999/00 and 
the quality and productivity changes of these DNOs were studied over the decade 
following the 1990-91 regulatory reforms and privatisation. The purpose of this was to 
identify and analyse their impact. Distribution outputs were expanded to include quality 
of service, and considerable attention was paid to the definition and the measurement of 
quality in distribution services. Although two dimensions of quality in electricity 
distribution were defined, namely the quality of supply dimension and the quality of 
customer service dimension, the quality of customer service dimension was omitted in the 
study due to the lack of adequate data. Empirical results were computed using a non- 
parametric mathematical programming approach called Data Envelopment Analysis. This 
approach is based on minimal assumptions about the technology under consideration and 
easily accommodates multiple inputs and outputs. 
Efficiency was evaluated using two evaluation methods. The first is the standard DEA 
model. However, not only did the model lack discrimination, it did not correctly reflect the 
technological realities of the production process studied. This is where the most important 
contributions of the thesis occurred. 
The thesis has made enhancements to the basic DEA model by incorporating weight 
restrictions constructed on the basis of realistic production trade-offs between inputs 
and/oi* outputs using the trade-off approach developed by Pod, novsk, (2000,2002). The 
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new model. called the 'weight-restricted' DEA model, improves discrimination and more 
generally captures the details of the production technology under consideration. The 
ability of the model to capture production trade-offs is important because, as was 
illustrated in the empirical context, trade-offs between inputs and outputs may have a 
substantial impact on efficiency. Ignoring trade-off can result in inappropriate estimates of 
efficiency, giving doubt to the relevance of the results to policy making. Since the welght 
restrictions are based on production trade-offs, the model preserves the radial nature of 
efficiency and the interpretation of efficiency as a radial improvement factor. In addition, 
the assessed efficiency will be consistent with the economic notion of input and/or output 
sub stitution/transfo rmation and thereby be compatible with economic theory. 
The thesis has further developed a new productivity index to evaluate DNOs productivity 
change. The new index is called the 'weight-restricted' Malmquist productivity index and 
is computed using the 'weight-restricted' DEA models developed earlier. The proposed 
index is in the spirit of the conventional Malmquist index but captures production trade- 
offs not captured by the latter. The Malmquist index is a popular methodology since it is 
based on minimal assumptions, it avoids making explicit aggregation of inputs and 
outputs and it provides decomposition of productivity into its root components. Like the 
conventional Malmquist index, the new productivity index was decomposed into its root 
components of technological change and efficiency change, which gave insights into the 
root sources of changes in DNOs dynamic performance. 
The 'weight-restricted' DEA and Malmquist models are useful in circumstances where 
there is a relatively small number of DMUs with complex activities (such as in our case of 
DNOs), and it is important to include several inputs and outputs In the model. The 
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4weight-restricted' models have an enhanced power of discrimination and will 
differentiate between DMUs in term of their performance to enable a meaningful 
interpretation of the results. 
As the 'weight-restricted' models require information on trade-offs between variables, in 
addition to input and output data, the assessment of efficiency or productivity here is more 
demanding that the standard model. However, the exact proportion in which factor 
sub stitution/transfo rination occurs is not required. All that is needed is an approximate 
proportion. A further drawback is that the evaluation of trade-offs between inputs and 
outputs can be difficult in practice as they may not clearly substitute for each other. Only 
sensible or reliable production trade-offs can be used in the assessment. Although the 
incorporation of production trade-offs can reduce the problem of slacks in performance 
measurement (since it removes some of the vertical and horizontal segments of the frontier 
associated with slacks), unless there are reliable trade-offs between all the factors in the 
model the problem of slacks may not be totally eliminated. 
6.2 Overall Summary and Discussion of the Results 
The standard and the 'weight-restricted' DEA models were used to evaluate the efficiency 
in fourteen UK DNOs in England, Wales and Scotland in the financial year 1999/00. 
Further, the DNOs quality and productivity changes over the ten years following the 1990- 
91 refonns and privatisation of the electricity industry was evaluated using the newly 
developed 'weight-restricted' Malmquist index. The DNOs engage in distributing 
electricity and lend themselves to comparisons by virtue of the fact that they operate in the 
same country, under the same regulatory control and to the same accounting standards. 
The data was from multiple sources, as summansed in the Appendix to Chapter 4 (page 
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254). The DNOs inputs were the operating expenditure and capital assets in monetary 
terms. The outputs were quantified in terms of the number of customers, the units of 
electricity distributed and simultaneous maximum demand. DNOs service quality was 
quantified in terms of the total number of interruptions, the total duration of interruptions 
(we treated these as inputs since they are negatively valued and need to be minimised) and 
the total number of interruptions restored within 3 hours of fault (treated as a normal 
output). The nature of the environment in which the DNOs operate in was captured by the 
service area in sq. km (we treated this as a non-discretionary output since it is given). 
Many of the variables used here are in line with the literature, although the input-output 
set was expanded to include quality variables. The input conserving orientation was 
adopted for the assessment of performance since it appears to be more consistent with the 
regulated context of electricity distribution. 
Efficiency was evaluated using standard and 'weight-restricted' DEA models. Overall, the 
results showed evidence that there was scope for operating expenditure savings and capital 
savings across all the DNOs. The potential gains in OPEX and CAPITAL showed that 
inefficient DNOs can improve performance through economies in both inputs, though the 
scope of improvement in CAPITAL is greater. The results also showed that considerable 
amounts of reductions in customer interruptions and duration of interruptions could be 
achieved by the DNOs on the whole. SWEB was found to be more efficient in providing a 
good level of service but not as cost efficient and the reverse applies to SWALEC. 
The results of the 'weight-restricted' DEA model show that there are three major clusters 
of performance. Eastern, London, SEEBOARD, Southern and Hydro-Electric were the 
leading performing DNOs while East Midlands, Manweb, Midlands and Yorkshire were 
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middle ranking and the poorest performers were Northern, NORWEB, SNAALEC, SWEB 
and ScottishPower. Eastern and Southern were the dominant efficient reference firrns, 
being the favounte peers for inefficient firins. They have the nearest input-output mix of 
the inefficient DNOs and can be used as a role model for the inefficient DNOs to emulate. 
The dynamic performance of the DNOs in terms of productivity and quality were 
evaluated using the newly developed 'weight-restricted' Malmquist index. Overall, the 
analysis showed that service quality improved over the periods considered and the 
improvements in quality were not at the expense of productivity. We also found that there 
was productivity regress in the immediate years after the reforms and prIvatisation in 
1990-91 but progress thereafter so that there was a net productivity progress. The 
decomposition of productivity change showed that the overall productivity progress was 
dominated by technological rather than efficiency changes. Overall, technological change 
led to a reduction in input usage. 
An overall finding of this study was that the DNOs productivity improvements 
concentrated around the beginning of the second price control period and gradually 
diminished thereafter. The results also showed that there are wide variations in the levels 
of productivity improvement achieved across individual DNOs over the time period 
analysed. Some DNOs showed substantial losses, while others made substantial gains in 
productivity. 
The introduction of regulatory reforins and the privatisation of the electricity industry in 
1990-91 had the aim of extensive efficiency, productivity and service quality gains and 
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indeed that has been achieved. There have been moderate gains as far as quality of supply 
is concerned (2.2%) but more extensive gains in productivity (6.6%). 
The finding that quality has improved does not lend support to the theory that service 
quality deteriorates under price-cap regulation. More specifically, Kidokoro (2002) made 
the theoretical prediction that investment related service quality deteriorates whilst effort 
related service quality improves under the price-cap regulation. Our definition of service 
quality is based on the quality of supply which is similar to the investment related service 
quality. 
The divergence of our results may be due to the fact that other factors are at play as well in 
influencing service quality performance other than the price cap regulation in place. 
Prominent among these is the regulation of quality through the use of Overall and 
Guaranteed Standard (GSOP). The GSOP plays a role of ensuring that quality of service is 
maintained as they impose penalty payments on DNOs for not meeting specific quality 
targets. Thus, the DNOs are under pressure to invest in order to reach the target and 
provide at least a predetermined level of service quality. Another factor that is in play is 
the development of competition in supply which was introduced in stages until a fully 
competitive market came into existence in 1999. Previously captive customers were 
offered a choice of both service and service providers (suppliers) and could exercise their 
right to 'switch'. The quality of distribution service has a bearing on competition in supply 
since the distribution function has a significant influence on the overall quality of service 
delivered to customers. DNOs are under a duty to facilitate competition and are therefore, 
obliged to invest more in providing customers with high quality services. Besides GSOP 
and competition, service quality may also be a ftinction of the technology incorporated in 
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the distribution network. Later switches and fault restoring gears may be less vulnerable to 
interruptions and breakdowns or even temporary lapses in supply. Other things being 
equal a more 'modem' network is likely to generate fewer service quality problems. 
Although there is empirical evidence of an improvement in quality, this does not 
necessarily imply that the overall level of service quality provided by the DNOs has 
improved since our study adopts a definition of quality within the dimension of quality of 
supply and the dimension of customer related quality is excluded from the analysis. 
The finding that productivity gain has occurred is consistent with the results of the 
assessment of the English and Wales DNOs conducted by Tilley and Weyman-Jones 
(1999). The results are also in line with evidence obtained by other studies such as PART 
(1999) and Hatton et al. (2002). 
The fact that the magnitude of DNOs productivity changes diminished towards the end of 
the price control period supports the argument that the present price control arrangement 
introduces an element of periodicity of the incentives under the regulatory framework. 
Under the arrangement in place, DNOs can retain the highest percentage of a cost 
reduction made in the first year of a price control period and the lowest percentage of a 
cost saving made in the fifth (and final) year. This has tended to blunt the incentives for 
continuous improvement of efficiency, since the closer the efficiency savings are made to 
the beginning of a new price control period the less are the benefits. As a result 
companies' behaviour has been distorted by delaying efficiency programmes to the 
beginning of a new price control period. This is consistent with the findings of Di Tella 
and Dyck (2002) in a study of Chilean electricity distribution companies under price cap 
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regulation where they report evidence of cyclical cost reductions that coincide with the 
initial years of price control periods, and the reverse prior to the next price control period. 
Thus, to enable a longer term effect on efficiency, OFGEM has expressed its intention to 
allow DNOs to retain the benefits of an efficiency saving for a fixed period of time 
regardless of when the savings are made (OFGEM, 2003b). 
Moreover, the fact that productivity trends were mostly led by technological trends 
suggests that it is easier for DNOs to improve performance by creating new technologies 
rather than improving the use of existing technologies. Tilley and Weyman-Jones (1999), 
PART (1999) and Hattori et aL (2002), all found that technological change rather than 
technical efficiency change dominate productivity in electricity distribution. 
It is useful to recall that, in this thesis, productivity change reflects changes over time in 
the amount of inputs used to deliver certain outputs. Productivity change was broken 
down into two components measures, namely technological change that reflects the 
performance of efficient producers and efficiency change that reflects the performance of 
inefficient producers. 
The empirical results of Chapter 5 have shown that that the overall productivity progress 
of approximately 6.6% (Table 5.4) was due to a technological progress of 11.6% and a 
5.7% overall efficiency regress (Table 5.5). This indicates that the efficient DNOs have 
become more efficient by the end of the period considered, whereas inefficient DNOs 
became less efficient. As there has been a progress of the industry frontier, the gains in 
productivity are entirely due to the fact that there has been technological advancement. 
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This suggests that regulatory reforms and privatisation have pushed the frontier of the 
industry, but there is no positive effect on efficiency. 
The decline in efficiency is likely to be due to the widening of the efficiency gap among 
DNOs with less efficient companies moving further away from the frontier. The increased 
dispersion of performance is consistent with the findings of Tilley and Weyman-Jones 
(1999), Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) and Hatton et al., (2002). The reasons for efficiency 
dispersion are not apparent but may indicate several things. The dispersion may be due to 
poor accounting practices resulting in inaccurate performance, the existence of barriers to 
difftision of innovation, for example institutional barriers, and the diminishing sense of 
rivalry as a result of the loss of comparators when DNOs merge or are acquired. Another 
reason for the dispersion could be that efficient reorganisation may not be taking place in 
the industry (that allows weakest finns to be taken over and reorganised). The 
convergence of efficiency towards the frontier can be achieved by learning the practices of 
peer units, strengthening incentive schemes to improve efficiency, controlling the 
reorganisation of the industry and removing barriers to the diffusion of innovation. 
Policies aimed at removing the barriers to diffusion of innovation may in fact be more 
effective in closing the gap rather then policies directed merely at stimulating innovation. 
An interesting insight into the performance of the DNOs can be gained by comparing the 
DNOs static efficiency in the financial year 1999/00 and their productivity over the total 
period. The pattern of efficiency is reflected in the individual DNOs productivity 
measures. The overall productivity change has been positive for all the leading performing 
and middle ranking DNOs except Hydro-Electric where it showed no change in 
productivity over the entire period (because it remained efficient over the years). With 
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regards to the poorest performing DNOs, Norweb and Scottish. Power recorded a negative 
change in productivity. 
The findings also indicate that the merger/take-over operations in the UK electricity 
distribution sector have had a one-off impact on performance rather than any steady 
impact over time. In order to exceed the one-off gains observed in the short run, DNOs 
will have to continue to innovate in ways they have not done before. Nonetheless, it seems 
reasonable to justify a merger through the elimination of one-off costs - provided that the 
loss of comparators does not lead to higher prices/profits at the expense of customers. 
The overall conclusion is that the regulatory reforins and privatisation in 1990-91 have 
had a measurable and important effect on productivity growth in DNOs. Although 
productivity indices provide an approach to detennine the X factors in a RPI-X type of 
price regulation, since productivity is still relatively dispersed among the regulated DNOs, 
it is not appropriate to base the incentive based X factors on it (CEPA, 2003; Tilley, 
2000). 
6.3 Key Contributions and Usefulness of the Methods Developed in the Study 
In summary the main contributions of this study are: 
9 The definition of quality of service in electricity distribution, its operationalisation and 
the suggestion of plausible measures of quality of service in electricity distribution for 
DEA evaluation. 
9 The development of a DEA model that includes both quantity and quality aspects of 
electricity distribution, so as to identify the inefficiencies in resource use and the 
service quality provided. 
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9 The inclusion of quality dimensions in measuring efficiency and productivity of 
electricity distribution. 
* The reflection of trade-offs between inputs and/or outputs that exist in the production 
process in efficiency and productivity measurement. 
* The development of extended DEA models involving weights restrictions, referred to 
as 'weight-restricted' DEA models. The weights restrictions were linked to the 
specific technological realities of the DNOs production process using the new trade- 
off approach devised by Podinovski (2000,2002). This represents a first practical 
application of the method introduced by Podinovski (2000,2002) which prevents 
DNOs from taking undue advantage of weights flexibility inconsistent with the known 
trade-offs in the production process. 
9 The development of an enhanced method for measuring productivity and quality, 
called the 'weight-restricted' Malmquist index. This index is based on 'weight- 
restricted' DEA models developed earlier that reflect the trade-offs in the production 
process. This study has proposed the use of this new index, given that it reflects the 
technological realities of the production process and thereby provides more accurate 
and meaningful results that can be used to guide policy analysis. The Malmquist 
productivity index can be further broken down into an index of technological change 
and an index of efficiency change. 
9 An analysis of the efficiency of the DNOs in the financial year 1999/00. 
eA comprehensive evaluation of reforms and privatisation introduced in 1990 in terms 
of productivity change, efficiency change, technical change and quality change. The 
quality changes have been evaluated for the first time in electricity distribution. 
41 An evaluation of the impact of mergers and take-overs in the electricity distribution 
sector is also conducted for the first time. 
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* Some policy implications. 
The new models and methods developed in this thesis can be used in a vanety of ways, 
such as to measure and analyse distribution service performance in a single period and to 
monitor it over time, to construct success indicators and league tables, to evaluate past 
policy reforms and to guide future policy analysis, to set overall performance targets at the 
industry level and define production targets at the DNO level, to demonstrate value for 
money, and to investigate best practice patterns among the most efficient producers in 
order to improve performance and firm management. Taken as a whole, the approach to 
performance measurement developed and used in this thesis may prove to be valuable in 
informing the electricity regulator in implementing the price-cap regulation system, and 
help set adequate regulatory incentive. In particular, this study will provide a relevant 
contribution to the fourth distribution price control review, which is due to take effect 
from I April 2005. 
The models and methods proposed in this thesis were constructed with the purpose of 
estimating the efficiency and productivity of DNOs, taking quality of service and trade- 
offs into account. It should be noted, however, that the proposed models are not restricted 
to the specific electricity network utility application, but have generable applicability to 
other industries as long as the data include information on production quality measures, 
trade-offs and production orientated activities. 
6.4 Policy Issues and Implications for Regulation and Benchmarking Performance 
At the commencement of this study, the quality of supply and how to apply performance 
regulation to it were the central intellectual issues. Quality of supply remains a central 
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issue, but its application has become more complex because it has to be applied while 
meeting environmental and security concerns. Progress in better serving customers goes 
hand in hand with innovation and investing wisely in developments so that security is 
maintained while the environment is protected. The question is how to manage these three 
dimensions. 
6.4.1 The Environment 
The DNOs are approaching the 2005 distribution price control review. From an 
environment and security perspective, DNOs need to develop towards becoming 'active' 
managers of their network (Mitchell and White, 1999; Mitchell, 2000; Mitchell, 2003). 
Thus, they need to become more innovative in order to become 'active' while at the same 
time meeting quality of supply targets and minimising the capital costs of running the 
network. To this end, OFGEM plans to stimulate innovation (see OFGEM 2003g). The 
objective of developing innovative network design and management is to increase asset 
utilisation and to enable distributed generation (DG) plants to be connected to the 
distribution network in a more effective and efficient manner. 
There has been a slow but steady increase in the capacity of distributed generation over 
the last 10 years, rising from about I GW to some 4.8 GW at the end of 2001 (NGC, 
2003). This has come largely from combined heat and power (CHP) and renewable 
generation schemes. Most of this capacity has been connected on a 'fit and forget' basis. 
In other words, the DG plant is connected in such a way that no active control is required 
by the DNO. Thus, the disti-ibution networks are at present 'passively' managed network. 
This is because electricity enters the gird from centralised power plants that are connected 
at high voltage; it is then transported through the grid and delivered to consumers at lower 
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voltages. In other words, the electricity travels Unidirectionally from the centralised power 
plants to consumers in a top-down network design. Thus, with such technological 
figurations it is easy for networks to be operated in the passive way and the network is 
deemed inflexible. 
The goverment has set an objective of at least IOGW of CHP electncal capacity to be 
installed in the United Kingdom by 2010 as part of its Climate Change Programme 
(DETF, 2000) and renewable energy to provide 10% of electricity supply by 2010 (DTI, 
2000). The recent 2003 White Paper on Energy (DTI, 2003b) has also stated its aspiration 
of renewables supplying 20% (i. e. one fifth) of electricity by 2020. The development of 
distributed generation in substantial volumes to meet the governments' target is likely to 
require DNOs' networks to become increasingly actively managed (Strbac and Jenkins, 
2001b). This is because DG plants are connected to the lower voltage distribution system 
and this thereby enables electricity to be transported in two directions to meet demand, 
breaking down the top-down network design and giving rise to a need for actively 
managing the network in order to match energy generation and demand. 
Also, if the 'fit and forget' approach continues, the DG connection costs i. e. the capital 
costs associated with the reinforcement of the distribution system are likely to rise as the 
number and capacity of DG plants increase (OFGEM, 2003g). Thus, innovations towards 
the design and management of the distribution networks need to be adopted across the 
industry to achieve lower costs. The question is one of how to manage the network most 
efficiently and economically. OFGEM has recently set out its thinking on promoting the 
ion paper on Innovation connection of DG plants and stimulating innovation in its discussi 
and Registered Power Zone (OFGEM, 2003g). There have also been some studies into the 
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costs of increased levels of renewables and/or distributed generation (see for example, 
Strbac and Jenkins, 2001b; SCAR, 2002; BWEA, 2002; and Dale et al.. 2003). 
Given the uncertainty of technology in the future because of government targets for 
renewable energy, another central issue is how DNOs can be given more incenti,,. *e to 
connect renewable energy so as to meet government target while at the same time 
maintaining a secure system (OFGEM, 2003c, 2003d). It is important to ensure that no 
perverse or distorted incentives are created and the DNOs can respond economically and 
efficiently to demands from all users of their system, including distributed generators. It 
is also important to ensure that DNOs are provided with appropriate incentives to develop, 
operate and maintain their network as economically and efficiently as possible. as for any 
technological future. The question is one of how to move DNOs from the way they work 
now i. e. acting passively in a risk free environment to becoming market facilitators that 
would actively manage networks suitable for an uncertain future. This thesis argues that a 
central way to achieve this is by increasing perfonnance or incentive based regulation 
within the regulatory price control mechanism. Performance or incentive based regulation 
is essential in promoting certain outcomes from regulated companies while at the same 
time meeting quality and security concerns. The use of performance measurement is 
essential to put performance based regulation in practice. This is because performance 
measurement can be used not only to set the regulatory incentives but. further, to 
strengthen the incentives facing regulated firms by rewarding them financially for closing 
the gap between their actual and potential environmental performance. This takes their 
performance into account in assessing the level of revenue they are allowed to reco,,,, er. 
Thus, the measurement of performance is needed in order to increase DNOs performance 
based revenue up from the 2% in the Incentive and Information Project (11P) that was 
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designed to provide incentive to improve quality of distribution service. In conclusion, it 
seems that active management, as argued by the Embedded Generation Working Group is 
the right way for both security and environment (EGWG, 2001). This issue will need to be 
met by benchmarking the DNOs taking into account security and environment concerns in 
the analysis. 
Moving DNOs towards active management is the next regulatory policy issue for the 
industry and the regulator in the UK, and is what this work should move on to. Changing 
DNOs to become 'active' manager of the network requires providing them with incentives 
for 'innovation' to do things differently. This study has gathered together information and 
an understanding of the ways and difficulties of putting performance based regulation in 
practice and providing incentives for DNOs. Performance based regulation is one way to 
ensure DNOs will do what customer want, as shown by the IIP. The building block of 
performance based regulation is performance measurement. Performance measurement 
needs to account for system security and environmental performance. 
6.4.2 Security 
The summer of 2003 was a time of electricity shortages, power emergencies and rolling 
blackouts for the US (Joskow, 2003), Italy (Rachman, 2003; AEEG, 2003), Sweden and 
Denmark (Svenska Krafhat, 2003), and the UK (OFGEM, 2003h). A summary account of 
all these recent events can be found in the Joint Energy Security of Supply Working 
Group Third Report (DTI, 2003c). Security of supply is gaining paramount importance. 
There are increasing concerns about long term security of supply in the UK (as reflected in 
the first speech by the new OFGEM Chairman, Sir John Mogg recently, OFGEM, 2003i) 
all the more so as the UK is moving from being a significant exporter to net importer of 
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electricity. This requires the network operators to invest sufficiently to expand their 
network capacity to transport electricity. Thus. it is important that the analysis should be 
extended to include infrastructure quality to take into account concerns about the system 
security and to further protect consumers' interest. The results may have possible 
consequences for policy decisions. 
6.5 Directions for Future Research 
The present study will hopefully offer a template for future research on the assessment of 
efficiency and productivity in organisations. The context-specific environment in which 
this study was carried out suggests a number of interesting objectives and techniques to be 
pursued by future research on the assessment of performance in utilities. 
This study has set out to analyse the efficiency and productivity of UK DNOs. The current 
analysis incorporated only one dimension of quality of service, i. e. the quality of supply 
leaving out the customer related service quality due to unavailability of data. The quality 
of supply dimension used in this study tells very little about the overall quality of 
distribution services. Thus, the analysis should include both the dimensions of quality of 
supply and customer related service quality or it should introduce an index that describes 
the overall quality of service. This can be done when the data becomes available. 
As highlighted in the previous section, the security and environmental perfon-nance of 
DNOs are other important areas of concern and it may be appropriate to extend the 
analysis to include such areas. This could include monitoring the adequacy of electricity 
infrastructure, the emissions of sulphur hexafluonde (SF6) which is a greenhouse gas used 
by DNOs as an insulant in some distribution equipment, the electrical losses in the 
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delivery of electricity and the connection of renewable and combined heat and power 
plants to the distribution network; a way to reduce losses on the system that corresponds 
to a reduction in climate change emissions (Mitchell, 2000). The latter will contribute 
towards a low carbon economy and sustainability of energy supply in the UK, the twin 
aims of the government. 
A further research objective could be to shift the focus of the analysis of productivity from 
the industry to the individual DNO level. In this study, the analysis mainly focused on the 
evaluation of the reforms and privatisation at the overall industry level. It was shown 
though that the individual DNOs exhibited differing trends and the overall results simply 
represent the net effect of individual DNO perforinance. A further analysis that tries to 
identify the characteristics of those DNOs which progress versus those which regress, as 
well as those that are efficient versus those that are inefficient would provide useful 
information for managerial and policy making purpose. This analysis could be pursued in 
two ways. First, the best and worst performers may be identified and their operating 
practices studied. Second, various environmental variables (that are beyond the control of 
management), quality variables and other variables can be regressed at a second-stage so 
at to find out how they influence DNOs performance. 
Another possible variation in the design of fti=e research may be as follows: (1) 
comparative studies considering companies operating in the same industry but belonging 
to different countries, (ii) comparative studies considering companies operating in 
different industry but belonging to the same country, for example, the comparison of other 
UK privatized industries, (111) comparative studies considering sub-companies (i. e. 
multiple observation within the same company, e. g. regions). 
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The models developed here are generic and can be used in different settings. These models 
can be ftirther developed to evaluate both quantitative and qualitative factors in a single 
framework (Cook et al. 1996). Customer perception of service quality is a qualitative 
dimension of service quality. Most widely used DEA models require ratio scale data 
whereas the measure of quality of customer service such as customer satisfaction is given 
by ordinal data. Therefore another issue is how to deal with ordinal scale data in the DEA 
framework (Cook et al. 1993) so that customer perceptions of service quality can be 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
A3.1: Levels of DNOs' Connectivity Prior to 2001/02 
Levels of connectivity Explanation DNOs 
Averaging or There is no link between c ustomer information Eastern, 
estimating at all and the physical network. Distribution Southern, 
voltages the impact on businesses use averaging or estimation London 
customers of incidents techniques at all voltage levels to calculate the 
on the network number of customers affected by a particular 
incident. For example, customers can be 
associated to the network (and therefore 
incidents) by geography or postal code. The 
method of averaging and estimating can vary 
across distribution businesses. 
HV/LV transformer There is a link between customer inforination Manweb, 
connectivity (averaging and the physical network at the HV/LV NORWEB, 
or estimating at LV transforiner, although the robustness of this link SEEBOARD, 
level) varies across distribution businesses. This means SWALEC, 
that distribution businesses are able to capture 
SWEB, 
with more accuracy the impact on customers of 
ScottishPower 
incidents on the HV network. There is still 
averaging and estimating at the LV level which 
varies across distribution businesses. 
LV circuit connectivity There is a link between customer infon-nation East Midlands, 
(averaging for phase) and the physical network at the outgoing circuit Northern, 
from the HV/LV transformer. This means that Hydro-Electric, 
distribution businesses are able to capture with Yorkshire 
much more accuracy the impact on customers of 
incidents on the LV network. There is still 
averaging at the phase level and different 
sections of the LV circuit. 
LV node connectivity There is a link between customer information Midlands 
and the physical network at the LV node. This 
means that the distribution knows which section 
of the LV circuit a customer is connected to. 
There is still averagingat the phase level. 
Phase connectivity Customers are typically connected to one of the 
three phases from the LV node. With phase 
connectivity there is a link between customer 
information and the individual phase they are 
connected to. This is the most detailed level of 
connectivity. 
Source: OFGEM, IIP: Output Measures and Monitoring Delivery between Reviews. Final Proposal. 
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A4.2: The Measurement of Cost of Capital 
Companies can be financed by both debt and equity. New funds from equity shareholders 
are obtained either from new issues of share or internally generated from retained earnings. 
Associated with each of these types of finance is a cost of capital - the cost of debt capital 
and the cost of equity capital. Since debt is paid before equity and the regulated firms are 
thought to be unlikely to default on their debt, loans to such companies are perceived safe 
investments. Naturally, debt is viewed as far less risky and the cost of debt finance is 
usually cheaper than the cost of equity finance. 
The cost of capital can be calculated as the weighted average of the cost of debt capital and 
equity capital, with the weighting being determined by the market value of the assumed 
proportion of debt and equity during the period under consideration. This is known as the 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACQ: 
WACC = 
ke E+ kd D 
D+E D+E 
where kd= cost of debt capital 
k, = cost of equity capital 
D= market value of the debt in the firm 
E= market value of the equity in the firm 
(A4.1) 
The proportion of debt to debt plus equity i. e. D/(D+E) is referred to as gearing. This 
measures the financial risk of a company's capital structure. 
The cost of debt capital can be observed from published information, but the cost of equity 
capital needs to be estimated from market data using such techniques as the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model. Regulatory decisions in UK have generally determined the cost of debt as a 
margin over the risk free rate, while the cost of equity is calculated using the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model methodology (CAPM). We adopt the same approach. 
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A4.2.1 The Cost of Debt Capital 
Concep 
The cost of debt capital is made up of two components, a risk free rate and a company 
specific debt risk premium. The risk-free interest rate is the return on a risk-free investment 
such as the index linked gilts (ILGs). Gilts are marketable securities issues by the 
government to finance its net cash requirements. On these securities, the investor receives a 
fixed rate of interest for life of the security and then the full repayment of the nominal 
capital on redemption. The company specific debt risk premium reflects the additional 
return required by the providers of debt capital to hold corporate rather than government 
debt and is estimated as a premium over the real risk free rate. It will depend on a number 
of company specific factors including the company's level of gearing and its overall 
financial position, the size and liquidity of the debt issue and its maturity, and wider 
economic factors. These factors are assessed by credit rating agencies. The agency assigns 
rating grades to individual debt issues by the degree of credit risk. The DNOs debt is 
regarded as investment grade rated i. e. represents the lowest risk. The cost of debt is a 
function of the credit rating that the debt receives. 
The cost of debt capital can be written as: 
kd= Rf+ 
where 
kd= cost of debt capital 
Rf = real risk free rate 
p= company-specific debt risk premium 
Input Data Estimation 
(A4.2) 
The cost of debt requires the risk free rate and the debt risk premium as inputs. The 
redemption yield on the UK index linked gilts (ILGs) provides a direct estimate of the real 
risk free rate for different maturities. (The redemption yield is the return one gets when 
redeeming the gilts). It is favourable to use the longest maturities of index-linked gilt 
available to match best the life of assets financed. We use a five-year instrument, which is 
consistent with the periodic review process. The data on the redemption yield obtained 
from The Debt Management Office included all index-linked gilts with five years or more 
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to maturity 43 - 
The data is based on a 3% inflation assumption from January 1998 onwards, 
whilst earlier data is based on a 5% inflation assumption. The raw data was used to 
compute the average redemption yields on ILGs over the last thirteen years. Since earl), 
1997, redemption yields on ILGS have fallen significantly and present redemption yields 
are at historically low levels. Since the fall may reflect temporary economic or market 
conditions, not a long term shift, a more appropriate estimate of the real risk free rate would 
be based an average of redemption yields over time. Thus we use the moving three-year 
average redemption yield. 
Table A4.1 summarizes the average and the three-year moving average redemption yields 
on ILGs in a time series. 
Table A4.1: Average and 3-Year Moving Average Redemption Yields on ILGs with 
Five Years or More to Maturity 






1990/91 4.22 3.86 
1991/92 4.26 4.05 
1992/93 3.97 4.15 
1993/94 3.17 3.80 
1994/95 3.81 3.65 
1995/96 3.61 3.53 
1996/97 3.60 3.67 
1997/98 3.33 3.51 
1998/99 2.51 3.15 
1999/00 2.06 2.64 
Source: Debt Management Office 
The DNOs have credits ratings above the minimum investment grade level (Baa3 and 
BBB- with Moody's and Standards & Poor's credit rating agencies respectively) (OFGEM, 
1999a). The regulator, OFGEM in its last distribution price control review, estimated the 
average debt premiums of utilities BBB rated debt at around 140 basis point, or 1.4 
percentage points over the comparable gilt (OFGEM, 1999b). It is also broadly consistent 
with the average premium for a range of BBB debt shown in the May 1999 Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin (Bank of England, 1999). However, we do not have access to 
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time senes data. Since companies in the UK have an obligation under the term of their 
license to maintain an investment grade credit rating on Its debt (OFGEMI 1999a). itwould 
be reasonable to use the average debt risk premium of 1.4 percent over the period of 
analysis i. e. 1990/91 to 1999/00. 
A4.2.2 The Cost of Equity Capital 
Concep 
The cost of equity is the cost to the company of providing equity holders with the return 
they require on their investment. The cost of equity equals the rate of return which investors 
expect to achieve on their equity holdings. 
The measurement of the equity cost of capital is much more complex than the cost of debt 
capital. The cost of equity capital can be estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). The CAPM is based on a comparison of all systematic risk of individual 
investments (shares in a particular company) and the risk of all shares in the market as a 
whole. Systematic risk is the risk that cannot be eliminated by diversifying and expanding 
the portfolio and is caused by factors affecting the whole market such as the changes in 
interest rates, exchange rates, prices, taxation etc. 
Under CAPM the cost of capital is defined as the risk free rate plus the product of the 
equity risk premium and equity beta. The equity risk premium (ERP) Is the expected return 
on equities over and above the risk free rate to be commensurate with the additional risk 
taken by the investor for investing in equities rather than risk-free securities. The ERP is the 
market-wide parameter and is not affected by firm specific factors. 
The equity beta coefficient is an adjustment to the ERP based upon the risk perception for 
the company in question. Beta is an indication of the specific riskiness of the company's 
share compared to the market. This aims to capture the sensitivity of a company's share 
price to market movements, and seeks to measure a company's non-diversifiable risk 
relative to equities generally. A share with a beta of 1.0 tends to perform in line with the 
market; one with a beta of 1.2 tends to change by 1.2% for each 1% move in the market. 
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Conversely, a share with a beta of 0.5 will on average move 0.5% for each 1% move in the 
market. 
Because the expected beta cannot be observed, beta estimates are usually based on past 
price data. Where a company's shares have a track record of being traded in a liquid stock 
market over time, historical beta can be estimated using the movements in the companyýs 
share prices and dividend payment relative to the entire stock market. The London Business 
School (LBS) publishes historical beta values estimated on monthly observations over a 5- 
year period. 
The cost of equity capital can be written as 
ke 
= Rf +P(Rm - Rf) 
where 
ke cost of equity capital 
Rf real risk free rate 
Rm expected market return 
P= equity beta (index of systematic risk for the share) 
Input Data Estimation 
(A4.3) 
The cost of equity requires the risk free rate, equity beta and the ERP as inputs. Estimation 
of the real risk free rate was discussed in the section on the cost of debt capital. 
The appropriate method of estimating the ERP has been the subject of considerable debate. 
As market returns cannot be observed, two different approaches might be taken to obtain an 
estimate of the ERP: historic returns as a proxy for future returns or survey of investors' 
expectations. A survey of institutional investors carried out by Credit Lyonnais Securities 
Europe 44 showed an implied ERP in the range of 2.4% to 4.7%, after adjusting for inflation. 
In this study we opt to use historical data as time series data was made available by 
Barclays Capita, 45 . Barclays 
Capital provided the rolling five-year ERP for 101 years 
expressed in real terms. The five year average taken was to smooth out the volatility of the 
series over time. Table A4.2 presents the rolling 5-year ERP i. e. the average excess return 
of equities relative to gilts over the last decade. 
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Table A4.2 Equity Risk Premium: Excess Return of Equities Relative to Gilts 
(5 Year Annualised) 











Source: Barclays Capital 
We obtained the beta values for the utilities from the London Business School Risk 
Measurement Service publication for the period 1990/91 to 1999/00. Since the expiry of the 
government's golden shares in the DNOs in March 1995, many of the DNOs have either 
merged or changed ownership. Many of them are investor owned (USA) or owned by the 
French Government and not publicly quoted. Using overseas betas for a UK based asset 
would give rise to estimation errors as the nature of the markets' are different. Where a 
company is not listed, conventional practice is to use other companies or sector averages as 
proxies. Therefore, we use the UK electricity sectors average beta. Table A4.3 presents the 
equity beta for the electricity industry in a time series. 
Table A4.3 Equity Beta in the UK Electricity Industry 
* Beta for the Electricity sector was not available and was estimated using the comparator sector 
figures i. e. the Oil and Gas Industry, as they have the same characteristics as the regulated 
businesses and operate in a similar environment. 
Note: The equity betas have been calculated on an equally average basis, which give identical 
weights to each company. 
Source: LBS Risk Measurement Service, Vol. 12 (Jan. 1990) to Vol. 22 (Oct. 2000). 












Whereas the risk free rate and the debt risk premium are estimated using current market 
data, the ERP and equity beta are estimated using historical data. 
A4.2.3 Adjusting for Taxation 
As well as providing a return on debt and equity in the form of interest and dividend, 
companies must also finance corporation tax payments. The cost of capital can be adjusted 
by a tax wedge to provide an allowance for corporation tax. As interest payments are 
allowable against corporation tax, the cost of debt capital does not need to be adjusted 
upwards to take account of corporation tax. The cost of equity capital needs to be adjusted 
upwards by a tax wedge to take account of mainstream rate of corporation tax. 
The cost of equity capital in (3.3) can be replaced by 
ke Rf +P(R. -Rf) II I-T 
where T is the statutory tax rate. 
(A4.4) 
OFGEM uses a pre-tax approach which includes an allowance for tax as part of the WACC. 
The data on the corporate tax rate was obtained from Inland Revenue. Table A4.4 provides 
the time series corporation tax rate. 
Table A4.4 Corporate Tax Rate 
Source: http: //www. inland. revenue. jzov. uk/stats/co! porate tax/00ap a6. htm 













A4.2.4 Capital Structure 
The level of f inancial risk a company faces is dependent on the company5 s capital structure. 
The capital structure is the general understanding of the proportion of financing provided 
by debt and by equity. The proportion of financing provided by debt is known as the 
gearing level. Increased gearing reduces costs through exploiting the tax shield (i. e. interest 
payments are tax deductible). However, a too high level of gearing might result in increased 
risk. 
The level of gearing is the final input to calculate the WACC. The actual gearing level for 
the individual DNOs is used as inputs. In theory, market values of securities and debt 
should be used in the gearing calculations as these give a more accurate measure of the 
company's economic value, although book values are frequently used in practice. The data 
on the market value of debt and equity were not accessible and thus the book values had to 
be used. 
The data on the value of debt and equity was obtained from FAME (Financial Analysis 
Made Easy) database, a leading provider of company information. The database contains 
financial information of public and private companies in the UK and Ireland derived from 
company Annual Reports. The data goes back to 1992/93. The data for 1990/91 and 
1991/92 were obtained directly from company Annual Reports using consistent definitions. 
Equity is defined as the shareholders funds that include issued capital and total reserves. 
Debt is defined as the long-term debts and liabilities plus short term loans and overdraft. 
The diagram below shows how the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is built up out 
of the components explained earlier. 
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Figure A4.1 Structure of the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
Cost of equity 
1, 




Rf = Beta R,,, - Rf Rf =P=E=D= 
Real risk - Equity Real risk- Debt risk Equity Debt 
free interest risk free interest premium capital 
rate premium rate 
k, = Rf + P*[R, -Rf ] Kd=Rf +p T= 
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43 However, the 2.5% Index-linked Convertible Stock 1999 was excluded because for most 
of its life is was very small (less than f, 2 million nominal outstanding) and so did not trade 
regularly, making its price and yield unrepresentative. 
44 Risk and Return in the UK Water Sector: An Independent Survey of Institutional 
Investors, Credit Lyonnais Securities Europe, 19 Oct 1998. 
45 Barclays Capital. Equity Gilt Study 2002. Barclays Bank PLC. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 
A5.1: Computation of the Quality Change Index 
Let us have in each period t (t=1 ... T), j 0=1 ... n) DNOs. The kthDNO consumes amounts 
xt of input i, (i=l.. m) to produce amounts yk'r each DNO ki of output r, (r-- I ... s). Assume in 
there are g' (p=l.. c) input quality attributes and ht (q=l.. d) output quality attributes. The kp kq 
indexes in (2-29) to (2.30) can be computed using the following distance functions of DNO 
k. 
The input-based distance function of DNO k at time t is the solution to the following linear 
programming problem: 
Dt(yt, bt, xtat) min 0 1 






< Og kp p=I i =: 1 
ntt 
yyrs j jr kr 
ntt 
X. h >h q=l d 




In the following distance function, note that the constraints incorporate observations from 
two periods. On the left-hand side period "t" is involved while on the right-hand side it is 
period "t+ I" 
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In the following distance function, note that only the quality constraints incorporate 
observations from two periods. On the left-hand side period "t" is involved while on the 
right-hand side it is period "t+1" 
Dt(yt, bt+', xt, at+') ]-' =minO I 
s. t. 
n 
X. xt < Oxt j ji ki 
i=l 
t <Ogt+I 1ki9 
ip - kp i =i 
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The L homogenous weight restrictions imposed in the restricted DEA model are 
included in 
the standard linear program in the following way: 
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